CLARE ELLIS

THE BLACKENING OF EUROPE

VOLUME I. IDEOLOGIES & INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS



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Orwell:

‘Every record has been destroyed or falsified, every book rewritten, every picture has been repainted, every statue and street and building has been renamed, every date has been altered. And that process is continuing day by day and minute by minute. History has stopped. Nothing exists except an endless present in which the Party is always right.’

Camus:

‘The non-existence of races, like the non-existence of classes, is indispensable for the industrial production of *l’homme remplaçable*: replaceable man; exchangeable man; decultivated, decivilised, denationalised, and unrooted, such as needed by and for generalised exchange: of man with man, of man with woman, of people with people, of animals with things, of man with machines, with prosthesis and with objects — the post-human condition.’

Faye:

‘European nations are victims of a surreptitious attempt at genocide, demographic and cultural elimination, driven by their own ethnomasochist and xenophile elites. A first in history.’

Orbán:

‘Europe is not free, because freedom begins with speaking the truth. In Europe today it is forbidden to speak the truth.’

Introduction

Indigenous Europeans are becoming demographic and political minorities in European nation-states. Europeans, understood as White, are already a world minority as a race. Out of about 7.7 billion people worldwide approximately one billion *people* are considered White; this means that Whites comprise less than 13% of the world population. Whites also have the lowest birth-rates in the world. For a population to exactly replace itself through births, the total fertility rate must be 2.1. The total fertility rate for the European Union is around 1.6, whereas the global average is 2.5, with the continent of Africa having the highest fertility rate in the world at 4.7.[1] However, it is not the low fertility rate of Europeans that renders them ethnic minorities within their own nations, but elite-sanctioned large-scale non-European immigration, which began about sixty years ago and which is now integral to the cosmopolitan EU project. Already in this short time, many cities and towns throughout the EU have become majority non-white and, as trends continue, by the end of this century, non-white peoples will come to represent the absolute majority population of entire European countries and the EU as a whole. When this majority-minority shift occurs, there will be an unprecedented transfer of political power from European peoples to non-Europeans, essentially signalling the final endpoint of Europeans' sovereignty over their ancestral homelands. Even now, while they still make up the majority of their national populations, indigenous Europeans and their traditional political and cultural institutions and identities are undergoing processes of erasure — stigmatisation,

marginalisation, deprivation, and replacement — by mandated immigration*ism*, multicultural*ism*, and other methods of forced diversification, while resistance to their political and cultural marginalisation and demographic dispossession is criminalised.

Although indigenous Europeans are facing these historically unprecedented transformations to their nations, identities, and institutions under the EU project, critical academic views are lacking that seriously and fairly address these issues or place them within the framework of international law. It is my view that this is due to the ideologies of Liberalism and Leftism, which have been dominant in academy since at least the end of WWII, and which favour and encourage European marginalisation and dispossession through immigration. I therefore would like to provide a much-needed critical perspective that identifies the root causes and central ideologies behind indigenous European decline, and to frame these within international law. The intention of my research is to expose, through critical analysis, any ideological bias, inherent flaws, ethical issues, democratic deficits, absence of understanding, and deliberate ignorance of pertinent data and known theories regarding the short- and long-term adverse consequences of the experiment[2] of mass-immigration and cosmopolitan integration within the EU. Overall, my research aims to raise new questions, apply existing theories to a new context, and unblock progress towards much-needed critical academic debates and investigations about the causes and long-term negative consequences of the decline of ethnic Europeans in Europe.

As such, this book (Volumes I, II and III) provides both past and present geopolitical and ideological causes, as well as other contributing factors, that have created the conditions for indigenous European political and demographic decline. It demonstrates that the EU project, including its attempts towards a Euro-Mediterranean Union, is a politically engineered cosmopolitan project rooted in anti-nationalism, the erasure of ethno-national identities, and the severing of political power and sovereignty from indigenous Europeans. It clearly shows that demographic engineering through Leftist and Liberal immigration policies is central to this project. Through demographic and politically engineered cosmopolitanism, European nation-states are transformed into open, multi-ethnic societies and

European peoples are reduced to ethnic and political minorities within their own homelands. In addition to the cosmopolitan EU project, this book also makes evident that Neoconservative foreign policies have contributed to the opening of Europe to widespread social and political problems associated with violent and non-violent forms of political Islam as well as Leftist-Third World alliances against European power structures and identities. Since all of these developments (the EU cosmopolitan project and the inroads of Neoconservatism, Islamism, and Third Worldism) directly contribute to the political marginalisation and demographic dispossession of Europeans and create the conditions for ethnic civil war in Europe, this book also provides an analysis of how they violate various rights of native Europeans as well as international laws that prohibit genocide in any form.

> A concerted and long-term attack against the civilization of white, European and North American man has been launched, and the attack is not confined to the political, social and cultural institutions that characterize the civilization but extends also to the race that created the civilization and continues to carry and transmit it today. The war against white civilization sometimes (indeed often) invokes liberal ideals as its justification and as its goal, but the likely reality is that the victory of the racial revolution will end merely in the domination or destruction of the white race and its civilization by the non-white peoples — if only for demographic reasons due to non-white immigration and the decline of white birthrates.[3]

Part I: Central Influences on the Formation of the European Union

1. Early European Integration

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, after constant conflict between European nations, notions of Perpetual Peace, cosmopolitanism, European confederation, and World federalism became increasingly popular among the cultural and political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. These ideas essentially influenced European integration in the Twentieth century. One of the most prominent initial ideas for European integration was the notion of a United States of Europe. George Washington (1732–1799), the first president of the United States of America, supported the idea.[4] In a letter to Marquis de LaFayette, he wrote that 'One day, taking its pattern from the United States, there will be founded the United States of Europe'.[5] In 1849, at the third International Peace Conference in Paris, a notable French Romantic, the poet, novelist, and dramatist Victor Hugo (1802–1885), echoed these sentiments, saying that A day will come when all nations on our continent will form a European brotherhood. … A day will come when we shall see … the United States of America and the United States of Europe face to face, reaching out for each other across the seas.[6]
Meanwhile, in 1756 a plan for European integration based on disarmament and peace titled *A Project for Perpetual Peace* had been outlined by French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), who wrote that '[i]t is not possible ... the confederacy being once established, that any seeds of hostility can remain amongst the confederates'.[7] His work was based on Abbe de Saint-Pierre's *Project for a Perpetual Peace* (1713) who greatly desired European federation in the context of international peace.[8] The work of Saint-Pierre also influenced many others, including renowned German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).

Less than thirty years after the publication of Rousseau's perpetual peace essay, Kant published his essay 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim' (1784), a pretext to his famous essay 'Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch' (1795). In the former essay he explained that the conflict of interests, or Hobbesian state of nature, between individuals and nations was what drove human progress and would, through

cooperation, mutual recognition, and self-discipline, lead to a future cosmopolitan ideal, a federation of states in perpetual peace.[9] In the latter essay, the basis for this peace included three principles or Definitive Articles he outlined in Section Two: • the civil constitution of every state should be republican; • the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states; • the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.[10]

Signalling the trend in eighteenth-century philosophical ideations of perpetual peace, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham suggested in Part IV of his *Principles of International Law* (1786–1789), titled 'A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace', that disarmament, arbitration, and the renunciation of colonies would produce a lasting peace — proposals also found in Kant's Preliminary Articles outlined in Section One of his 'Toward Perpetual Peace'.[11]

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries peace movements and cosmopolitanism became prevalent in Britain and America. Anti-war organizations sprang up in 1815–1816 and evolved into the London and American Peace Societies, which aimed at gradual disarmament. Cosmopolitanism in early twentieth century America went further, focusing on racial equality, liberal immigration, and a universal national identity. Organizations based on anti-discrimination, pro-immigration, and anti-nationalism were established, such as the American Liberal Progressive Movement (1905) and the Immigrant Protective Association (1908). Several European organisations in the early twentieth century openly supported the notion of a United States of Europe, such as the British Quaker Pacifists (1910), the National Peace League (1911), and the European Unity League (1913). Cosmopolitanism also drove academic pressure groups to attack 'the nationalist canon', such as the British Union of Democratic Control (UDC, 1914).[12] During the interwar period cosmopolitan books written by the UDC were 'derisive of nationalist shibboleths' and could be found in English and American universities.[13]

1.1 Kalergi's Paneuropean Movement

Anti-national, cosmopolitan, and liberal progressive notions of a peaceful and united Europe soon coalesced into a socialist and geopolitical project in

the interwar era (post-WWI) called the Paneuropean Movement, founded in 1922 by Count Richard Nikolaus Eijiro von Coudenhove-Kalergi (from here on, Kalergi). Kalergi (1894–1972) was an Austro-Hungarian cosmopolitan geopolitician and philosopher.[14] His mother, Mitsuko Aoyama, was a wealthy Japanese woman, and his father, Heinrich, was a Bohemian noble, coming from a family of mixed European heritage (Flemish, Czech, Austrian, Hungarian, and Greek) and a long line of nobility (800-year-old oligarchical family). Kalergi wrote numerous books and articles about European integration over his lifetime. His first book was titled *Adel* (1922), translated as *Nobility*; this work, along with *Pazifismus* (1924), was the basis for his book *Praktischer Idealismus: Adel–Technik–Pazifismus* or *Practical Idealism: Nobility–Technique–Pacifism* (1925). It was these books, along with his 1922 article 'Pan-Europa — A Proposal' and his book *Pan-Europa* (1923), that marked the beginning of the Pan European movement. His monthly journal *Paneuropa* (1924–1938) and books, *The Fight for Paneuropa* (1925–1928, three volumes) and *Europa Erwacht* (*Europe Awakened*, 1934) among other works, further elaborated his exposition on European integration.

Kalergi is often considered the founding father of the European Union. He was the recipient of the first Charlemagne Prize in 1950 and today the European Coudenhove-Kalergi Prize is awarded every two years to 'leading personalities for their extraordinary commitment in the European unification process'.[15] In addition to the Coudenhove-Kalergi Prize, the Europe Square in Germany, a gold euro coin, an Austrian peace monument and stamp, the European anthem (Beethoven, 'Ode to Joy'), and a Viennese park, honour and testify to Kalergi's legacy as a major figurehead in the integration process of Europe.[16] The Paneuropean Movement continues to influence European unity to this day.[17]

Some of Kalergi's main intellectual influences were Oswald Spengler, Rudolf Kjellén (a Swede who coined the term 'geopolitics' and influenced Hitler), Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche. A vital inspiration to his Paneuropean ideology came from the Austrian noble prize laureate, freemason,[18] and pacifist, Alfred Hermann Fried, who founded the German Peace Society and wrote *Pan-Amerika*, which allowed for the preservation of national identity (1910).[19] Yet Kalergi was a staunch anti-nationalist and supported the creation of a New World Order based on a federation of

federations. The integration of Europe, a Pan-Europa, was merely the *first step* towards this world government.

1.1.1 Historical and Political Context

Kalergi founded the Paneuropean Movement through 'grassroots organising';[20] it was a movement that was intimately linked to the liberal progressive cosmopolitanism of the peace movements[21] and arose as a response to World War I. This war was partly the result of Germany's ascendancy to power in the nineteenth century, which altered the existing power status quo. Beginning in the sixteenth century and led by the English, European countries formed alliances in an attempt to collectivize self-defence and maintain peace. These pacts came to be known as the 'balance of powers' and sought to prevent one nation from achieving hegemony over Europe and creating a single Universal Monarchy. It required a repetitive changing of alliances to restrain any ambitions for dominance. After the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815 — the French military and political leader who was an influential figure in the French Revolution and had, through the Napoleonic Wars, established dominance throughout much of continental Europe — this balance of powers led to several arrangements between European nations to prevent further French aggression and maintain peace in Europe. These agreements included the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815),[22] which set the national boundaries in Europe and produced a loose agreement between the United Kingdom, Prussia, Russia, and Austria (the Quadruple Alliance) and later France (the Quintuple Alliance) called the Concert of Europe, which aimed to preserve the political and territorial arrangements.[23] However, this balance of powers gradually eroded during the nineteenth century because of growing economic and political rivalries between European nations and was replaced by temporary and shifting alliances, such as the Triple Alliance (1882–1915) between Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary.[24]

Prior to 1871 a federated nation called Germany did not yet exist, although Germans were the largest ethnic group at the time. On eighteenth January 1871, after Napoleon III of France declared war (1870) against Prussia and lost, twenty-five German states were formally integrated administratively and politically into the new nation-state of Germany, called

the German Reich (1871–1918). This German Empire, founded by the conservative Prussian statesman, Otto von Bismarck, was ruled by the King of Prussia (1861–1888), Wilhelm I of Prussia (1871–1888), who was officially made Emperor of Germany at the Versailles Palace's Hall of Mirrors in France.[25] By 1900 Germany had the largest economy in Europe, and by 1913 (along with America) its exports of steel dominated the world market, placing Britain in third place.[26] This meant that Germany had become a huge economic menace, and, as it developed its Imperial Navy (Kaiserliche Marine), which was seen by the British as a threat to their Royal Navy, it further altered the existing balance of powers in Europe. In 1907 France, Britain, and Russia formed an alliance called the Triple Entente to counter the Triple Alliance between Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. These two opposing groups of allies were central to the outbreak of WWI.[27]

At the end of WWI, allied victors set the terms of peace for the defeated powers at the Paris Peace Conference (1919). This conference led to the development of an intergovernmental organisation, the League of Nations, which was informed by Atlantic world federalism and peace movements. Drafts for the League of Nations were submitted by Britain (Phillimore Commission), America (President Woodrow Wilson),[28] and the South African and British Commonwealth statesman, Jan Smuts.[29] The final draft was signed by forty-four states on 28th June 1919 and the League of Nations was officially established on 10th January 1920. The League aimed at, among other things, peace by disarmament and international arbitration. However, during the early 1920s and 1930s Europe split into three divisive political ideologies that influenced European relations for decades to come: liberal democracy (France and Britain), communism (Russia, who split from Europe in 1917 signified by the Bolshevik Revolution), and authoritarian nationalism or fascism (Italy and Germany).

In this European climate of war, fascism, 'nationalistic pretensions', and hostility between Germany and France,[30] Kalergi wrote that

> Europe as a political concept does not exist. The part of the world with that name covers peoples and States in chaos, a powder keg of international conflicts, the breeding ground of future conflicts. This is the European Question: the mutual hatred of Europeans for each other poisons the international atmosphere and is a perpetual worry to even the most peace-loving countries of the world. ... The European Question will be resolved only by the union of the peoples of

> Europe. This will come about either voluntarily, by the construction of a pan-European federation or coercively by Russian conquest. … The greatest obstacle to the realisation of the United States of Europe is the thousand-year rivalry between the two most populous nations of Pan-Europe: Germany and France.[31]

Hostilities between France and Germany had a long history[32] but were greatly inflamed after the defeat of Germany in WWI. France sent colonial troops numbering between 20,000 and 45,000[33] from Madagascar, West Africa, Morocco, and Algeria to occupy the German Rhineland, a position that was considered by the Germans (and other Europeans) as the 'Black horror on the Rhine'.[34] The occupation by Black soldiers was considered an affront to German identity and culture because Blacks were considered as 'unreliable savages who posed great danger, especially for the German female and juvenile population'.[35] The German president at the time, Friedrich Ebert stated that 'the deployment of coloured troops of the most inferior culture as overseers of a population of such high spiritual and economic importance as the Rhinelanders is an intolerable violation of the law of European civilization'.[36] Yet this was just one of the first among many assaults that were to come that targeted German ethnic identity in the twentieth century. In fact, race became a central factor of European relations, not just between France and Germany,[37] but also between European liberal cosmopolitanism and those that opposed this political ideology.

1.1.2 Ideology

Kalergi perceived the interwar period as a vital time to prevent another Great War and the destruction of European and Western civilization. He felt that Europe was endangered by European ethnonationalism, particularly National Socialism, as well as the 'Bolshevik danger'[38] and an American 'economic and cultural threat'.[39] He thought it was a time of choice between 'integration or collapse', between 'perpetual war or perpetual peace' and warned of a 'future war' that could see American and Soviet powers taking over Europe.[40] His remedy for these ills and forebodings was a Pan-Europe aimed toward peace.

There were three main kinds of reasons a Pan-Europe was imperative for Kalergi and his supporters: political, cultural, and economic-geopolitical. The political reasons aimed at peace, at 'prevent[ing] a repetition of the

First World War' and the defence of Europe against Bolshevism.[41] The cultural reasons were embedded in an 'argument for civilization', which held that 'Europe was a spiritual unity owning a specific Weltanschauung',[42] and were motivated by the 'real protection of minorities and real equality between the nations of Europe'.[43] The economic reasons focused on 'European free trade or European customs union' and stemmed from a desire to 'prevent economic ruin' in the face of strong US and Soviet Russia economies. These latter economies had grown due to their continental organization, but in comparison, Europe, which was politically divided and suffered from trade barriers, had weaker economic might.[44] European economic, cultural and political integration into a Pan-Europa would thus enable it 'to regain its place as a dominant power on a par with the others'.[45] In other words, Kalergi envisioned a united Europe that would protect and strengthen European economic and political powers at the geopolitical level and enable Europe to be of equal strength to Soviet Russia, the British Commonwealth, and the United States of America — a sort of international balance of powers.

Europe as a world power related to Kalergi's vision, shared by many of his contemporaries and having roots in the distant past, of a 'future world federation of humanity'.[46] He clarifies the essential aim of the Pan European movement in his book *Pan-Europa* (1923): [I]f world organisation is to take the place of world anarchy then the first step must be for the states to form themselves into super-states … so the unification of Europe will be a necessary state on the road to a united humanity.[47]

Writing in 1931, he further elaborated this goal: 'The great aim … is to make European boundaries invisible' which will lead to European peace and prosperity, conditions that are necessary for the defence of Western civilization and the creation of 'the real universal State', a future where 'nationalism on a narrow basis' has been replaced by a 'patriotism for large areas of the world' and where the 'Atlantic brotherhood' has paved the way to 'the future federation of humanity'.[48] A unified Europe without national boundaries was a first step towards the cosmopolitan federation of the world.

In order to realise a federated Europe and a world federation, Kalergi suggested that the League of Nations be modelled as a 'federation of

federations' and that the European Union be modelled after the original League of Nations, a 'federation of states' — something that Aristide Briand, a leading statesman of France, had already been working on. This 'federation of federations' would be based on the division of the world into five political blocs, or what Kalergi termed 'the five great parts of the world — the British Commonwealth, Pan-America, Pan-Europe, Eastern Asia, and the Soviet Union'. These five blocs in a 'federation of federations' would enable a 'balance of power in the world', a necessary arrangement to 'prevent any one part of the world from obtaining hegemony over another'. So, the first step towards creating a world federation was the federation of European states that would represent a third collaborative Atlantic power (on par with the British Commonwealth and with Pan-America) acting in concert to 'save Western civilization from the great dangers now threatening it'. At this time, Kalergi did not think that Britain would join the Pan European Union (PEU) because it was the 'head of a federation which covered a quarter of humanity', i.e. the British Commonwealth, which was much larger than Europe.[49] However, this position of the British was affected by the Atlantic Treaty (see below).

1.1.3 Ethnonationalism Sterilised for Mischief

Although European federation was to be based on the collective economic, cultural, militaristic, and political defence of Europe, Kalergi wanted Europe to disarm, to replace militaristic forces with peace forces so it could progress culturally in concord and equality. By 'creating a new public opinion, by showing the European a new ideal and common interests'[50] he thought he could create a socially conservative European democracy that united the European peoples and nations in peace. In this vein, he argued that Europe had a shared historical identity that could be renewed: Historically, culturally and ethically, the unity of Europe was a real unity, temporarily obliterated in later centuries by religious divisions and the conception of linguistic patriotisms. If these narrow patriotisms could be weakened by a common European patriotism, the underlying central conditions of unity would reappear.[51]

However, it can be argued against Kalergi that there was no concept of modern patriotism and no theorising of national identity until the French

Revolution, which created a sense of national citizenship.[52] More importantly there was never any 'real unity' in Europe, no common cosmopolitan identity that existed in European history other than its Christian and Greco-Roman heritages. The Leiden University Institute for History writes that in a world of constantly changing borders, strong local political traditions, profitable transnational trade, and dense networks of international relations, 'identity' was never monolithic, even if a recognizably European intellectual culture, which played an essential role in the transfer of knowledge, religious and political ideas, always prevailed.[53]

Regardless of these facts, the new European patriotism based on an imagined common historical, cultural, and moral unity required the cleansing of language-based and ethnic elements of national patriotism that were perceived as being incompatible to European peace. For Kalergi, 'Europe as a cultural unity was … not so much a matter of political, historical, or racial identification, but a matter of morals and of style'.[54] Paneuropeanism was a method to overcome 'egocentric nationalism' based on race and culture.[55] Indeed, Kalergi envisioned a future of race mixing:

> The man of the future will be of mixed race. Today's races and castes will gradually disappear owing to the vanishing of space, time, and prejudice. The Eurasian-Negroid race of the future, similar in its appearance to the Ancient Egyptians, will replace the diversity of peoples with a diversity of individuals.[56]

Kalergi sought to replace individual national ideals of ethnic communities, ethno-national European identities, with an ethnically mixed European patriotism, a 'common European nationalism' based on a common European culture and identity, 'a kind of "supra-national" nationalism' rather than a balance of powers between the European nations.[57] He wrote that 'Europe is one big nation that is divided into branches; racist nationalities see only the branches and think they are trees because, semi-cultured as they are, they are unable to see the trunk'.[58] He thought nationalism 'is the product of bourgeois semi-culture' and wrote: Just as aristocrats nourished their self-esteem through the disdain of the bourgeois, so the bourgeois began using the newly discovered nationalism in order to thoroughly despise all other nations. In some way, every nation sees itself as the chosen people, as Grande Nation, as the salt of the earth.[59]

Kalergi rejected European 'national "egocentricity"' as 'a kind of chauvinist universalism attempting to dominate the others'[60] and thought that ethno-nationalists and national boundaries were 'the principal obstacle to his ideas' and 'a primary cause of war and human misery'.[61] To solve cultural-historical national rivalries (particularly those of France and Germany) and attain European integration and perpetual peace, 'existing patriotisms' had to be 'sterilised for mischief' while retaining those elements that are 'for good'.[62] In response to Kalergi's plan, the Hungarian-Jewish and British politician and journalist Leo Amery, also a cosmopolitan,[63] suggested that Pan-Europe could help the League of Nations by 'separating out purely European causes of friction, thus making the League more truly universal and easier for the United States to join'.[64] A first step in this plan was the neutralisation of French and German nationalisms and their renewal of friendly relations.[65]

This creation of a new Europe, based on new ideals of social democracy rather than feudal aristocracy and a new European identity deprived of its ethno-national characteristics, would be overseen, according to Kalergi, by a 'social aristocracy of the spirit'.[66] He claimed that the traits required for the spiritual aristocratic leadership of the new Europe — '[s]trength of character combined with sharpness of spirit' — can *only* be found in the Jewish people. These traits, according to Kalergi, 'predestine' Jews 'to be leaders of urban humanity, the protagonists of capitalism as well as the revolution'. In other words, the central leaders of both capitalism and socialism were Jewish. But, it is only 'the Jewish Socialist leaders' who 'want to redeem us with the highest self-denial from the original sin of capitalism, free people from injustice, violence and serfdom and change the liberated world into an earthly paradise'.[67] Further, he wrote:

> [t]he influence of the nobility of blood decreases, the influence of the nobility of spirit is growing. Such a development, and with it the chaos of modern politics, will find its end only when an aristocracy of spirit will seize the reins of society's power: by seizing powder, gold, and printing ink to devote to the welfare of the community.'[68]

It would not be the European aristocrats that would lead the new Europe to unification and finally world federation; rather it would be the interplay of the leaders of both Jewish capitalism and Jewish socialism alone who

would take over and dominate the forces of European power and determine its destiny.

1.1.4 Eurafrica

Kalergi claimed that for the full materialisation of a united and prosperous Europe national colonialism needed to be replaced by the joint colonization and exploitation of the resources and land of the African colonies. This would lead to the creation of Eurafrica, a large geopolitical bloc that had the Mediterranean Sea as its central axis and would encompass (and Europeanise) nations in the African and Muslim world south of the Mediterranean. Africa was seen as part of the geopolitical sphere of Europe, a link that needed to be strengthened. Kalergi believed that European federation required the proper exploitation of 'common resources' so that Europe could develop its 'great African territories', which, in turn, would enable Europe to become 'capable of living for itself'.[69] Essentially, Kalergi thought that it was only through a joint colonization of Africa, rather than national colonial projects, that Europe could fully develop its 'economic and political potential' and prosperity and sustainability 'for all' could be realised.[70]

In 1929 Kalergi coined the term 'Eurafrica'. In the 1920s a movement known as Eurasianism was popular among the Russian émigré community and one of its key proponents was Prince Nicolas S. Trubetzkoy (1890–1938), representative of the Prague Circle. He promoted the notion that Russia did not belong to Europe (since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution) but rather has 'cultural affinities' with Asians and forms, along with its Asian colonies, Eurasia, a geographical and geopolitical region which stretches to the Pacific Ocean.[71] Kalergi rejected the idea of Eurasia because it was 'anti-European' but agreed that Russia should not be part of Europe. He considered that Soviet communism was incompatible with European liberalism and wrote that Communism is more than just a 'state system' but is also 'a new form of religion, like Islam in its day, and wants to conquer the world for its idea'.[72] It was in this context that he promoted the idea of Eurafrica.

According to the German philosopher Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, Kalergi's notion of Eurafrica was 'an extended version of Europe', such that 'Europe

stretches from Angola to Spitzbergen' and the Mediterranean would be 'Europe's axis and not its border'. In this scheme, Eurafrica was 'the multilateral relationship between six European states and their dependencies overseas'. It was a 'purely imperialistic' enterprise according to Botz-Bornstein, as it suggested that 'millions of Europeans' should settle in the African colonies because 'the fatherland had become too narrow', too over-populated, and land and resources were needed. It also proposed that 'the colonies would become the main providers of raw materials [and thus a source of wealth] for the empire', resources that would include hydroelectric power and agricultural produce.[73]

The African colonies would also be 'Europeanized' along with other 'regions should they enter the Paneuropean Community (like Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan)' as this would be necessary 'for the coherence of Europe as a geopolitical and cultural body'.[74] In *Europa Erwacht* (1934) Kalergi thought that 'the Arab population of Africa' will eventually 'adopt the European way of life'.[75] Although Kalergi thought it necessary for Europe to exploit and settle Africa, he did not intend large-scale immigration and settlement in Europe by African peoples: 'Europe must at all costs prevent "that great numbers of black workers and soldiers immigrate to Europe"'.[76] Furthermore, Kalergi was concerned about over-population in Europe and sought a solution in the settlement of African colonies by surplus European populations. He also considered that European culture was separate and distinct from the other cultures of the world, such as Islam. This too points to the fact that he did not intend for large-scale immigration into Europe from non-European peoples, especially from Africa and the Muslim Middle East.

The supranational Paneuropean and Eurafrica project of Kalergi represented the birth of a third geopolitical power that he assumed would create a balance of powers in the world. In 1931 all colonial powers except for Britain were invited to the Colonial Exposition in Paris to display their colonial possessions and this was to be followed by European cooperation in the African colonies themselves.[77]

1.1.5 Funding, Support, Leadership, and Opposition

Kalergi's Paneuropean project was directly funded by wealthy bankers, and supported by politicians and cultural forces on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1924 Kalergi's friend Austrian Baron Louis Nathaniel de Rothschild introduced him to Hamburg banker Max Warburg, who offered 60,000 gold marks to fund the first three years of the movement; Warburg and Kalergi remained in 'constant intellectual dialogue' thereon in.[78] Max then introduced him to his brothers Felix and Paul Warburg and the American financier, Bernard Baruch in 1925. Robert Bosch, a German industrialist, '[w]as so impressed by Coudenhove that he set up the Pan-Europe Development Fund'.[79] According to American author and education consultant David J. Peterson, the Paneuropean Movement was also 'provided financial support and promoted' by the 'Thurn und Taxis, Wittlesbachs, Hapsburgs and Kalergi families'.[80]

Kalergi also had the support of many important statesmen, political figureheads, and cultural elites in Britain and Europe. Three years after he founded the Paneuropean Movement he brought thousands of leading European elites together at the First Pan-European Congress (Vienna, 1926). By the mid twentieth century, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, French Prime Minister Leon Blum, and Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi were perceived as the 'five Presidents of Honour' of the Pan European Union.[81] Austrian Chancellor Ignaz Seipel provided the Pan-Europa Movement with headquarters in Hofburg Palace and was President of this Austrian branch of the PEU, and support followed from Austrian Chancellors Engelbert Dollfuß and Kurt Schuschnigg, President of Austria Karl Renner, and Archduke of Austria Otto von Habsburg. In France endorsement came from French politician Louis Loucheur, who became president of the movement in France in 1927, and from Prime Ministers Leon Blum, Eduard Herriot, Charles de Gaulle, and Aristide Briand. Briand spoke in favour of a federal Europe in his speech at the League of Nations, 8 September 1929, and in his *Memorandum on the Organisation of a Regime of European Federal Union* (1930). In Germany, foreign minister and Nobel Prize laureate[82] Gustav Stresemann, German socialist and President of the Reichstag Paul Lobe, and numerous pacifists, novelists, and socialists, such as Kurt Hiller, and Heinrich and Thomas Mann, agreed to the Union.[83] The PEU was also endorsed by many other

prominent authors, playwrights, poets, and novelists, such as Paul Valéry, Gerhart Hauptmann, Rainer Maria Rilke, Stefan Zweig, Franz Werfel, and Arthur Schnitzler, and scientists, such as Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud.[84]

Opposition to Pan-Europa was prevalent among the Fascist nationalists of Italy and the National Socialists of Germany in the 1920s and 30s, which essentially revealed the continued divisions in historical-political relations among European nation-states at the time. It was a conflict between the political ideologies of cosmopolitanism, which aimed to undermine European ethnicity, and political or ethnonationalism.[85] Kalergi approached Benito Mussolini twice, in May 1933 and 1936, in an attempt to sway him to the movement, but Mussolini was more interested in discussing fascism in Europe.[86] In Germany, university professor Ewald Geißler complained that the idea of a Pan-Europe was not new but 'always shows its face when France is very near to its highest political goal: Rule over Europe',[87] and Adolf Hitler called Kalergi a 'cosmopolitan bastard'.[88] In return, Kalergi showed his disdain for Hitler by saying 'I do not believe anything good or noble can come from such a vulgar physiognomy'.[89] In the mean time, anti-fascists before and during the Second World War published works calling for the 'sterilisation' and 'outbreeding' of the German race so to rid Europe of the German ethno-national identity manifested in National Socialism, which was perceived as an obstacle to the cosmopolitan plan for European integration.[90]

1.2 American Influence and Further Eurafrican Development, 1945–1970

With the Fall of France in 1940 Kalergi fled to New York and between 1942 and 1945 he taught as assistant professor of History at New York University. While there, he propagated his ideas and set up a Research Seminar for a Federative Postwar Europe, which was assisted by Senator William Fulbright, the leader of the American Committee for a Free and United Europe.[91] After WWII Kalergi returned to Europe and a year later he co-founded the Pan European Union (PEU, 1946) with Archduke Otto von Hapsburg in Switzerland. At this time, Paneuropean pacifist ideology and socialist cosmopolitanism resurfaced in Europe, manifesting in

organisations such as the United European Movement, the French Council for a United Europe, the European League for Economic Co-operation, the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe, and the European Union of Federalists. All of these organizations contributed to the 'social capital necessary for realisation' of the PEU and were connected to the institutions that developed the European Union.[92]

In Zürich on September 19, 1946 Winston Churchill delivered a speech that he had prepared and Kalergi had overseen. In this speech Churchill suggested the necessity of post-World War II European integration to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.[93]

He also spoke of an 'enlarged patriotism and common citizenship' as well as the 'first steps' towards the European Union, 'a partnership between France and Germany', 'a Council of Europe' and the development of 'the United Nations Organization'.[94] Under the rubric of the United Nations, Kalergi founded the European Parliamentary Union (EPU) in 1947, of which he was the General Secretary. The EPU was another grassroots initiative that began with an enquiry by Kalergi (Nov 1946–spring 1947) who sent letters to almost 4000 members of European parliaments asking them if they agreed to the 'establishment of a European federation within the framework of the United Nations'; 612 responded favourably.[95] In March 1947 Kalergi declared that governments who do not wish to unionise should be defeated by those who do: 'some of the most important of these committees soon embrace parliamentary majorities, strong enough to compel their governments to go ahead towards union, and to overthrow those who refuse'.[96] This followed the kind of thinking by British PM Clement Attlee who delivered a speech in 1939 to Labour MPs and candidates and coined the phrase 'Europe must federate or perish!', a type of thinking that was also echoed by James Paul Warburg in 1950 (February 17th), who addressed the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, saying: We shall have world government, whether or not we like it. The question is only whether world government will be achieved by consent or by conquest. Today we are faced with a divided world — its two halves glowering at each other across the iron curtain. The world's two

superpowers — Russia and the United States — are entangled in the vicious circle of an arms race, which more and more preempts energies and resources sorely needed to lay the foundations of enduring peace.[97]

Although Kalergi founded some of the fundamental building blocks that eventually gave rise to the European Union we know today, two scholars, Daniel C. Villanueva and Michael Gehler, suggest that the Pan European Movement and Union were appropriated by people who wished to use it for their own ends. Villanueva, Honors Program professor at the University of Nevada, writes that 'technocrats, politicians, and lawyers rather than intellectuals' took over the movement and Kalergi 'became increasingly marginalised' as a voice of direction for the PEU.[98] Gehler, professor of contemporary history at the University of Innsbruck, writes that 'politicians such as Aristide Briand, Julius Curtius and Ignaz Seipel … [were] hijacking, and misusing, Pan-Europe to suit their own ends'.[99] Although these claims may be true,[100] it was clear that Briand was well thought of by Kalergi: Briand pushed for Paneuropean cosmopolitanism at the European parliament, which Kalergi mentioned favourably, and Briand was praised in Winston Churchill's 1946 speech in Zürich, which was overseen by Kalergi. Yet while Kalergi wanted 'an imagined common European culture [that] mitigates against military solutions to differences of opinion over specific governmental forms and regimes' and strove towards European integration based on an ideal of peace that required European disarmament, influential post-war West German leaders and integrationists, Kurt Schumacher and Konrad Adenauer, wanted to rearm Europe via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[101]

1.2.1 American Intellectual and Financial Involvement

Part of the European reconstruction process in the post-War era involved American support for the unification of Europe into a United States of Europe. American President Harry Truman (1945–1953) and his successor General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) encouraged European unification and under their leadership US policymakers conceived European unification 'as a way to solve the German problem'.[102] At this time, Kalergi, among others, feared a Fourth Reich emerging in Germany that would become the 'mouthpiece of pan-Germanism', both of which had

to be prevented for the realisation of his (and others) unification goals. For Kalergi, the unification of Europe was only possible ‘if Germany’s political structure is radically changed, shifting sovereignty from the Reich to the states, while integrating German production into the general system of a pan-European market’.[103] He thought that a unified Europe was ‘the only force capable of competing successfully with pan-Germanism and with world revolution’ and that only with ‘American support’ can ‘the dangerous vacuum in the German soul, resulting from the breakdown of old ideals, be filled with the fascinating vision of a new European community based on fraternal ties’.[104] Kalergi was certainly not alone in thinking that American involvement was integral to European integration.

There were several movements in Europe (as well as in Canada and the United States) for European integration in the wake of WWII and they were brought together at The Hague Congress in 1948 to discuss the development of a political, economic, and monetary European Union. This Congress was organized by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, which was presided over by Winston Churchill and in late 1948 came to be known as the European Movement.[105] Under the initiative of the President of the European Movement, Paul Henri-Spaak, a Harvard University-based and directed special task force, a Committee of Experts, was created in the 1950s to ‘guide’ the ‘step-by-step, gradualist progression’ of European political integration in the core European countries (France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux states).[106] It was co-headed by Carl Friedrich, an adviser to the American military governor in Germany and a member of wartime planning and organisation regarding the US military occupation of Germany, and by Robert Bowie, the legal counsel to the US High Commission in occupied Germany and overviewer of negotiations regarding the early European Coal and Steel Committee and European Defence Community.[107] According to a member of the Harvard Committee of Experts, Canadian lawyer Edward McWhinney, the group ‘prepared advice and draft action programmes for the European leaders’ and heavily influenced the ‘operational methodology’ of the New Europe.[108]

American influence on European integration was not confined to advice, but extended also to financial support. Much of this monetary support was covert, in what some have called the ‘Liberal Conspiracy’.[109] Richard J. Aldrich, professor of International Security at the University of Warwick,

wrote that Europe received a ‘discreet injection of over three million dollars between 1949 and 1960, mostly from US government sources’, and this money was the main impetus for eliciting ‘mass support for the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community and a European Assembly’ with the aim of overcoming ‘the staunch resistance of the British Labour government to federalist ideas’. The covert American financial operations in postwar Europe were channelled through the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE), which was organised in 1948 by the Central Intelligence Agency and National Safety Council associate Allen Welsh Dulles as well as the former head of the Office of Strategic Services, William J. Donovan (Wild Bill), both of whom were responding to Kalergi and Churchill who had requested assistance.[110] In the meantime, the European notion of Eurafrica continued to be advocated and institutionalised in the post-war era.

The Congress of Europe (The Hague, 1948) considered the development of African colonies an ‘imperative necessity’ and a ‘collective benefit’ for a war-devastated Europe to emerge as ‘a “third force” in world politics’.[111] When the Labour Party came to power in Britain the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin ‘launched his bid to establish a “Third World Power”’ involving the integration of the African colonies and their resources ‘into a Western European power sphere able to withstand a world order dictated by the United States and the Soviet Union’.[112] Bevin wanted to compete with the US, and even envisioned Americans being ‘dependent on us and eating out of our hands’.[113] Bevin was speaking in a context of overt American financial aid to war-torn Europe in the form of loans and grants. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, 1948, replaced in 1961 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or OECD) was established to administer the Marshall Plan/European Recovery Program (ERP), the American initiative to financially aid the post-war reconstruction of Europe ($13 billion between 1948 and 1952).[114] This move effectively institutionalised the Eurafrican project. The OEEC established an Overseas Territories Working Group ‘to promote European cooperation in colonial affairs, particularly towards Africa’, and involved long term plans in infrastructure, agriculture, water works, and heavy construction development.[115]

In 1952, the Council of Europe (1949),[116] which developed out of the Pan European Union, the European Parliamentary Union, and The Hague Congress, adopted the Strasbourg Plan. This Plan aimed at profiting Europe by the joint development of the raw materials of African colonies and the settlement of these overseas territories to curb overpopulation in Europe, which was considered as 'one of Europe's most critical human and social problems' at the time.[117] The Council also adopted the Schuman Plan (1950, authored by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman), which was vital for European integration and the development and exploitation of African resources. The Schuman Plan gave rise to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) involving France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries; this Community, established by the Treaty of Paris (1951), was, as we have noted, influenced by the Harvard Committee of Experts. The 'chief architect' and president of the ECSC was Jean Monnet, founder of the Action Committee for a United Europe (1955). He thought that 'France could give Africa as a "dowry to Europe"', a strategy that would also 'seduce the Germans'.[118] The High Authority in the ECSC was the European Commission, which was also established in 1951 under the Presidency of Monnet.[119]

It was the 'idealistic, committed bureaucrats' of this Commission that gave further impetus to the European integration movement.[120]

1.2.2 The European Economic Community

The same countries that signed the Treaty of Paris were involved in the Rome Treaty negotiations of 1956–1957. These discussions involved the promotion of the 'economic and social development of the [colonial] countries and territories' and the establishment of 'close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole'.[121] The signing of the Rome Treaties involved the determination 'to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe' and 'to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe'.[122] This ratification signalled the birth of the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957), a customs union that aimed to incorporate all the colonial possessions of the member countries: 'French West and Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Italian

Somaliland and Netherlands New Guinea'.[123] During these developments, Guy Mollet, socialist premier of France, claimed that Europe's economic development will bring about a better standard of living to the Europeans as well as to the African peoples freely associated here. This is not a hazy dream, I am firmly convinced that EURAFRICA will be the reality of tomorrow.[124]

On conclusion of the Rome Treaty negotiations, Mollet stated 'EURAFRICA, [is] a close association in which we will work together to promote progress, happiness and democracy in Africa'.[125] This 'collective colonialism' of Africa was central to the European integration agenda regardless of the increasing autonomy and independence of the African colonies. In fact, many African states agreed with EEC relations with Africa. In 1963, under the Yaoundé Convention, a total of eighteen independent African states agreed to multilateral EEC association and by the mid 1970s, under the Lomé Convention, most African states had chosen EEC association.[126] Since the late 1950s integration of Europe with Africa (Eurafrica) changed to cooperation and partnerships, such as the Constantine Plan (1958, de Gaulle) between France and its former colony of Algeria.[127] Further details of the impact of Kalergi's PEU after WWII are discussed in Chapter 3.

2. The Fabian Society and the Frankfurt School

There were two influential international ideologies and movements that came to prominence in the early to mid twentieth century, and that are directly linked to the gradual, step-by-step European integration project of the cosmopolitan socialist elites described above: the socialism of the Fabian Society (Britain) and the socialism of the Frankfurt School (Germany), both of which extended across the Atlantic to America. There are many shared aspects between these two ideologies and movements: both claim to promote socialism; both are funded by capitalists; both promote the radical transformation of Western civilization through socialist utopianism; and both reject revolutionary Marxism and instead use and advocate stealth, infiltration, and 'gradualism', a step-by-step process towards socialism. However, there are several differences between them as well, as discussed below.

2.1 The Fabian Society

The British East India Company (BEIC), founded in 1600, made many of its shareholders (many of whom were freemasons) very wealthy.[128] By the time of its end in 1873, several shareholders were major financiers and had a kind of pre-Fabian elitist philosophy, which eventually played a key role in the establishment of the Fabian Society. For example, John Stuart Mill was the secretary of BEIC (1856–1873) and was named by his father after John Stuart, the head of the BEIC. He was close friends with Richard Potter, the father of a core Fabian Society member, Beatrice Webb, and heavily influenced the Fabian philosophy with his well-known work, *Principles of Political Economy* (1848).[129]

On October 24th 1883, wealthy socialists, including members of the Society for Psychical Research (1882), met to discuss the creation of a British socialist organisation, *The Fellowship of the New Life*, which was based on the monastic ideas of the Scottish intellectual, Thomas Davidson.[130] This organisation was dedicated to the 'cultivation of a perfect

character in each and all' and sought to slowly and progressively transform society through individual example, advocating such ideas as pure intelligence, simple living, pacifism, and vegetarianism.[131] On November 7th of the same year, members of the Fellowship outlined their ultimate goal: 'the reconstruction of Society in accordance with the highest moral possibilities'.[132] However, some members wanted to be more politically involved to aid in this socialist transformation, and so in January 1884 it was decided that a separate society would be founded that actively promoted the project of the slow, progressive transformation of society towards collectivism. This society was named the Fabian Society.

The founders of the Fabian Society included Frank Podmore (psychical researcher), Edward Pease (member of the Stock Exchange), Hubert Bland (commercial clerk) and his wife Edith Nesbit (author and political activist). Over a few years the Fabian Society attracted many influential people interested in go-slow socialism, with members including: George Bernard Shaw, H.G. Wells, Annie Besant, J.G. Stapleton, Graham Wallas, Margaret Cole, Charles Marson, Sydney Olivier, Oliver Lodge, Leonard and Virginia Woolf, Ramsay MacDonald, Emmeline Pankhurst, and Sidney and Beatrice Webb. In the decades to come, many powerful people and groups became members or became associated through various partnerships and funding processes.

Even though they were not overtly Marxist in their style of socialism, as they were influenced by an uncommon mix of disparate spiritual, scientific and utopian socialists and thinkers such as Plato, Auguste Comte, Charles Darwin, J. S. Mill, Robert Owen, Henry George, and, in particular, John Ruskin, Fabians were still influenced by (and utilised) the revolutionary socialist works of Engels and Marx and had the same ultimate objectives. A major distinction between Marxist socialism and Fabian socialism is in their strategy to change society. Believing in the inevitability of socialism, the Fabians stressed evolution not revolution. Long before the proletariat revolution (prescribed by Marx) failed, as signified by the failure of the working classes to unite in the face of WWI, the Fabians had already rejected the method of violent revolution by means of proletarian force and instead advocated gradual, stealthy, non-violent and reformist means to create a new world based on socialism. As Robert Sullivan writing for

Brown University and the University of Tulsa puts it: The Fabians preferred the method of ‘permeation,’ or what Margaret (Postgate) Cole termed the ‘honeycomb’ effect. Instead of undertaking direct confrontational action, for example, by aligning themselves with working-class trade unionism or other militant socialists, the Fabians sought to change the system from within, and would achieve this by a process of infiltration. Through their great intellectual weight, they would ‘persuade’ members of government (whatever the Party), civil servants, and other people in power that ameliorating the plight of the less fortunate in society was a necessary and just cause. They achieved a measurable success at this because they possessed among their small number some of the best minds and celebrities of the time.[133]

The Fabian Society was named after Quintus Fabius Maximus, a Roman general nicknamed ‘Cunctator’ or ‘the Delayer’ for his slow but sure measures to achieve his goal of defeating the large Carthaginian army led by general Hannibal in the Second Punic War (218–201 BC). Rather than dealing with head-on battles, Fabius used tactics of elusion, harassment, and attrition to allow the Roman army to regroup and defeat Hannibal’s army. The strategy of the Fabians can be understood by their ‘doctrine of inevitability of gradualism’, which is clarified by G.B. Shaw, one of the leading figures of the Fabian Society and one of the main promoters of cosmopolitanism in Britain. He wrote that the methods of the Society were ‘stealth, intrigue, subversion, and the deception of never calling socialism by its right name’.[134] As can be read from their first pamphlet, the Fabian idea was to be patient and stealthy, then strike at the right moment: For the right moment you must wait, as Fabius did most patiently, when warring against Hannibal, though many censured his delays; but when the time comes you must strike hard, as Fabius did, or your waiting will be in vain, and fruitless.[135]

In other words, Fabians perceive they are in an ideological war with the established social order, which they will overthrow gradually at first through stealth and infiltration, and then, when the time is right, will launch a full and devastating attack.

Source: Freedom Is Knowledge Conservative Web Portal Above is an image of the famed Fabian stained-glass window designed by George Bernard Shaw in 1910 and executed by Caroline Townsend. The window depicts Sidney Webb and G.B. Shaw (with hammers), Edward Pease (bellows) and other Fabians actively creating a ‘new world’, and says ‘remould it nearer to the heart’s desire’, i.e. the whole world is to be governed by a socialist dictatorship designed and built by the Fabians. This line is taken from an Iranian poem written by Omar Khayyam.[136] Note the people at the bottom praying and worshipping a pile of books, which advocate the theories of socialism. Notice also the wolf in a sheepskin and the ‘F.S.’, which stands for Fabian Society. The symbol of the

Fabian Society is the tortoise:

Source: TVM, “Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing,” One Piece at a Time (blog), December 26 2013, http://onepieceatatime.info/blog/

According to American counterterrorism author and analyst Jon Perdue, the tortoise represented the group’s predilection for a slow, imperceptible transition to socialism, while its coat of arms, a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’, represented its preferred methodology for achieving its goal.[137]

On 25th January 1884 Fabian J.G. Stapleton spoke on the ‘Social Conditions in England with a View to Social Reconstruction or Development’, which was the first lecture of many to come.[138] In April 1884, the first pamphlet was distributed, entitled *Why Are the Many Poor?*, which concluded that ‘The time approaches when Capital can be made social, and can be no longer left at the disposal of the few, but belong to the community for the benefit of all’.[139] By 1886 there were four leading figures of the Fabian Society, dubbed the ‘Big Four’: G.B. Shaw, Graham Wallas, Sidney Webb, and Sidney Olivier. By 1889, 6,500 tracts had been distributed and 721 lectures had been given by thirty-one speakers. Between 1891 and 1892

nearly 120 Fabians delivered 3,339 lectures and membership had grown to 400. At this time, the Fabian Society became associated with the Second Socialist International (est. 1889) and helped strengthen democratic and socialist elements in Great Britain.[140]

Over the next few years more people joined the Society: there were 681 members in 1894 and 881 in 1899. By this time the Fabian Society had set up chapters in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa, Spain, Denmark, and Germany. In 1899, the most noted work on Fabian Socialism, *Fabian Essays in Socialism*, was produced by seven members and became the blueprint for socialist legislation. It sold hundreds of thousands of copies, was reprinted several times and translated into numerous languages. Another book written and edited by eight second generation Fabians, titled *New Fabian Essays*, was published in 1952.

Prior to becoming a member of the Fabian Society, H.B. Wells wrote his book *Anticipations: Of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human life and Thought* (1901). In this work, which was influenced by Plato's *Republic*, Wells details the rise of the 'New Republic', a system of world governance and scientific control. He describes its 'more developed phases … as a sort of outspoken secret society with which even the prominent men of the ostensible state may be openly affiliated' and 'there are no doubt elements of technical treason'.[141] He goes on to say that the New Republicans 'will constitute an informal and open freemasonry. In all sorts of ways they will be influencing and controlling the apparatus of the ostensible governments'.[142] In January 1902, the then secretary of the Fabian Society, Edward Pease, wrote to Wells to say that Sidney Webb and his wife were 'pioneers of your New Republic'.[143] In February 1903, Wells became a member and during his membership wrote several non-fiction works, including *A Modern Utopia* (1905).

However, Wells was openly critical of the Fabian Society. He became increasingly disappointed with it, criticizing its lack of radical reforms and explicit propaganda, and its pandering to the middle class rather than the lower classes. In 1906 he wrote a pamphlet called the *Faults of the Fabians* outlining his goals of reorganizing the Society. Of course, this was not favoured by the 'inner circle' and in September 1908 Wells resigned.[144] Wells later denounced the Fabians as 'the new Machiavellians'.[145] Nevertheless, Wells continued to be a staunch advocate of socialism, and in

1928 he published *Open Conspiracy: Blueprints for a World Revolution.* In this work he elaborates his ideas of the New Republic and ideas from his 1926 three-volume novel *The World of William Clissold,* the latter of which detailed a seven-point program for the development of the 'new human community'.[146] In the *Open Conspiracy* he explained that the New Republic would be a classless World State run by an intelligent minority that controlled everything and who 'may work in alliance with all sorts of movements and people' to further its aims. He wrote that the open conspiracy … will have become a great world movement as widespread and evident as Socialism and Communism. It will largely have taken the place of these movements. It will be more, it will be a world-religion. This large, loose, assimilatory mass of groups and societies will be definitely and obviously attempting to swallow up the entire population of the world and become the new human community'.[147]

In volume III of *The World of William Clissold* Wells wrote, 'we can weave a world system of monetary and economic activities, while the politicians, the diplomatists, and the soldiers are still too busy with their ancient and habitual antics to realise what we are doing'.[148] This 'open conspiracy,' according to Wells, was 'not a project to overthrow existing governments by insurrectionary attacks, but to supersede them by disregard. It does not want to destroy them or alter their forms but to make them negligible by replacing their functions'. The New Republicans will also be selective: 'What is useful to them it will use; what is useless it will efface by its stronger reality'.[149]

2.1.1 The London School of Economics and the Labour Party

Central to the Fabian strategy for gaining power gradually has been infiltration, replacement, and a socialist-capitalist alliance. Allies have foremost been sought in the universities, Churches, and newspapers, and speakers, writers, and politicians are trained and young scholars indoctrinated, all of whom eventually enter educational institutions, government agencies, and political parties to promote Fabian socialism. For example, Henry Hutchinson, a Derby lawyer and Fabian, left a generous sum of money (£20,000) to the Society for 'propaganda and other purposes', which was 'used by the Webbs, Graham Wallas and G.B. Shaw

to found a research institute to provide proof positive of the collectivist ideal'.[150] In 1895 the Webbs, Shaw, and Wallas set up this institute as a branch of the University of London, called the *London School of Economics and Political Science* (LSE). According to conservative author Kerry Bolton, LSE 'provides an influential means by which Big Business can foster its [Fabian Society] aims'.[151]

In relation to Big Business, the Fabian LSE has been funded by wealthy members associated with the financial assets accrued from BEIC as stated above. The major financial contributors include the Indian millionaire Ratan Tata, the Rockefeller Foundation (in 1923 it contributed $1 million and between 1929–1952 it contributed $4,105,592), the Rothschilds, Sir Julius Wernher, Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, Mrs. Ernest Elmhurst, widow of Willard Straight who was partner of J.P. Morgan, the NGO Gaddafi Foundation that pledged a donation of £1.5 million, and Sir Ernest Cassel.[152]

Cassel was a major merchant banker and capitalist, and a partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and Vickers Maxim Armaments. According to Lord Haldane, a friend of Cassel, the aim of LSE is to 'make this institution a place to raise and train the bureaucracy of the future Socialist state'.[153] So here we have a socialist-capitalist alliance whereby Big Business elites utilise socialist institutions to nurture their own aims. This obviously begs a particular question: Why do major capitalists and international finance organizations want to train the bureaucracy for the creation of a future socialist state? Isn't socialism, in its very essence, antithetical to capitalism? H.B. Wells explained this apparent paradox in 1920: Big Business is in no means antipathetic to Communism. The larger big business grows the more it approximates Collectivism. It is the upper road of the few instead of the lower road of the masses to Collectivism.[154]

In other words, not only is Fabian socialism different from classical Marxist socialism in its strategy, it also prefers wealthy elites (intellectual, political, economic) rather than the proletariat (working class) as the source of revolutionary potential.

Over in America, in 1905 Fabians established the *Rand School of Social Science* in New York City and incorporated the *Intercollegiate Socialist Society* to promote 'an intelligent interest in socialism among college men

and women'.[155] A founding member was American Fabian John Dewey (1859–1952), an atheist, socialist, and evolutionist who is considered the father of progressive education. In 1921 the Fabian Rand School changed its name to *The League for Industrial Democracy* and established a network of 125 chapters with the aim of de-Christianising America. Dewey became president of it in 1941. Dewey also co-founded the *New School for Social Research* (NSSR) in 1919, which is the American equivalent to LSE. This school, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation ($208,100 between 1940 and 1944) and the Carnegie Corporation ($95,000 in 1940) among others, set up the Graduate Faculty on Political and Social Science in 1933, called the 'University in Exile', and aimed to 'accommodate the large number of socialist intellectuals' who fled or were expelled from Hitler's Germany.[156]

Back in Britain, in the late 1890s the Fabian Society founded the *Labour Representation Committee*, which became the *Labour Party* in 1906. In 1918 the Labour Party adopted a programme that implemented the ideas of Fabianism.[157] In 1931 the New Fabian Research Bureau was formed, joining the Fabian Society in 1939.[158] In 1940 the Colonial Bureau of the Fabian Society was established and in 1941 the Fabian International Bureau was formed to cater to international interests.[159] During WWII, 'the Fabians created the intellectual architecture for the peacetime reconstruction' of Europe and an essay by Fabian member William Robson, titled 'Social Security', greatly influenced the British Beveridge report.[160] In this 1942 report, actually titled *Social Insurance and Allied Services*, progressive socialist and economist Sir William Beveridge made various promises to Britons if they accepted his outlined social reforms.[161] In 1945, partly as a result of this report, Fabian socialists took over the House of Commons (over half of the members of Parliament for the Labour Party were Fabians) and created the British Labour government.[162] Within a few years British industries and services had been nationalised and were under government control. For example, in 1946 the Bank of England, which had been privately owned by shareholders since the mid seventeenth century, was nationalised (came under the ownership of the Fabian-created Labour government) and became the central bank of England.[163]

Over the span of just over half a century, from the Fabian Society's inception in 1884 to 1945, when the Fabian-created Labour Party became an established British power, Fabian Society membership swelled to 8,400

members. Currently, there are around 7,000 UK Fabian Society members and, according to the UK website, '[a]round 80% of our members are also members of the Labour Party'.[164] Over the last twenty years, many Labour leaders and British Prime Ministers have been Fabians, such as Tony Blair (PM 1997–2007), Robin Cook (Foreign Secretary 1997–2001), David Blunkett (Home Secretary 2001–2004), Gordon Brown (PM 2007–2010), and Jack Straw (leader, House of Commons, 2006–2007). In addition, over 200 members of parliament are Fabians, Fabianism 'continues to be at the heart of the Labour movement', and 'the Fabian Society and the LSE continue to work closely together'.[165] The UK Labour Party is now the leading advocate of the social and demographic engineering project that aims to transform the national character and ethnic identity of Great Britain through large-scale non-European immigration and immigrant multicultural ideology[166] while simultaneously condemning and silencing legitimate criticisms by indigenous Britons of these non-democratic, top-down-enforced practices and policies.

In the mid 1980s the Fabian-Labour Party sought out the ethnic vote, particularly in Birmingham. Romain Garbaye, affiliate of Worcester College, writes that 'The Labour Party on the whole has been sympathetic to ethnic minorities in all the major cities, in return for strong electoral support from ethnic minority voters'.[167] After Labour once again came to power in 1997, 'multiculturalism' became a fashionable term in politics and national speeches. In 2000, Tony Blair set out his new vision of 'Britishness' and claimed that Britain was 'a rich mix of all different ethnic and religious origins'.[168] In 2002 the Queen echoed his sentiments, saying in her Jubilee speech to Parliament: 'our richly multicultural and multifaith society, a major development since 1952, is being achieved remarkably peacefully and with much goodwill'.[169] The Labour Party also instigated the open-border policy that saw the gates of Britain flung wide open from 2002 onwards. In fact, it has now emerged that through large-scale immigration the Labour Party intentionally turned London, the capital of Britain, into an unrecognisable 'foreign city'.[170] In 2009, the scandal emerged. Andrew Neather, former advisor to PM Tony Blair, claimed that the true nature behind the open border mass-immigration policy of the Labour Party was politically motivated: it was a social- and demographic-engineering project. *The Telegraph* newspaper reported that Neather had said that 'Labour threw

open Britain's borders to mass immigration to help socially engineer a "truly multicultural" country' and '[t]he huge increases in migrants over the last decade were partly due to a politically motivated attempt by ministers to radically change the country' and 'render their [the Right] arguments out of date'.[171] A new biography of Blair by investigative journalist Tom Bower, who interviewed more than 200 senior civil servants, ex-ministers and other insiders for his book, *Broken Vows: Tony Blair — The Tragedy of Power* (2016), alleges that immigration minister Barbara Roche told a senior immigration official: 'Asylum seekers should be allowed to stay in Britain. Removal takes too long and it's emotional', and that Blair, during his time in power, was 'presiding over a silent conspiracy' that allowed over two million more migrants to enter Britain than were expected.[172]

Fabian Labour members also promote Eurafrica and integration with the Middle East and are intimately involved in the European Union. For example, in 2007, Fabian member David Miliband, former Labour Party politician, declared in a speech at the College of Europe in Belgium, that the 'goal' of the EU

> must be a multilateral free-trade zone around our periphery — a version of the European Free Trade Association that could gradually bring the countries of the Maghreb, the Middle-East and Eastern-Europe in line with the single-market, not as an alternative to membership, but potentially as a step towards it.[173]

2.2 The Frankfurt School

The origins of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory can be traced to the German Jewish Marxist theoretician Karl Korsch (1886–1961). Korsch was born near Hamburg into a middle-class family and went on to receive a Doctor of Jurisprudence in 1911 from the University of Jena. A year later he joined the SPD (the German Social Democratic Party) and left for England to work with Sir Ernest Schuster, a professor of law.[174] Although Korsch remained in Britain for only a few years, while there he joined the Fabian Society. He was attracted by their emphasis on 'will', 'humanity' and 'ideas'[175] and liked their 'concrete, practical engagement', as reflected in their attempt to construct 'a finished plan for the socialisation of the economy'.[176] Most of his early writing reflects the influence of Fabianism on his thinking, such as his article 'The Fabian Society' (1912) which praised and professed admiration for the same.

In 1914 Korsch returned to Germany and increasingly turned towards Marxism. He broke with the SPD in 1919 and joined the German Independent Socialist Party (USPD), which was the most important section of the Second International at that time. In the same year the University of Jena offered him a professorship in Public and Labour Law, a position he held until 1923, and he became the assistant of the socialist professor Robert Wilbrandt on the Socialisation Commission for Coal Mining (Berlin). During his assistantship he developed his own serial Programme for Practical Socialism under the title 'What is Socialisation?', with the hope that these would provide the 'mentally gifted' a proper understanding of socialism and entice them to practically engage in the movement, much like what the Fabian Society pamphlets were doing.[177] In 1922 he attended a Marxist 'work week' in Ilmenau, Thuringia, which was funded by the young Felix Weil, who was the son of international grain speculator Hermann Weil, a member of the Frankfurt Soldiers' and Workers' Council, a student of Korsch's, and a previous student of Wilbrandt (1919). Participants in this week-long seminar included Georg Lukács, Friedrich Pollock, Karl August Wittfogel, and Richard Sorge.[178] This meeting of minds, which was centred on Korsch's unpublished manuscript *Marxism and Philosophy* became the organisational groundwork for the creation of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.[179] In 1923 Korsch published *Marxism and Philosophy* and in October he became Communist Minister of Justice in the Thuringian government and a leading member of the Communist Party.

In *Marxism and Philosophy* Korsch defended revolutionary Marxism and criticised Second International socialism for its 'degeneration' and inferiority to Marx's socialism; for Korsch, this form of socialism had become reformist rather than revolutionary, theoretical rather than practical, and too accepting of the capitalist state.[180] He thought that the leading socialists of the day had ignored philosophy and separated scientific socialism off from the wider political and class-based struggles associated with original revolutionary Marxism. Surmising that Marxism is a form of revolutionary action that unites theory and practice via practical human action, or praxis, he attempted to 'reconstruct the revolutionary, active side of Marxism, as exemplified in the Bolshevik Revolution [1917]'. With this

emphasis on practical socialism he opposed both the orthodox and revisionist strains of Second International Marxism.[181]

When *Marxism and Philosophy* was published it was quite evident that Korsch was beginning to differ from Fabian-style socialism. Although leading Fabians G.B. Shaw and the Webbs also advocated practical socialism as reflected by Bolshevism — Shaw declared that 'Stalin is a first rate Fabian'[182] and the Webbs co-authored the book *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* (1935) — they were supportive of the Nikolai Bukharin-style socialism put forward by Stalin in 1924 in the form of '*Socialism in One Country*'.[183] This version stressed national socialism (which differed from the national socialism of Hitler) via slow industrial change versus a violent and rapid proletarian revolution as a model for the world. In other words, it was very similar to the Fabian 'gradualist' step-by-step evolution towards socialism.[184] However, Stalin engineered a famine (the Holodomor) between 1932 and 1933 in Ukraine that killed between 3.5 and 10 million people,[185] and between 1934 and 1940 he initiated what came to be known as the *Great Purge* or the *Great Terror*, which saw 750,000 people executed and 3 million arrested, many of whom were sent to the Gulag.[186] At this time leading Fabians, particular G.B. Shaw, supported Stalin and were apologists for him,[187] seemingly contradicting their emphasis on non-violent gradual reformism.

In the early 1920s the Bolshevism that Korsch endorsed was practical, revolutionary, proletarian, purely anti-capitalist and grounded in original Marxism, but the Bolshevism that the Webbs and Shaw liked was go-slow, elitist, violent and in cooperation with capitalists: it was a 'state-capitalist, or state-socialist, form of capital production'.[188] Korsch eventually argued not just against capitalism and the reformism, revisionism, and Orthodoxy of the Second and Third Internationals, but also against Bolshevism. He was convinced that the latter was a regime of 'false consciousness' that 'exploited' the 'international radical labour movement' and thus was not beneficial to proletarian communism.[189] Korsch's new ideas and dissent eventually led to his expulsion from the Communist Party in 1926. By the late 1920s Korsch completely broke with Bolshevism, stating that 'its content and function [had] become a seemingly classless but in reality *bourgeois and anti-proletarian state ideology*'.[190]

2.2.1 Cultural Marxism and Critical Theory

The Weil-funded Marxist seminar in 1922 that centred on Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy* eventually led to the founding of the Frankfurt School, called the Institute for Social Research, on February 3rd 1923 by members of the German Communist Party at Frankfurt University.[191] This institute was funded by Felix Weil's father who provided 'a yearly income of 120,000 Marks'.[192] It officially opened on June 22, 1924, was co-chaired by Felix and his father, and directed (3 February 1923) by Carl Grünberg (1861–1940), after the future-appointed first director (1922), Fabian member Kurt Albert Gerlach, died at the age of thirty-six from diabetes before he could take up the position. Nevertheless, Gerlach left his 8,000-volume library to Felix Weil, who then passed it on to the Institute.

Initially, Korsch had a large influence on the Frankfurt School in terms of his emphasis on praxis — practical political activism — and in terms of introducing the 'gradualism' of Fabianism.[193] By this time the Marxist-prescribed proletariat revolution was obviously not going according to plan, as signified by World War I (the working classes, rather than aligning with their class, gave preference to their nations and fought each other), so Marxist intellectuals of the Frankfurt School set about a 'searching re-examination of the very foundations of Marxist theory' and reformulated it 'with the dual hope of explaining past errors and preparing for future action'.[194] As they reworked Marxist theories they developed a new strain of Marxism that gave priority to the radical transformation of the cultural superstructure (foundations) of Western civilization. They perceived Christianity and Western cultural traditions as obstacles to their revolution and so they set about devising ways to sever them at their roots. This Marxist ideology came to be known as *cultural Marxism*, a non-violent collectivist revolutionary ideology that seeks the gradual gain of power via destructive effects to cultural and political structures, such as the modification of laws, traditional political and educational institutions, and social organisations. William S. Lind, an American paleoconservative and author, explains that Cultural Marxism is a branch of western Marxism, different from the Marxism-Leninism of the old Soviet Union. It is commonly known as 'multiculturalism' or, less formally, Political Correctness. From its beginning, the promoters of cultural Marxism have

known they could be more effective if they concealed the Marxist nature of their work, hence the use of terms such as ‘multiculturalism’.[195]
In this sense, cultural Marxism is like Fabianism: it conceals its true socialist nature.

There were several European Marxist thinkers that had a significant impact on cultural Marxism: Georg Lukács (1885–1971), Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), and Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979). Lukács was born in Hungary to a wealthy banker, József Löwinger, and was named Bernát György Löwinger, but in 1890, five years after his birth, his father altered their surname to Lukács. One year after the Hungarian Revolution (1918) the young Lukács became Deputy Commissar for education and culture for the short-lived (just over four months) Bela Kun Bolshevik regime in Budapest, Hungary. During this position Lukács was involved in what was called the *Red Terror*, named after the Red Terror in Soviet Russia by the Bolshevik regime under Lenin that involved mass-murder, torture, and oppression.[196] A pack of about 200 young men, the ‘Lenin Boys’, sought out and killed counter-revolutionaries and dissidents in Hungary at this time.[197]

While he was Deputy Commissar Lukács sought to destroy established society along with the traditional values of the West, writing: ‘I saw the revolutionary destruction of society as the one and only solution’ and the ‘worldwide overturning of values cannot take place without the annihilation of the old values and the creation of new ones by the revolutionaries’. He described his methods as *cultural terrorism.*[198] One of these methods to undermine traditional Western culture was the introduction of a radical sex-education programme, which involved ‘special lectures and supportive literature … to instruct Hungarian children’ about free love and sexual intercourse, to repudiate middle-class family codes of monogamy, and ‘to deride and ignore the authority of parental authority, and precepts of traditional morality’.[199] In addition, the promiscuity and rebellion of women against patriarchy was promoted. Yet, Lukács was disappointed with the way the revolution had developed — it was a disaster — and soon asked, ‘Who will save us from Western civilization?’[200]

In 1922 Lukács attended the Marxist work week in Thuringia, helping to found the Frankfurt School. In 1923 he published *History and Class*

Consciousness, the same year that Korsch published his *Marxism and Philosophy*. In this work, Lukács develops a theory of reification, a 'socially induced pathology' created by capitalist commodity fetishism, which reduces all objects, subjects, and social relations to the status of things without quality, and, as such, renders people 'atomized and isolated'. For Lukács, the only way to overcome this alienation is through a communist revolution that destroys the social forces, the Western cultural institutions that had enabled capitalism to obscure people's understanding of the dominant forces that affect their lives.[201] This work influenced the development of Critical Theory.

Critical Theory was largely developed by the writings of Max Horkheimer, the son of a wealthy textile businessman and the director of the Frankfurt School in the 1930s, and Theodor Adorno, son of a successful German wine merchant, and director of the School in 1958. These influential thinkers developed Critical Theory in the 1930s and early 1940s, culminating in their jointly written book, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944). Critical Theory is a dialectical method of destructive critical analysis of the existing social, political, and economic order of the West with the aim of fostering social change. Martin Jay, the Sidney Hellman Ehrman Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley explains that '[a]t the very heart of Critical Theory was an aversion to closed philosophical systems' and it 'was expressed through a series of critiques of other thinkers and philosophical traditions'.[202] It reflected what Karl Marx stated in note XI in his 'Theses on Feuerbach', that '[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it'.[203] Lind explains that Critical Theory 'is simply criticizing. It calls for the most destructive criticism possible, in every possible way, designed to bring the current order down'.[204] Similarly, author Raymond Raehn defines Critical Theory as

> essentially destructive criticism of the main elements of Western culture, including Christianity, capitalism, authority, the family, patriarchy, hierarchy, morality, tradition, sexual restraint, loyalty, patriotism, nationalism, heredity, ethnocentrism, convention and conservatism.[205]

All of these organisations and ways of life were targets for change: they were to be 'captured … converted' and 'politicised' into agents of revolution by a slow and gradual infiltration.[206]

Horkheimer, like the Fabians and other European Marxists, wanted ‘a subtle revolution’ that would be undertaken by ‘the penetration and transformation of the cultural traditions and institutions of Western Civilization’.[207] However, following Hitler’s rise to power (1933), the Frankfurt School was shut down and many members left Germany and immigrated to the USA. In 1934, Columbia University helped these ‘political refugees’ and set up a version of the Frankfurt School based in New York City, called the *Institute for Social Research*. Around this time, an *Emergency Program for European Scholars* and, as mentioned above, the Fabian University in Exile, were established and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, and intended to bring these Marxist scholars to the USA.[208] These Frankfurt intellectuals began careers in America that impacted the 1960s counter-culture movements and eventually laid the groundwork for the social and psychological sciences that dominate Western academia today.

Adorno left Germany for New York in 1938, obtaining teaching positions at Princeton and Berkley, and in 1950 he published a major work, *The Authoritarian Personality*, co-authored with Else Frenkel-Brunswik and Daniel J. Levinson. Writing the preface of this work, Horkheimer states: ‘This is a book about social discrimination’ and ‘the position of minorities in modern society, and more specifically the problem of religious and racial hatreds’ associated with ‘the authoritarian type of man’, a ‘complicated personality syndrome’ that can be measured according to an ‘F Scale’ (F stands for fascism).[209] Focusing on conservative rather than leftist authoritarianism, this work argued that the traditional Christian family is the ‘seedbed of “fascism”’, anti-minority prejudice, and anti-Semitism and there is an ‘inherent authoritarianism of the father-figure’, which is the genetic origin of the fascist mentality.[210] Raehn writes that *The Authoritarian Personality* ‘was premised on one basic idea’, namely that ‘a society of Christianity, capitalism and the patriarchal-authoritarian family created a character prone to racial prejudice and German fascism’.[211] Of course, this meant that such a fascist and anti-Semitic Christian society and all its traditional institutions needed to be overhauled and replaced with a new liberal democratic secular society and new institutions conceived by the Critical Theorists. Here are a few select quotes from the book: It is a well-known hypothesis that susceptibility to fascism is most

characteristically a middle-class phenomenon, that it is ‘in the culture’ and, hence, that those who conform the most to this culture will be the most prejudiced.

> The power-relationship between the parents, the domination of the subject’s family by the father or by the mother, and their relative dominance in specific areas of life also seemed of importance for our problem.
>
> It would then be more understandable why the German family, with its long history of authoritarian, threatening father figures, could become susceptible to a fascist ideology.
>
> A tendency to transmit mainly a set of conventional rules and customs, may be considered as interfering with the development of a clear-cut personal identity in the growing child.[212]

This is what American conservative politician and political commentator Pat Buchanan calls the ‘psychologisation of politics’. Buchanan asserted in 1993 that the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* are Leftists who see ‘themselves as mentally healthy and morally superior’ and they look upon their ‘conservative adversaries as morally retarded and mentally ill, people who do not need to be answered so much as they need to be cured — of attitudes rooted in a middle-class upbringing’.[213] The attempted ‘psychologization’ of the conservative viewpoint was scientifically attempted by the scholars Brad Verhulst, Lindon Eaves, and Peter K. Hatemi in an *American Journal of Political Science* article in January 2012. They declared that conservatives were more prone to psychotism and authoritarianism than liberals,[214] a view that has been repeated by many, such as Dr. Barry X. Kuhle, a Psychology professor at Scranton University in his June 12, 2012 piece ‘Conservatism as a Mental Illness’ for *Psychology Today.*[215] However, in an article in the *American Journal of Political Science* in January 2016, titled ‘Erratum to “Correlation not Causation: The Relationship between Personality Traits and Political Ideologies”’ *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (1), 34–51’, the authors of the 2012 study admit they made a mistake; the findings of the study were ‘exactly reverse’ — Liberals were more prone to psychotism and authoritarianism instead.[216]

Another Marxist theorist that influenced Critical Theory and cultural Marxism was the Italian, Antonio Gramsci. Like the Frankfurt School theorists, he thought that in order to overthrow capitalism the cultural institutions of the West, the roots, had to be severed. Between 1929 and

1935, while in prison, he outlined a plan for a future revolution involving cultural changes from within, now well-known in his *Prison Notebooks*.[217] Although he died in 1937, his writings were not published until the 1950s. These writings contain his theory of cultural hegemony (cultural dominance by the ruling class), and two methods for a counter-hegemonic force to eventually gain power: 'war of position' and 'war of movement'.

According to Richard Howson, Senior Lecturer and Head of the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communications at the University of Wollongong in Australia, the 'war of position' is the 'struggle for emancipation' of the subordinated and marginalised classes; it is a 'tactical struggle' that enables the opposition forces to break down the dominating group's socio-cultural influence and, simultaneously, works to disperse their military strength, giving the opposition the spatial and temporal conditions to develop a collective consciousness and a determined will to construct and employ their own strikeforce,[218]
what is called the 'war of movement' involving 'direct violence and force'.[219] Gramsci's strategy of 'war of position' is one of gradual infiltration, like Fabian 'permeation' and 'honeycombing'; it is, in the 1968 interpretation by Alfred Willi Rudi Dutschke, 'a long march through the institutions'.[220]

In America, the leading spokesman ('guru') for the counter-culture movement in the 1960s, the most influential and supportive figure associated with American political activism and the New Left, was Frankfurt theorist Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse was born in Berlin into an upper-middle class family. He joined the Social Democratic Party while a student and received his Ph.D. in 1922 from the University of Freiburg. He helped co-found the Frankfurt School and then moved to the USA in 1934. During World War II he worked with the government on anti-Nazi propaganda, and after the war he taught at a series of Universities: Columbia, Harvard, Brandeis, and the University of California. The student rebellion, the resistance to the draft, and the Vietnam War provided the conditions for Marcuse to promote his work and that of the Frankfurt School. Two of his books, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud* (1955) and *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (1964) influenced the Students for a

Democratic Society (SDS), the student movement as a whole, and the sexual 'revolution'. Along with another member of the Frankfurt School, Erich Fromm (1900–1980), who wrote about the so-called social construction of gender differences, Marcuse synthesised Freudian psychoanalytical theories of sexual repression and Marxist theory.

In *Eros and Civilization* (1955) Marcuse advocated the idea that sexuality was 'by nature "polymorphous perverse"' (natural sexual libido of infants to age five), a notion that emphasised sexual liberation from socially normative sexual behaviours via an infantile and primitive Pleasure Principle.[221] In line with Fromm and others, he promoted free love, and thought that 'sexual repression' is a product of capitalist society — 'enforced by the interests of domination and exploitation' — and that 'sexual liberation' would precede a socialist revolution.[222] According to Bolton, this 'sexual revolution' meant the necessary 'destruction of traditional concepts of family, parenthood and child rearing'.[223] To Marcuse and his ilk, gender, sex, marriage, and the family were merely social constructs that needed to be deconstructed for liberation to occur.

In *One Dimensional Man* Marcuse argued that new forms of social control — mass media, advertising, and industrial management — had stifled the negation of oppositional activity, creating a one-dimensional universe empty of critical thought and revolutionary potential. People who had formerly been of revolutionary potential, i.e. the proletariat, were now, in mass-consumer society, 'assimilated', but this did not indicate 'the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population'. He added that '[u]nder the conditions of a rising standard of living, non-conformity with the system itself appears to be socially useless'.[224] In other words, the working classes were no longer a viable source for revolutionary socialism. As such, Marcuse sought out new sources. According to Douglas Kellner, a third-generation Critical Theorist, Marcuse reflect[ed] upon the potential for liberation in Third World revolutionary movements, the possibilities of solidarity between those organisations and racial forces in the highly industrialised countries, and the potential for emancipatory social transformation in the New Left, student

anti-war movement, feminism, black power, and other social forces of the era.[225]

Marcuse claimed that such opposition movements had the 'right' to stake moral and political demands against Western orthodoxy in their bid for 'natural liberation' and emphasised their marginalisation, oppression, and victimhood as central to their solidarity.

2.3 Fabianism, Cultural Marxism, Paneuropean Socialism, and the New Left

The 'permeation' strategies of Fabian socialism and the 'long march' of Frankfurt School cultural Marxism manifested in numerous cultural and political developments and reforms in the wake of the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Sexual Revolution that were harnessed as sources of revolutionary social change. They have included: feminism, affirmative action, deconstruction (Derrida, 1967), the transformation of the traditional family, church, education, and morals, Third-World opposition movements, anti-nationalism, cultural contempt, anti-discrimination, liberal immigration reforms, 'White Privilege', 'White Guilt', 'Diversity is Strength', 'tolerance', Political Correctness, and multicultural*ism*. The new sources of radical social change were also found in the enormous waves of Third-World immigrants into Europe and the West from the onset in the 1950s of non-European mass-immigration and the resultant growth of significantly large ethnic immigrant communities.

By the 1950s and 60s the revolutionary efforts of Fabianism, cultural Marxism, cosmopolitan Paneuropeanism, and the various other socialist and anti-nationalist organizations and movements at the time had infiltrated social and political institutions and disseminated their ideologies into the educational institutions. Essentially, they gave rise to a 'New Class' (Daniel Bell and Alvin Gouldner). According to Eric Kaufmann, Professor of Politics at Birkbeck College, University of London, the New Class is a 'sector of post-industrial societies [that] tends to be liberal on cultural issues, university educated, and drawn from relatively younger age cohorts' and who identify with the world rather than a specific nation or locale.[226] They have 'reduced national pride and a greater embrace of liberal-cosmopolitan values'[227] and are the Critical Theorists and 'organic

intellectuals'[228] of cosmopolitan national networks that gain support from the elite, thus increasing their social capital vital for political action. This was furthered by transnational networks, the expansion of higher education, and centralised television media which has perpetuated the cosmopolitan transformation of the West. Some of the consequences of these developments have been multicultural national narratives, colour-blind immigration, and more entrenched liberal democratic efforts towards European integration.[229] By the early 1970s the New Left on both sides of the Atlantic had splintered into separate groups; yet, armed with their cultural Marxist and socialist ideologies, they continued their 'long march through the institutions' promoting their anti-authoritarianism, anti-establishmentarianism, and the destruction and remaking of Western culture and society.

Like the claims found in *The Authoritarian Personality*, cultural Marxists employ a pessimistic tactic involving the repetition of the false idea that Western societies 'are the greatest repositories of racism, sexism, nativism, xenophobia, homophobia, anti-Semitism, fascism, and Nazism'.[230] This is a tactic that is similar to, if not directly taken from, the Communist Directive of the Moscow Central Committee of 1943: When certain obstructionists [to communism] become too irritating, label them, after suitable buildups, as fascist or Nazi … and use the prestige of anti-fascist and tolerance organisations to discredit them. Members and front organizations must continually embarrass, discredit and degrade our critics. Accuse them of being traitors to the war effort, fascists, Red-baiters, peace-destroyers, Quislings, labor-traitors. … The association will, after enough repetition, become 'fact' in the public mind.[231]

Another strategy is the labelling of the opposition as mentally ill and/or in need of psychological reconditioning, as mentioned above. Yet, although the 'scientific' studies have been debunked, programmes such as sensitivity and diversity training have been designed to instil 'correct attitudes' in non-liberal non-conformists, essentially aiming to forcibly replace their values and views with 'politically correct' ones. Still another tactic, particularly under the rubric of 'tolerance' and 'political correctness', is the complete intolerance and punishment of any criticism or resistance to the government-enforced policies of multiculturalism and mass-immigration.

Some of the methods used are dehumanisation, demonisation, stigmatisation, job loss, hiring practice discrimination, removal of children from the family, and even arrest, incarceration, and fines, which are nefariously justified by accusations of racism, supremacism, white privilege, Nazism, ethnocentrism, and right-wing extremism.

Not only is Fabian and Frankfurt School socialism different from Marxist socialism by explicit strategy (gradualism versus violent revolution), it also differs in where it locates revolutionary potential: rather than the proletariat (working class) Fabians focus on the elites and cultural Marxists harness the marginalised and Third World racial groups. Yet both can be considered as elite forms of socialism, whether in intellectual, political, cultural, or economic terms, as they no longer focus on the working classes. They are bourgeois revolutionary theories that instigate revolutions from above, not below; they are not grassroots or democratic; they are plutocratic, oligarchic, and dictatorial. These socialist intellectuals 'march through the institutions' to effect a 'gradual' revolution from above and are sponsored by the capitalist forces they supposedly oppose.[232]

According to Bolton, the

> [s]trategy of international oligarchy is dialectics: the conflict of opposing forces that generates a *synthesis*. This dialectical method … [explains] why the oligarchy so often seems to be backing opposite ideologies, governments and policies.

Bolton writes further that [t]he oligarchs … apparently operate on the dialectical premise that what will result from their 'controlled conflict' [through imposed diversity] will be a socialist-capitalist synthesis which we might call the 'World Collectivist State'; a world order that will be communistic in organisation but run by oligarchs rather than commissars.[233]

And, to repeat H.G. Wells' criticism of Fabianism: Big Business is in no means antipathetic to Communism. The larger big business grows the more it approximates Collectivism. It is the upper road of the few instead of the lower road of the masses to Collectivism.[234]

Some writers, such as the late journalist and author Pierre de Villemarest, suggest that the Pan European Union, among other organisations, were 'the vehicles for the Fabian ideals and objectives' and 'the majority of movements with an internationalist, socialist calling, born in the thirties,

and especially after 1945 were, if not created by, at least totally infiltrated and influenced by the Fabians'.[235] Whether or not this is true, there is no denying that the 'permeation' and 'long march' of Fabian and Frankfurt School socialism continues today in Europe and European-based countries in the policies and practices of multiculturalism, multiracialism and mass-immigration.

A good example of the relationship between cultural Marxism/Fabianism and Pan European cosmopolitanism can be found in the liberal multicultural theories of a prominent Canadian intellectual of Queens University, William Kymlicka. He has written that 'there was a deep institutional embedding of multiculturalism' in Canada.[236] Initiated in the federal statement of multiculturalism in 1971 by PM Pierre Trudeau, multiculturalism was gradually implemented, step-by-step, in what Kymlicka and his colleague Keith Banting explicitly refer to (without citing) as part of the '*long march through the institutions* at all levels of Canadian society'.[237] In fact, according to Hugh Donald Forbes, political economy professor at the University of Toronto, Pierre Trudeau considered multiculturalism 'a big political experiment' that had as its 'aim' the testing and refinement of 'a theory of how to overcome national or ethnic conflict'. This experiment involved the deliberate mixing of the populations of existing states even further, with a view to ultimately separating state and nation altogether, thus undermining the psychological basis for an intense and exclusive state patriotism and preparing the way for the necessary transition to a world of semi-sovereign states (or provinces) under some form of global governance.[238]

The same can be said of the policies and strategies of multiculturalism/multiracialism in all European nations; they are a strategic part of an elite project of demographic engineering that aims to alter the ethnic populations of European nation-states and create multi-ethnic cosmopolitan societies under global governance. This is discussed in detail in later chapters.

3. International and Geopolitical Developments

Kalergi's notion of Eurafrica lacked any explicit mention of the African peoples or the Arabs of Africa and peoples of the Middle East and their cultures becoming embedded in Europe via mass-immigration. Instead Kalergi envisioned the eventual Europeanisation of these peoples and cultures through modernisation.[239] He also thought that 'Europe is bound together by the Christian religion, European science, art and culture, which rest on a Christian-Hellenic basis.'[240] There was also no indication that Islam was integral to the foundation of European culture and societies, that Europe required cultural enrichment from the Third World, or that Europe required massive immigration in order to survive — all claims which are made today by leading European elites, as shown throughout this work. Kalergi made it quite clear that Europe had a distinct identity that contrasted with other cultures: 'European culture is said to be proudly "distinct from the Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu and Confucian cultures of Asia"'.[241] But this all began to change in the post-WWII era.

During World War II American President Franklin D. Roosevelt developed a Fabian-influenced Wilsonian vision of the postwar era that stressed international free trade, national sovereignty, and shared security. Woodrow Wilson, famous for his principles of world peace (Fourteen Points), was a fan of Fabian socialism, and Roosevelt himself was well-connected to the Fabian Society as his wife, Eleanor, and his economic adviser, Stuart Chase, who authored *A New Deal* (1932), were both Fabians. In August 1941 the US and the UK released a joint declaration on their postwar goals, called the Atlantic Charter. In point 4 of the Charter it states that Britain and the USA would endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.[242]
For Roosevelt the 'equality of peoples' was a necessary element for his plan of international free trade to materialise: 'The structure of the peace demands and will get equality of peoples. Equality of peoples involves the

utmost freedom of competitive trade'.[243] The Atlantic Charter also included the dismantling of the old-world imperialist system and Empire, as well as global reductions in armaments, for the purpose of creating world peace (as set out by the League of Nations post WWI). In actuality it was more like an American-led neocolonialism masquerading as free trade.

Just before the Atlantic Charter was officially declared, at a dinner in August 1941 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill responded to the Roosevelt plan by saying, 'Mr. President, I believe you are trying to do away with the British Empire. Every idea you entertain about the structure of the postwar world demonstrates it'.[244] He was not wrong. Regardless of this critical stance, Churchill signed the Charter anyway. He too was heavily influenced by Fabianism, accepting the 1942 Beveridge report of the UK Fabian-Labour Party led by Fabian PM Clement Attlee and, like the Webbs and G.B. Shaw, called Stalin 'Uncle Joe'.[245]

In 1942, a short document which came to be known as the United Nations Declaration was signed by 26 nations that pledged to uphold the Atlantic Charter.[246] Then, in 1945, the United Nations Conference on International Organization resulted in the creation of the United Nations Charter, the foundational treaty of the United Nations. However, due to WWII atrocities, a clear and concise definition of the rights referred to in the UN Charter was required. Fabian member Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Drafting Committee, which began in 1946, and the principal drafter was the Canadian socialist, John Peters Humphrey. On 10 December 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as the first global expression of abstract human rights and the inherent entitlement of all human beings to the same.

The 1941 US-UK Atlantic Charter and the development of other postwar Western-influenced global institutions such as the United Nations, the UDHR, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and NATO, institutionalised a new global order based on notions of a Western 'peace'. This new postwar development influenced the opening of European and Western nations to non-European immigration from the Third World. Before World War II immigration into European countries was mainly intra-Western and based on 'white-only' selection criteria. With the creation of the UDHR, modifications to immigrant selection criteria were considered

necessary so that immigration laws were consistent with Human Rights. UDHR requirements meant that for the international system the selection of immigrant sources would no longer be based on the grounds of race as this was considered racist.[247] In fact, as immigration was necessary to fuel economic growth for the international free-trade agenda of the Atlantic Charter, and because cheap European labour power was limited post-WWII, including in non-war-torn Canada and the United States, it was vital that race was removed from immigrant selection criteria.

After WWII, Europe needed a supply of cheap labour to begin the reconstruction process. As this was also a time when Western colonial powers were providing independence for countries in Asia and Africa and elsewhere, such as the West Indies, a significant amount of the labour power came from these areas. For example, the French had settled the Algerian coastal plain and aimed at integrating Algeria into the French nation as a province. Algerian soldiers who had fought alongside the French during WWI had been given French citizenship and many Algerian citizens were recruited as cheap labourers in France in the interwar and immediate post-WWII era.[248] France also recruited labourers from its protectorates, such as Tunisia and Morocco, the amount of which increased in the 1950s and 60s when they gained their independence, and recruited as well from other African countries and from Turkey.[249] In Britain, the British Nationality Act in 1948 guaranteed the ‘right of entry’ to the Commonwealth citizens of their former colonies (West Indies, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India) and they were recruited as a cheap labour force, settling and working in the various industries in Britain.[250]

However, the Marshall Plan (1948–1952) had ushered in an ‘economic miracle’ and many European economies were booming; at the same time, workers were sought from high-unemployment countries in Europe, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, to work as cheap labourers.[251] It was only about ten years after the war, after rebuilding was almost finished, that immigration was officially initiated from the non-European world. For example, on 30 October 1961, a bilateral labour recruitment treaty between Turkey and Germany was signed, which initiated temporary work permits and the arrival of large numbers of Turks as ‘guest workers’ (mostly cheap and unskilled labourers).[252] Germany also signed recruitment treaties with Morocco (1963) and Tunisia (1965).[253]

In Britain, the British Nationality Act resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount of non-European non-economic migrants because 'family reunification meant that every pre-1962 migrant would bring in two or four subsequent migrants in the form of his family members'.[254] In response, the Act was overturned by the Conservative government under Harold Macmillan, who initiated the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act to control the entry of Commonwealth citizens into the UK.[255] The Labour government under Harold Wilson (1964–1970) further tightened administrative controls over immigration and in 1968 amended the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act so that 'a British subject was free from immigration control only if he, or at least one of his parents or grandparents was born, adopted, registered, or naturalised in the United Kingdom'.[256] By 1971 another Immigration Act was passed by the Conservative government under PM Edward Heath, which gave only temporary work permits to non-European immigrants and made provisions for assisting the voluntary repatriation of those migrants who had come to the UK under the British Nationality Act.[257]

As a result of the temporary work permits, a great number of non-Europeans voluntarily migrated to the UK in the 1970s because of good employment prospects. They were considered 'guest workers', cheap and temporary labourers who would eventually return to their home countries. But this did not occur. For example, Christian Karner, associate professor of sociology at the University of Nottingham, writes that '[m]any South Asian workers initially intended their stays to be temporary and a means of socio-economic mobility — through higher wages and remittances — for themselves and their extended families at home', what is now known as the 'myth of return'.[258] It was a myth precisely because many of these non-European economic migrants (and those recruited but refusing repatriation) settled permanently in the UK, staying after the collapse of industries and rising unemployment in the 1970s. They also brought over their families via family reunification laws, leading to the massive growth of the non-European multi-generational communities that we see today. The same is true of all European nations that recruited former colonial citizens and non-European temporary workers between the 1950s and 1970s. A more detailed discussion of non-European immigration in select European countries will be found in Volume II.

Simultaneous to non-European immigration into Europe was the entrenchment of Fabian (Britain) and Frankfurt School (Germany) socialism into mainstream society on both sides of the Atlantic. These two very influential ‘permeation’ and ‘long march’ socialist-cosmopolitan movements, along with the efforts of liberal Paneuropeanism and the emphasis on the new Universal Human Rights, entered the mainstream media and educational institutions; they promoted the destruction and reconstruction of Western culture via anti-nationalism, anti-traditionalism, liberal progressivism, and non-European immigration and rights.

Meanwhile, other issues were developing in the Middle East that would essentially affect the ethnic character of Europe and further European integration for decades to come.

3.1 Middle-East Conflicts and Euro-Arab Cooperation, 1948–1979

The following sections provide perspective on certain developments that directly impacted early political and economic unification in Europe and led to mass-immigration from the African and Muslim regions. First, details are given on how the creation of Israel (1948) and the ensuing Middle-East conflicts, Western support for Israel, and the 1970s Arab-imposed oil embargo initiated a new Euro-Arab cooperation that led to large-scale Muslim immigration and the promotion and ever-increasing spread of Islam in Europe (Eurabia). Then, after a brief discussion about further European economic and political integration through the *Schengen Acquis*, the assigning to Brussels important national sovereign powers, and the official creation of the European Union, the development of wider Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the ongoing development of Eurafrica are examined. Here it is shown that in addition to the new Euro-Arab relations, a Union for the Mediterranean opened Europe to the south (particularly North Africa) and the east (Middle East) with the overall aim being close political association and economic integration with these regions. Furthermore, it is revealed that these developments also involved the ethnic and cultural mixing of Europe through mass-immigration and processes of Arabisation, Africanisation, and Islamisation.

Between the late 1940s and late 1960s, the military and political power of Europe in the Middle East and the conflicts therein led to changes within

Europe, and in the very notion and plans of Pan-Europa. One of the pinnacle events was the creation of Israel. After decades of Zionist campaigning for a Jewish homeland,[259] and in direct relation to the Holocaust,[260] the State of Israel was formally created on May 14, 1948 and was immediately attacked by Arabs from Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt who were opposed to its establishment. It was not until February 1949 that an official truce was made based on 'formal armistice lines'.[261] Meanwhile, movements towards a Pan-Arabism and a re-politicisation of Islam, a Pan-Islamism, had been brewing for decades, grounded in Muslim Brotherhood ideology and its offshoots, as well as in the shared oppositional stance of Arabs towards the creation of Israel. On July 26th 1956, the Suez Canal, 'a vital route for oil travelling to Britain', which was owned by and built under the French and British Suez Canal Company and which linked the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, was seized and nationalised by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.[262] This presented a problem for European geopolitical aspirations. Nasser considered European political influence in the Middle East as an effort 'to perpetuate their colonial domination';[263] in turn, socialist premier of France, Guy Mollet, among others, thought that Colonel Nasser had aspirations 'to recreate the empire of Islam around Egypt', that Pan-Islamism 'conspires with Soviet Pan-Slavism', and that the Near East and North Africa has but 'one game … being played', 'the expansion of Pan-Islamism'.[264] In this context, in September 1956 the Liberal International in Stresa, Italy, voiced their support for a United Europe to counter President Nasser.[265]

Nasser was already considered a danger to Israel due to his Pan-Arabism and the rising Pan-Islamism, and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal threatened the British economy, especially in the Cold War context. As a response, in late October 1956 Britain, France and Israel, without consulting America, invaded Egypt to overthrow Nasser. On November 6th the US, concerned that the Soviet Union would intervene to aid Nasser (which they did), pressured Britain and France to 'accept a United Nations ceasefire' and publicly censured them by voting for a UN resolution that condemned their actions.[266] Britain and France felt humiliated and the Chancellor of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, comforted Mollet, the French PM, assuring him that a united 'Europe will be your revenge'.[267]

Later, in May 1967, while the New Class was rising and convulsing in the West, Nasser was mobilising army units in the Sinai Peninsula and closing Israel's connection, the Gulf of Aqaba, to the Indian Ocean. This initiated what came to be known as the Six Day War, and this time, the US supported Israel. Knowing the reliance of the US and Europe on Arab oil, the Arab states responded by imposing an oil embargo against them (June–September 1967), passing a Resolution at the Oil Ministers Conference in Baghdad (June 9–18) that held that Arab oil shall be denied to and shall not be allowed to reach directly or indirectly countries committing aggression or participating in aggression on sovereignty of any Arab state or its territories or its territorial waters, particularly the Gulf of Aqaba.[268]

However, this embargo had limited effect on the US or Europe as it was disorganised and ended with the Khartoum Resolution (1967).[269] Despite this, the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967), which stated that 'a just and lasting peace in the Middle East' should include the '[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict' and the [t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.[270]

In 1970 the member states of the EEC established the European Political Cooperation (EPC) or Davignon procedure to cooperate in 'consultation, coordination, and … action in foreign policy matters', particularly on the Middle East conflicts.[271] Then, in 1972, the European Commission issued a memorandum to the Council of Ministers that included 'consultations with oil-exporting countries' based on mutual interests and the socio-economic development of these countries 'in exchange for certain guarantees of oil supply and price'.[272] However, none of the member states acted on this suggestion. A year later (1973), another war broke out in the Middle East, which would prove a crucial moment for Europe: the Yom Kippur War.

The Arab world had become increasingly incensed by what they saw as the occupation of Arab territories by Israel and the pro-Israeli stance of the United States. On October 6th Egypt (under President Anwar Sadat), Iraq, and Syria, with the help of Jordan, Libya, and other Arab states, launched

an attack on Israel. Israel mobilised and pushed back, taking part of the west bank of the Suez Canal. In an effort to effect Western policies on the Middle-East conflict, a second oil embargo (decided on October 17th) was imposed on pro-Israel Western countries by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) — and this time it was effective.[273]

3.1.1 1973 Oil Embargo and the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD)

In September 1960, five Arab and non-Arab petroleum producing countries — the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela — signed an agreement that signalled the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and their status as the core founding members of this organisation. Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and Algeria joined OPEC in the 1960s, Nigeria and Ecuador in the 1970s, and Angola in 2007. The 'mission' of OPEC is to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry.[274]
In January 1968, OAPEC was established by Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia and aimed at separating politics from the production and sale of oil.[275] However, both OPEC and OAPEC effected an oil crisis between 1973–1974.

In October 1973 OPEC increased oil prices by 70 percent, raising the price of oil to $5.11 per barrel. The following day OAPEC initiated an oil embargo, cutting production by an initial five percent and then a further five percent per month.[276] America, due to their emergency aid ($2.2 billion) as well as the supply of weapons and other provisions to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, was the main target for the oil embargo. In Europe, out of the members of the EEC at that time (Nine) only the Netherlands[277] was completely embargoed, Britain and France were not directly targeted (they had prevented the US from using their airspace to resupply Israel), and the other six, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Ireland were subject to the 'phased production of 5 per cent a month'.[278] As Rotterdam was the biggest port in Europe and was completely cut-off, the

embargo ‘created economic turmoil in Europe including Britain’.[279] Britain was reliant on Arab oil — it had imported 624 million pounds of oil from the Middle East in 1970 — and it was affected by the ‘overall cut’ in Arab oil production, which amounted to 25% by November 1973, and was also affected by the rise in oil prices, which had increased by 470 percent in 1973 to over $11 a barrel.[280]

On November 6th 1973, the EPC issued a Declaration on the Crisis in the Middle East. This Brussels Declaration included an interpretation of the UN Resolution 242: it stressed Palestinian rights, Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories of 1967 and a return to the 1949 armistice lines.[281] Near the end of November, Arab heads of state issued the Arab Declaration of Algiers, which defined their parameters for cooperating with the EEC, including the ‘demand that the countries of Western Europe cease their military and economic support of Israel’.[282] This Declaration prompted French President of the European Commission, Georges Pompidou, to call for an EEC Summit meeting in Copenhagen (15 December 1973) to discuss the Middle-East crisis. Pompidou and West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt[283] sponsored this meeting. Four Arab Foreign Ministers attended, delegated by the Arab Algiers Summit, laid out their political objectives and suggested various strategies, including the offer of a relationship between the two regions based on ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’.[284]

The Europeans, including Britain, thought that dialogue with the oil-producing Arab states was important but they had three choices to consider regarding the oil embargo: 1) a European approach in contrast to the American approach, which is what the Arabs wanted; 2) abidance of American demands for a collective Atlantic stance against the oil-producers; and 3), the replacement of common Atlantic or European approaches with bilateral relations between individual European countries and oil-producing countries.[285] The Nine of the EEC went to the Washington Energy Conference in January 1974, but France did not participate in the International Energy Agency set up to develop Atlantic Solidarity (2nd choice). However, in an effort to deal with the oil supplies and protect industrial interests that relied on energy resources coming from the Middle East, at a political cooperation meeting in Brussels on March 4th 1974 eight of the Nine Foreign Ministers (excluding Britain) decided to begin a dialogue with the Arab League states, known as the Euro-Arab Dialogue

(EAD). The EAD established a multilateral economic forum that was designed to reinforce cooperation between the Nine of the EEC and the twenty Arab League states, cooperation that included ‘a wide number of economic, financial, technical, and cultural fields’.[286] The EEC perceived that such cooperation would bring about economic benefits for Europe from ‘expanded oil, commercial, and industrial markets’, which included the ‘massive sales of arms, as well as of industrial and nuclear equipment’.[287] It was also a way for Europeans to further strengthen their relations amongst themselves so to protect against Arab discrimination and future embargos.[288]

Britain initially had reservations about joining the EAD as they were concerned what impact it would have on not just British interests but also on Israeli and Arab relations and American attitudes for peace-brokering in the Middle East. They were worried that the Dialogue might impede the peace process as it could turn into a political forum that focused on the Palestinian issue rather than an economic forum.[289] However, British PM Edward Heath (1970–1974), leader of the Conservative Party (1965–1975) and supporter of Resolution 242, thought that Britain needed a unified voice and a common European policy in dealing with the Arabs. On December 13th 1973 at the House of Commons, Heath stated that Europe needed a ‘long term policy with the Arab world’ that would involve ‘investments, Arab countries’ balances and development of the Arab world … on an enormous scale’.[290] On 30 December he spoke to US President Richard Nixon and argued for the importance of European solidarity and a common position on the Middle East issue. He said that Europe did not need ‘to provoke the Arabs’ and must ‘lay plans for the long term’ due to their reliance on oil.[291] In February 1974 Secretary of State of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) under the Conservatives, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, said that ‘[w]e do not believe that the European dialogue with the Arabs can damage American policies’ and [i]t is not the Soviet Union or the United States which will suffer from any Arab oil policy. It is Europe which will suffer, and the Arab countries now understand this. It is a fact of life. Obviously we want to get as much oil as we can to Europe, but we do not want to submit to blackmail (by the Arabs).

He further said that what the Nine and the Community are doing does not conflict with either the search of peace in the Middle East or with the follow up to the Washington Energy Conference. … Our objective is to

ensure that the Dialogue and the Community's plans or cooperation with oil producers are all properly coordinated so that what is eventually offered to the various Arabs is seen by them as coherent and convincing of Community goodwill.[292]

Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, was suspicious of the motivations behind the Arabs proposal of a dialogue however; he thought it may undermine Atlantic solidarity in dealing with the oil producers and that the 'Europeans will be unable to achieve anything in the Middle East in a million years'.[293] Americans thought that the main impetus for a distinct 'European approach was coming from the French for traditional anti-US reasons', and this weakened Euro-American relations.[294] When the British Labour Party came to power on March 4th 1974 under PM Harold Wilson these relations improved. The FCO Secretary of State, James Callaghan stressed that the EAD 'was not concerned with the peace process' but it would 'secure Britain's oil interests', 'enable the Community to resist Arab pressure', and encourage the Arabs to perceive Europe as 'a natural source of expertise and assistance', thus restraining their hostilities towards 'European interests in the Middle East'.[295] Furthermore, Callaghan said that the EAD was a 'reinsurance policy against further use of the oil weapon in case Dr. Kissinger's peace initiative fails'[296] and in any case, 'the United States as a superpower with its own oil was in a much safer position' than Europe.[297] .

Nevertheless, the Europeans were accused by the Americans of not acting like allies, since they had not consulted the Americans about their decision to initiate the Dialogue. Kissinger refused to accept the decision of the Nine because he had not been officially informed and criticised them for their 'self-assertiveness'.[298] . He thought the Dialogue could lead to 'European support for the line taken by radical Arabs' and opposed it at the ministerial level.[299] . The US State Department accused the EEC of deliberately subverting the Atlantic Solidarity and endangering Kissinger's peace mission and wanted the Brits to refuse participation in the EAD. But the EAD had no effect on this process.

Nonetheless, on 15 March 1974 Nixon disapproved the European move and warned them not to 'gang up against the United States in political and economic areas or they would face a reduction in the level of US troops

stationed in Europe'.[300] . Nixon exchanged letters with German chancellor Willy Brandt and German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel regarding the European approach to the Middle East conflict. While Nixon did not disagree with the idea of a long-term relationship between the Arab and European worlds, he had a problem with the timing of it, i.e. the US-led Middle-Eastern peace process. The West Germans argued for the importance of the Dialogue for the European Community but agreed that 'consultation with Washington in the framework of trans-Atlantic co-operation should be improved'. However, the French thought that consultation with America in regards to the EAD was, in practice, 'subservience to American wishes' and outright rejected it.[301] .

In March 1974, Gideon Rafael, Israeli Ambassador to the UK (1973–1977), phoned Callaghan 'to express Israeli dismay over the European approaches to the Arabs' but Callaghan convinced him 'that HMG's [Her Majesty's Government] sympathy with Israel was not in doubt' and that Israel must 'accept the need of HMG to make harmless gestures that would allay Arab feelings'. Callaghan further told the ambassador 'We [the UK] could be no use to Israel if we were crippled by Arab action against us over oil for example'. However, a few years later, the Ambassador of Israel to the EEC, Itzhak Minerbi (1978–1983), claimed the Dialogue represented European 'anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian (Arab) policy'. Yet the FCO did not consider the Dialogue to be anti-Israeli, but rather considered it an economically motivated strategy. The British Labour government had traditionally close ties with Israel and had stated its intention to not jeopardise these relations. Callaghan thought that if Britain did not endorse the Dialogue then the Arabs might see the Brits as succumbing to pressures coming from Israel and the United States and this might result in compromised oil supplies. In addition, if the UK rejected the Dialogue then the European Community might consider the Brits as being subservient to American pressures, which may have led to conflicts in European relations and possibly soured associations on the whole between the EC and the Arabs.[302] .

On the 17th March, 1974 the OAPEC oil embargo ended. Callaghan met Kissinger in London on March 28 and reassured him that the Dialogue would not interfere with the American peace process and that the British were committed to preventing the Dialogue from being compromised by the

entry of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), as this would ‘be a politicisation of it’. The Brits did not recognise the PLO as it was not a state or government and because it did ‘not recognize Israel’ and continued its ‘policy of terrorism’.[303] . At this meeting Kissinger informed Callaghan that the Americans understood the need for good relations between the Europeans, British, and Arabs and approved British involvement with the EAD. At the European Ministerial Summit in Luxembourg, April 2nd, 1974, Britain became a member of the EAD.

3.1.2 Politicisation of the EAD and Promotion of Islam in Europe

Although Euro-Arab cooperation was an economically motivated strategy for Europe involving guaranteed oil supplies and expanded markets in Arab countries, it was also one of the key steps for European political unification and of central importance to the proliferation of Muslims and Islam in Europe. What follows is an examination of how the EAD helped 1) necessitate stronger European relations and integration in terms of a common foreign policy to protect against future oil embargoes as well as the geopolitical aspirations of Islamism; 2) improve political and cultural, not just economic cooperation between Europe and the Arab world as part of European geopolitical aspiration — a power bloc on the world stage as an alternative to American power; and 3) promote and integrate the people, culture, and religion of Islam in Europe.

According to Loughborough University professor, David Allen, the EAD was ‘an exercise in self-interest for the Nine’, interests that included profitable markets for European technology, future oil supplies, and avoidance of politically significant support of the Arab cause in the Middle East.[304] . For the sake of political sensitivity to American and Israeli interests, the EEC gave assurances that the Euro-Arab dialogue would not affect the Middle East peace process undertaken by America and it was not anti-Israel, and certain discussion topics at EAD meetings were forbidden: deals over oil price, the supply problem, and the Middle East conflict. Even though the EAD did arise out of the oil crisis, eleven of the twenty Arab League states were not oil exporters (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Somalia, Sudan, Mauretania, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen) and other oil-producing countries were not members of the Arab League, such as Iran

(not Arab). The EAD was not just about producer-consumer negotiations; many non-oil producers of the Arab League were involved in the Middle East crisis, such as Syria and Egypt. Therefore, political matters necessarily informed this Dialogue from the beginning. The Europeans were already well aware of the rise in Arab political power and Arab geopolitical aspirations, as evident in the warnings socialist premier Guy Mollet gave in the 1950s about the expansion of Islamism and the rise of Pan-Arabism, and the necessity of European integration to stave off this threat. European involvement in the Suez crisis and the 1973 Brussels and Algiers Declarations regarding European foreign policy in the Middle East conflicts revealed the political character of Euro-Arab relations as well.

The first official meeting between Europeans and Arabs at the ministerial level occurred on July 31st 1974 in Paris to ascertain the foundation and organisation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The Nine founded the European Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation (PAEAC) with the aim of improving European integration by initiating a common foreign policy between the member states and 'improv[ing] political, cultural, and economic cooperation between Europe and the Arab world', and it met biannually.[305] . The Arabs founded the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU) with part of its aim being the development of 'mutual interests' and the 'strengthening … of an overall cooperation between the Arab and the West European Countries'.[306] . PAEAC and AIPU have met almost annually since 1974 at the Euro-Arab Parliamentary Dialogue conference, which takes place alternatively in Europe and the Arab world.[307] . At the first conference in Damascus in 1974 (September, 14–17) the 'Arabs set out their political preconditions for economic agreements with Western European countries', which included the withdrawal of Israel to 1949 armistice lines and the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) with its leader, Yasser Arafat, as observer in discussions and negotiations of the EAD.[308]

On May 11th 1975 the EEC and the ECSC signed trade agreements with Israel.[309] A month later the PAEAC met at Strasbourg, June 7–8. At this meeting recognition of the 'historical contribution of Arab culture to European development' and 'the contribution that the European countries can still expect from Arab culture, notably in the area of human values' were discussed. Also deliberated was the provision of the 'means' created

by the Arab countries, to enable Arab immigrants in Europe ‘to participate in Arab cultural and religious life’ in their respective host countries, and included the propagation of Islam and the Arab culture throughout Europe, which was a priority of the EEC. To a large extent these discussions had been stimulated by a study on the conditions of Euro-Arab cooperation submitted to the economic commission of the PAEAC by Belgian member, Tilj DeClercq. He wrote that [a] medium and long term policy must henceforth be formulated in order to bring about economic cooperation through a combination of Arab manpower reserves and raw materials, and European technology and ‘management’.

This essentially promoted further Arab-Muslim immigration into Europe. DeClercq also suggested that a ‘genuine political will must be at the base of the concrete plans for cooperation and must be demonstrated on three levels: the national level; the level of the continent; and at world level’.[310] . In other words, economic integration was not possible until political support for Arabs in the Middle East was clarified.

DeClercq’s suggestions were elucidated in a speech given to a 1975 Euro-Arab Cooperation meeting in Amsterdam by Dr. Ibrahim A. Obaid, Saudi Arabia’s director-general of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and EAD delegate. He said that for the sake of peace the EEC should work toward ‘an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories foremost of which is Jerusalem’ and should ‘suspend all military and economic assistance to Israel until it abides by the UN resolutions 242 and 388’. In response to Obaid, Dr. Louis Metzemaekers, Chief Editor of the financial newspaper, *Financieel Dagblad* in Amsterdam, agreed that the EEC member countries … should exert all possible diplomatic and political pressure at its disposal to convince Israel of the Palestinians’ national rights [but] … such a European activity would not force Israel to withdraw from their occupied territories.[311]

DeClercq’s proposals were accepted by PAEAC and integrated into their resolutions, which included calls ‘for news coverage more favourable to Arab causes, as well as special conditions for Arab immigrants’ such as the equal rights of Arab immigrant workers in Europe to that of national citizens.[312] The resolutions were issued in July 1975 in *Eurabia*,[313] a journal first published in 1970 by the European Committee for Coordination of

Friendship Associations with the Arab World. This journal outlined an essential aim of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, a ‘continent-wide foreign policy unity, so as to become a global alternative to American power’.[314] The EAD, according to *Eurabia*, had to express ‘a joint political will’ and European authorities had to create ‘a climate of opinion’ that was ‘favourable to the Arabs’. If Europe was to cooperate with the Arab world then it was necessary for Europe to ‘reaffirm their confidence in the Euro-Arab friendship and their respect for the millennial contribution of the Arabs to world civilization’.[315] In other words, the EAD was becoming politicised and effectively opened Europe up to not just further Arab-Muslim ‘manpower’ but also to the promotion of Islam, essentially reversing the aims of Pan-Europa (Kalergi) and contradicting the supposed termination of the bilateral temporary migrant labour agreements in 1974.[316]

Two days after the PAEAC meeting in Strasbourg, the Arabs and Europeans convened at the first meeting of experts (EAD) in Cairo (June 10–14, 1975). A Joint Memorandum was issued that outlined the principles and aims of the EAD, including a detailing of the working group areas. The Memorandum stated that ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue is the fruit of a common political desire’ and that ‘The establishment of a cooperation of the two groups is inspired by neighboring ties and a common cultural heritage, as well as by their complementary and convergent interests’. It listed several areas of cooperation, which included a section on ‘[c]ooperation in the fields of culture and civilization’ that ‘should embrace education, the arts, science, and information’ and also cooperation with the Arab workforce in Europe, involving the equal treatment of immigrants in three main areas: employment, working and living conditions, and social security benefits.[317]

The second EAD meeting convened in Rome (July, 22–24, 1975). Here the Arabs requested a forum where political issues could be discussed, which was stalled by the Europeans. However, the discussion of political issues was becoming essential, as all the preparatory work had been completed. This occurred in Luxembourg, 18–20 May, 1976. At this meeting the organisational structure and procedures of the EAD were defined. The structure of the Dialogue was outlined as threefold: a General Committee, the Working Committees, and the Coordinating Committee.[318] The highest organ of the EAD, the core decision-making body and platform to raise political issues, was the General Committee (GC). It maintained the

focus of EAD goals (political, cultural, social, technological, and economic) and its meetings were prepared by a Coordinating Group — expert working groups that represented an institutional framework (within EPC) for dealing with projects in seven areas of cooperation: 'Industrialisation, infrastructure, agriculture and rural development, financial cooperation, trade, scientific and technological cooperation, and cultural, social, and labour questions'.[319] The cooperative partnership of Euro-Arab trade for example, increased dramatically in the 1970s. In September 1976 the European Commission issued a report on Euro-Arab trade developments, revealing that there was a 334 percent increase in EEC exports to the Arab world between 1970 and 1975 and Arab-EEC trade with the world more than doubled, from 6.2 to 12.6 percent.[320] In 1974 alone, EC exports to Arab countries amounted to $13.2 billion accounting for 48 percent of total imports to the Arab League.[321]

At the Luxembourg meeting (May, 1976) the Arabs pressed for a Foreign Minister level meeting, and their ultimate goal, a Summit meeting with Heads of Government, but the Europeans resisted. The Arab side questioned the European stance on the Middle East conflict and repeatedly focused on the political issues of the Dialogue. The Europeans reiterated the November 1973 decision (UN resolution 242) and noted that the Nine were supporting the consideration of the idea of Palestinian rights, particularly national identity. Although the EAD was supposed to be based on economic initiatives only — channelling the political into economic developments — the adoption and reiteration of resolution 242 in effect addressed the political issues of the Arab side of the EAD, i.e. the Israeli-Arab conflict and sympathy for the Palestinians. The EAD was effectively politicised, yet this move was a strategy in an effort to stall the complete politicisation of the EAD and retain good relations with the Arab world.

Although the European approach aimed at being apolitical — the economic development of Arab countries — the Arabs consistently demanded that political preconditions be fulfilled for progress in economic agreements. As a response the EAD was put on hold until the Dublin Solution of February 1975. European Foreign Ministers did not want to endorse the Arabs' political demands and met in Dublin on February 13th to discuss how to get around formally recognising the national compositions of delegations, i.e. the PLO, so as to not discuss political issues. They

decided not to permit national identities at the EAD meetings; rather, the Arabs and the Europeans 'were to meet in the form of single European and single Arab delegations without national identification'.[322] However, the Arabs appointed PLO representative, Ahmad Sidqi Al-Dajani, as the leader of the Arab delegation.[323]

At the GC meeting in Tunis, February 1977, guidelines were laid down for the future, and a group was created to establish procedures to deal with financial contributions for the various projects being discussed (i.e. economic development in the Arab countries). The Arabs gave a budget of $350,000 for EAD activities. The Communique of this meeting involved the transfer of technology, commercial cooperation (specifically an Arab request for the establishment of a 'Euro-Arab Trade Cooperation Center'), the protection and encouragement of investment, a number of industrial contracts, cultural cooperation, and finally, the living and working conditions of migrant workers.[324]

'Cultural cooperation' involved the Arabisation and Islamisation of European culture, and the encouragement, initiated by the Arab League and abided to by the Europeans, of Arab-Muslim immigrants to retain their cultural traditions in their new countries of residence. Included in this was discussion on the establishment of 'a program for intensifying Euro-Arab cooperation in the media and information domain'.[325] Such cultural inroads were advocated by a Euro-Arab Seminar titled *Means and Forms of Cooperation for the Diffusion in Europe of the Knowledge of Arabic Language and Literary Civilization* that was held at the University of Venice from March 28 to 30, 1977.[326] This Seminar proposed a common culture for the 'north and south shores of the Mediterranean' and offered nineteen recommendations[327] for the formation of 'Euro-Arab Cultural Centers' in European capitals for the diffusion of Arab culture and language within Europe. Two years later, the Arab League Secretary General, Chedli Klibi proposed an 'information' or 'propaganda campaign' with a 'special, primary role', one that would influence 'all the international communities, especially Europe and America' — a project that was fully approved by European leaders and the European Council.[328]

On June 29 1977, the Nine of the EC issued a Declaration in London that stated in Article 2, 'the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation

which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967'.[329] Then at the 3rd session of the GC in Brussels on October 26–28, 1978 the Europeans furthered the politicisation of the EAD by reiterating these demands, including Israel's withdrawal to its 1949 borders; Israel's obligation to recognise the national rights of the Palestinians; and the invalidation of all measures and decisions taken by Israel in the administered territories outside the 1949 borders, including Jerusalem.[330]

Also at this Brussels meeting, the Europeans contributed 3.5 million from the Community budget to the Dialogue for feasibility studies (of projects) and the Arabs contributed 15 million, all of which would be used for projects in the Arab states.[331]

The fourth meeting of the GC in Damascus, December 9–11, 1978 was at the ambassadorial level and further confirmed the cultural and migratory inroads of Arabs into Europe. The stance of the EAD on the Middle East conflict was once again initiated and discussion of Euro-Arab cultural cooperation called for a significant demonstration of the closeness of Euro-Arab relations to be made at the Hamburg Symposium, September 17–21, 1979. This session also produced the *Damascus Declaration*, which effectively provided Arab countries the right to transfer their culture, customs, and people into Europe.[332]

While the 1977–1978 meetings took place between Europe and the Arabs, Washington was overseeing the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations at Camp David. Egyptian president Mohamed Anwar Sadat addressed the Knesset on 20 November 1977, warning that [a]ny talk about a just and lasting peace, any step to guarantee our living together in this part of the world in peace and security, while you occupy Arab lands by armed forces would be meaningless; there can be no peace built on the occupation of the land of the others.[333]

However, Egypt ended up accepting the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (1979), which was rejected by the Arab League; consequently, Egypt was expelled from the League (though it later became a member again). This Egypt-Israel peace treaty led to a temporary suspension of the Dialogue.

The Iranian-Khomeini revolution in 1979 created another oil crisis, particularly for Western Europe, whereby Iran and OPEC reduced their oil production and caused huge inflation (11.5%). However, this stimulated the

revival of the EAD along with an enforcement of the political requests of the Arabs. Chairman of OPEC, Mana Ben Saeed Al-Otaiba, at the September 30th symposium in Rimini, Italy (1979), which saw the United Nations, the European Communities, the League of Arab States, and OPEC in attendance, declared threateningly that 'We must all work together to calm this situation — this smouldering in the oil fields must be damped down otherwise it will burst into flames and then there would be no more oil to supply the industrialised countries with'. He went on to say that [o]ur cooperation should therefore be based on moral educational principles so that Europe should play its part in putting an end to injustice and restoring the people of Palestine to their rights. Unless these aims are adhered to, it will be difficult for Europe to have her petroleum supplies guaranteed.[334]
In June 1980 the EEC and the PLO met and the EC issued the Venice Declaration, which repeated that Israel must withdraw to 1949 lines and stated that Israeli occupation of territories prevented the peace process in the Middle East.[335]

Israel had claimed West Jerusalem as its capital in 1948, and in 1967 declared the whole of Jerusalem as the 'eternal, undivided capital of Israel'.[336] This was a huge problem for the Arabs who claimed that this annexing of Jerusalem (or Al Quds in Arabic) was 'a challenge to humanity as a whole'. At the Fez Islamic Conference, September 18–20, 1980, which was the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on the Question of Jerusalem, several resolutions were passed that aimed to 'deny Israel's *right* to Jerusalem'. Resolution 2 was a 'commitment of Islamic countries to mobilise all their political, financial, petroleum, and military potentials to counter the Israeli decision of annexing Al Quds' and threatened any country that acknowledged and contributed to the Israeli position with a 'political and economic boycott' and resolution 4 urged the Security Council 'to adopt military and economic sanctions against Israel'.[337] Clearly, the Israel issue was central to EAD negotiations and dialogues.

3.2 Euro-Arab Cooperation and Integration, 1985 to Twenty-first Century

Meanwhile, other developments that furthered the integration of European nation-states continued. In June 1985, France, Germany, and the Benelux

countries signed a document called the *Schengen Acquis* that focused on the gradual elimination of the internal border controls between them. This agreement aimed to create the conditions for the free movement of Member State nationals, goods, and services across internal borders and 'to strengthen the solidarity between their peoples'.[338] Schengen was implemented in 1990 by what is now known as the *Schengen Agreement*, which involved articles dealing with the harmonisation of laws and regulations for policing and security across member states and the creation of a single external border.[339] The core five countries were joined by Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in the 1990s.[340]

Various other European integration and common European foreign policies developed further in the late 1980s and the 1990s. In 1986 the *Single European Act*[341] (SEA, 1986) was adopted, and in 1991 the *Maastricht Treaty*[342] was approved by European heads of state and introduced Citizenship of the EU, which has been enforced since December 1st 2009 via an amended (2007) Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.[343] The Maastricht Treaty emphasised the collective definition and application of a common foreign and security policy for the EU and its members states. In 1992 the *Maastricht Treaty on European Union* (TEU)[344] set down three pillars of the EU: the European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA, renamed Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters [PJCC] in 2003). The CFSP enforces a common European foreign policy on member states and the JHA creates shared judgments on asylum and immigration policies as well as cooperation in civil and criminal matters, including terrorism.[345]

The official establishment of the European Union came about with the enforcement of the *Maastricht Treaty* in 1993. The early EU was the amalgamation of earlier EEC treaties that focused on economic unification as key to the formation of a political union, along with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). These three international communities, involving France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries, signed the *Merger Treaty* (Brussels Treaty) in 1965,[346] which was enforced in 1967, and brought all three communities under a single institutional structure, the

European Communities, which were ‘the first organisations based on supranational integration’.[347] In 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined as did Greece in 1981 followed by Portugal and Spain in 1986. In June 1993, at a European Council meeting in Copenhagen, the criteria for membership in the European Union were laid down and have since been called the Copenhagen Criteria.[348] The European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights have since clarified these criteria. They require that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.[349]

Two years later, Austria, Finland, and Sweden became Member States as did Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria became EU members, and in 2013 Croatia became the 28th member. In response to EU enlargement, another treaty, the *Treaty of Lisbon* (2007), which was implemented in 2009, amended the founding treaties with the aim of ‘enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its action’.[350] Essentially this treaty aimed to reform and improve the function and structure of the enlarged European Union.

The gradual abolition of internal borders between EU member states created the need for a common policy on refugees; this began with the *Dublin Convention* (1990), which aimed to guarantee adequate protection to refugees in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Geneva Convention’ and the ‘New York Protocol’ respectively.[351]

The Convention came to be known as the *Dublin Regulation*, of which there have been two versions: the Dublin II Regulation (2003)[352] and the Dublin III Regulation (2013).[353] The Dublin Regulation established the grounds to

determine which states were responsible for processing asylum applications, and is essentially an effort to prevent irregular migrants entering Europe from making 'multiple asylum claims or "forum shopping" within the European Union'[354] whereby they choose a preferred destination country, usually a rich and generous welfare nation, in which to claim asylum rather than the first country they enter.

There were various other treaties, agreements, and conventions in the 1990s that further incorporated European nation-states, dissolved internal borders for the free movement of peoples, focused on humanitarian measures when dealing with immigrants, and strengthened external borders. For example, articles 17 through 20 of the *Edinburgh Agreement* (1992) outlined various preconditions for the Free Movement of Persons, including efforts that would protect against 'dangers for public security' and would combat 'illegal immigration'. Article 25 (Migration) was concerned with the protection of immigrants against racism and the full implementation of European Council policies on the integration of legal immigrants.[355] In relation to the gradual erasure of internal borders was the issue of the creation of a single external border and the protection of this border from the illegal entrance of foreign nationals. The *External Frontiers Convention* (1993) provided an initial approach to this matter, including a proposal on decisions about external border crossings by third country nationals and the necessity of visas.[356]

In terms of external border management and the prevention of organised crime (e.g. people smuggling and illegal immigration) it was necessary to develop intergovernmental cooperation and coordination among the police and judicial authorities of member states, which was established with the signing of the *Amsterdam Treaty* in 1999. Under this treaty member states essentially transferred some of their powers to the European Parliament, such as immigration legislation, civil and criminal law adoption, and foreign and security policy by 'laying down the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the duties of its Members'. The Amsterdam Treaty also reiterated a major objective of the EU: to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate

measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.[357]

This treaty also outlined the main objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.[358]

The European Council on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has since developed efforts to improve cooperation in the areas of migration, asylum and security, such as the External Border Practitioners Common Unit (2002),[359] composed of members of the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA)[360] and national border control services.

In 2004 the EC developed the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), which aims to improve ‘procedures and working methods of the Common Unit’.[361] It ‘promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter applying the concept of Integrated Border Management’ and works in close cooperation with other EU agencies involved in Freedom, Security, and Justice, such as the European Police Office (Europol), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Eurojust (people-smuggling and trafficking), the European Police College (CEPOL), and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA).[362]

3.2.1 Euro-Arab and Euro-Mediterranean Relations and Funding

After the Cold War ended Europe became more active in the establishment of Euro-Arab and Euro-Mediterranean relations. In 1995, the European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Co-operation (MEDEA) was established in Brussels with the aim of enhancing cooperation and development in the Mediterranean basin and further improving Euro-Arab relations. At the first Euro-Med conference in Barcelona, November 27–28, 1995, which was attended by fifteen EU members and twelve non-members, including the Palestinian Authority,[363] MEDEA developed a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) that brought together Israel, the EU member states, and nine Arab states. The Barcelona delegates issued the *Barcelona Declaration*,[364] which sought to transform the Mediterranean basin into a zone of cooperation, dialogue, and exchange, and has aimed at guaranteeing 'peace, stability, and growth in the Mediterranean Partner Countries', a plan that has been further implemented by the Final Declaration of the EUROMED Forum meeting in Brussels, October 27–28, 1998.[365]

EUROMED focused on cooperation through political, cultural, and economic fields, but with the political channelled through economic and socio-cultural projects, so as to not compete with American political mediation in the Middle East. It had three objective pillars: Political and Security Partnership, Economical and Financial Partnership, and Social, Cultural and Human Partnership, and focused on increasing Muslim immigration into Europe from Arab and Muslim countries and maintaining their status as a preferential source of immigrants.[366] In fact, in 2003 the advisory group to Romano Prodi, former president of the European Commission, stated that 'the ground' needs to be prepared 'to bring peoples and cultures together' and that within the next half century the two parts of the Euro-Mediterranean (European and African/Arab) area would have integrated their day to day life. This preparation will involve more efforts towards the creation of civil societies, such as educational programmes, that have ended 'the discriminations from which European citizens of immigrant origin still too often suffer'; in particular, it intends to create conditions favourable to the harmonious combining of cultural, and particularly religious, diversity, of untrammelled freedom of conscience in every dimension, with the *neutrality of the public realm*. Once all these conditions are present they can ensure an inclusive process of secularisation without

which racist (particularly anti-semitic and islamophobic) prejudices could persist.[367]

In other words, European ethno-cultural nation-states in particular will be deliberately transformed into 'neutral' and secular public environments of cultural and racial plurality favourable towards non-European immigrants, a process that will accommodate the Arabisation, Africanisation, and Islamisation of European cultures and populations.

Out of the Barcelona Declaration came the main financial instrument of the European Union for the enactment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), the Mediterranean Development Assistance program (MEDA).[368] Between 1995 and 1999 MEDA allocated €4.685 billion of tax-payers' monies for 'financial cooperation' of the countries of the Euro-Med and this was increased to €5.35 billion between 2000 and 2006. In 2003 the European Commission signed three MEDA-funded programs that amounted to €32 million. At the second meeting of the Policy Dialogue and Co-ordination Committee of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) in April 2003, the European Investment Bank (EIB) approved €1.5 billion for investment in Arab countries. A few months later, at its third meeting in Naples FEMIP announced that the Bank had given out more than €1.8 billion of new loans and also approved €1.8 billion of new investment operations in the Muslim world. About 90 percent of MEDA resources have benefitted the Mediterranean partners of Europe rather than Europe itself, which include Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority.[369]

3.2.2 Anna Lindh Foundation, European Neighbourhood Policy, and Union for the Mediterranean

In Brussels, June 2002, the Euro-Arab Parliamentary Dialogue, which brought together delegates from the PAEAC and AIPU, wanted to create another foundation to develop Euro-Arab joint cultural and educational programs. In October 2003 Romano Prodi said that the foundation would 'give concrete form to the principle of co-ownership, of the feeling of belonging'.[370] This 'feeling of belonging' was explained in the same month by a High-Level Advisory Meeting in Brussels, mentioned above, which

stated in their report that ‘feelings of belonging now work as intersecting circles, and no longer as concentric or juxtaposed circles’ — it is no longer about people defining ‘themselves by opposition to others’. According to this report, individuals do not first and foremost belong to an ethnicity, country, or region, but individuals act as individuals — ‘each person for themself’ — and, next, act as world citizens.[371] In other words, they are at once individuals and cosmopolitans, with nothing in between.

In Naples, on 2–3 December 2003, the Sixth Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs met as part of the Barcelona Process and recommended the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, a Euro-Mediterranean Bank for Euro-Mediterranean Investment, and a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures. In addition, this meeting also stressed the importance of Ministers accepting the following ongoing programs: Euromed Heritage, Euromed Audio-Visual, Euromed Youth, and Euromed Platform Youth.[372] In Dublin in 2004, May 5–6, EUROMED founded the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures, which has since established its HQ in Alexandria, Egypt. It aims to ‘bring people together from across the Mediterranean to improve mutual respect between cultures and to support civil society working for a common future for the region’.[373] It was named after the Social Democratic Party member Anna Lindh, who was assassinated in 2003.

In 2004, the EU developed the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to govern its cooperation with its ‘Southern’ neighbours, (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia) and its ‘Eastern’ neighbours (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). Its aim is the ‘strengthening [of] the prosperity, stability and security of all’ and it is rooted in ‘the values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights’.[374] The EU utilises the ENP to ‘achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration’ with its southern and eastern neighbours and as such, is ‘a key part’ of the foreign policy of the EU.[375] The ENP was ‘revitalised’ in 2011, partly as a response to the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis, and aimed to strengthen EU relationships with neighbouring countries ‘through a “more funds for more reform” approach’ which included support for any ‘progress towards deep democracy, sustainable economic and social development’.[376]

It was further revised in November 2015, mostly as a response to the rise in instability and Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Islamist terrorism in Europe and the 'migrant crisis', and promoted its own 'universal values' including 'democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness' for stability in the region, particularly 'in political, economic, and security related terms'.[377] In support of (and to incentivise) any achievements towards universal values, open economies and so on, the EU provides 'financial support; economic integration and access to EU markets; easier travel to the EU; and technical and policy support' to their southern and eastern neighbours.[378] ENP funding is overseen by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which allocated a budget of €12 billion between January 2007 and the end of 2013, over €9 billion of which went to the southern neighbours[379] and was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in 2014, which has an allocated budget of over €15.4 billion for the period 2014–2020.[380] The vast majority of the EU funds goes to their southern and eastern neighbours for bilateral cooperation programmes.[381]

In 2008 the original partners of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM),[382] which is based on the Barcelona Process (1995) and encourages 'economic integration and democratic reform across 16 neighbours to the EU's south in North Africa and the Middle East', including Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (now suspended), Tunisia, Turkey, with Libya as an observer.[383] At the international level, UfM seeks to 'advance to the wider world' the following principles that define its 'own creation': democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.[384]

The European push for a Union for the Mediterranean continues to work towards the early Twentieth century notion of Eurafrica. In 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy spoke in Dakar and suggested that Eurafrica still remained the destiny of the two continents: What France wants to do with Africa is co-development … shared development … a joint strategy within

the globalisation process … a jointly negotiated policy on immigration. … What France wants to do with Africa is to prepare the advent of Eurafrique, this great common destiny which awaits Europe and Africa.[385]

On 17 December 2008 he also gave an impassioned speech on diversity at the École Polytechnique de Paliseau, suggesting that 'diversity should be set in the stone of the constitution' and advocated *métissage*, which denotes 'the mixing of racial or ethnic groups'.[386] He said that he wanted more ethnic diversity in the media, in politics, and in the elite schools and aimed to 'end the stranglehold of France's white, monocultural elite'.[387] In a 2011 speech on Europe in Toulon (December 1st) he stated his goals: 'a capitalism of production, regulated globalization, regulated finance, sustainable development, a new role for the state in the economy and a new European and global governance'.[388] In August 2014, the European Commission issued a press release stating the launch of a Pan-African Programme that will fund activities totalling €415 million and 'offer new possibilities for the EU and Africa to work together'.[389] This Programme, continued until 2017, aimed to 'contribute to increased mobility within the continent as well as between Europe and Africa', movements that involved student exchange programmes as well as 'labour mobility', particularly African migration to Europe.[390]

As part of the enlargement plan towards a Euro-Mediterranean Union, the European Union has developed strategies for greater integration with the Arab and Muslim world as well as Africa, as evidenced by ENP partnerships and efforts to align culturally, economically, and politically with various Muslim countries, as discussed above. In this sense, the Union for the Mediterranean is not just about a cultural, political, and economic partnership and convergence with Africa but also with the Arab world, what some have called Eurabia.[391] British Labour politician, David Miliband, gave a speech in 2007 in Bruges, Belgium, which spoke of the enlargement of Europe that entailed a version of the European Free Trade Association that could gradually bring the countries of the Maghreb, the Middle East and Eastern Europe in line with the single market, not as an alternative to membership, but potentially as a step towards it.[392]

In 2009 David Cameron, who has been advised by Tariq Ramadan,[393] said to Muslims in Britain:

> It's not enough, as I've said many times, for a party like the Conservatives to open the door, and say 'come on in', if all you see is a sea of white Christian faces. You need to see people from your own communities getting to the top of the army, getting to the top of the legal profession, getting to the top of business and, yes, getting to the top of the Conservative party and politics too.[394]

Cameron has also declared his vision for the British capital: a world capital of Islamic finance.[395]

In response to the 2015/2016 'migrant crisis', increased terrorism in Europe, continued destabilisation in the Middle East and North Africa, and Brexit, a June 2016 EU Global Strategy document titled 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe' declared that the ENP will continue to support the EU's eastern and southern neighbours in implementing association agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). We will also think creatively about deepening tailor-made partnerships further. Possibilities include the creation of an economic area with countries implementing DCFTAs, the extension of Trans-European Networks and the Energy Community, as well as building physical and digital connections. Societal links will also be strengthened through enhanced mobility, cultural and educational exchanges, research cooperation and civil society platforms. Full participation in EU programmes and agencies will be pursued alongside strategic dialogue with a view to paving the way for these countries' further involvement in CSDP [Common Security and Defense Policy].[396]

EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, who oversaw this document, presented a new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy to EU leaders on June 28th 2016 in Brussels.[397] She essentially re-stated the basic claims and aims of the document, in which she had said that [w]e live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned.

She also declared that [g]rounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.[398]

Two days before Mogherini's presentation, a document titled 'A Strong Europe in a World of Uncertainties', by German Foreign Minister Frank-

Walter Steinmeier and French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, suggested the creation of a reformed European Union based on further political and economic integration and the handing over of important national sovereign powers to Brussels, the seat of the EU.[399] Nick Gutteridge writing for the *Express* newspaper stated on June 28th 2016 that a 'long-held plan' for a new EU superstate was unveiled by European political chiefs, which involves merging all EU member states into one 'giant superstate' whereby 'EU countries will lose the right to have their own army, criminal law, taxation system or central bank, with all those powers being transferred to Brussels'. They would also lose control over their national borders including the Dublin procedure regarding asylum seekers and refugees.[400]

In the 'Strong Europe' document Steinmeier and Ayrault write that France and Germany, two of the 27 EU member states, will lead this EU integration reform. Such reform includes things like a common European Union army, police force, border and coast guard, a common criminal system, and the 'continuous intensification of political governance as well as fiscal burden sharing'. In terms of foreign policy, the reformed EU project will provide 'joint initiatives in stabilisation, development and reconstruction in Syria and Iraq' and further intensify dialogue and cooperation with third countries in North Africa, the Sahel strip, the Lake Chad Basin, West Africa, the horn of Africa and the Middle East, as well as regional and sub-regional organisations (African Union, G5).

And in terms of migration, the EU will remain 'open to what migration and mobility can contribute to our societies in the fields of the economy, culture and diversity' and will develop a common asylum system that excludes 'unilateral national answers to the migration challenge', promote a common responsibility to asylum seekers, and improve the Dublin system to ensure 'a permanent and binding mechanism' of 'burden sharing' among all European Union member states.[401]

Once again, France and Germany are attempting to lead European integration, a project that began as an elite Paneuropean socialist movement initiated by Kalergi involving the creation of a geopolitical bloc called Eurafrica, but has morphed into an incredibly expensive, risky, and complex cosmopolitan and collectivist project of engineered cultural and racial plurality, Euro-Mediterranean partnerships involving new forms of

geopolitical hybridity (Eurafrica, Eurabia), socialist marches through the institutions, the pervasive spread of universal values and public neutrality, non-European mass-migration, and the gradual but sure erasure of European national sovereignty and distinct ethnic identities.

Part II: Deep Ideological Currents

4. Original to New Cosmopolitanism, and a Critique

There are many models of cosmopolitan thought throughout Western history, from the ancient Greeks and Stoics to liberal, pluralistic, and new cosmopolitanism today. Cosmopolitanism describes a variety of different moral and/or political views envisioning human beings as citizens of a single community. A widely accepted definition holds that 'cosmopolitanism is the ideology that all human ethnic groups belong to a single community based on a shared morality' and it 'may entail some sort of world government or may simply refer to more inclusive moral, economic, and/or political relationships between nations or individuals of different nations'.[402] Contemporary cosmopolitanism is usually normative and critical of the current reality and rests on the notion of world-openness. According to Gerard Delanty, British sociologist and Professor of Sociology and Social & Political Thought at the University of Sussex, critical cosmopolitanism is 'a condition of openness to the world and entailing self and societal transformation in light of the encounter with the Other'.[403] This is often linked to global justice. According to Gillian Brock, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, cosmopolitanism aims to 'prohibit discrimination, exploitation and aggression towards others, and is, therefore, at least potentially a significant force in the struggle to secure justice on a global scale'.[404] However, according to Pheng Cheah, Professor of Rhetoric and Chair of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at UC Berkeley, contemporary cosmopolitanism is an eighteenth-century intellectual minority ethos that has been turned into a vision of an 'institutionally embedded global political consciousness' and has no basis in actual reality.[405]

Various forms of cosmopolitanism[406] have been central to socialist, neoliberal, and neoconservative elites who, in an effort to transform societies in the post-WWII Western world, have used cosmopolitan ideals to

emphasize and justify mass-immigration, multiculturalism, anti-nationalism, one worldism, universal values, world citizenship, mass-culture, global governance, and the erasure of borders and national ethnic identities in Europe and European-based countries (the West).

4.1 Cosmopolitanism

The etymological origin of the word cosmopolitanism comes from the ancient Greek *kosmopolites* meaning citizens of the world. Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412 BC), founder of the Cynic movement, has been credited for creating the term 'cosmopolitan', but he actually had 'little concern for others' and his 'I am a citizen of the world' was a 'quip' rather than a serious statement about his existence.[407] Nevertheless, other ancients had a very 'strong notion of universal morality' and a common humanity — as for instance the Stoics.[408] Stoicism, a Hellenic philosophy that began in the third century B.C.E., considered the universe to be rational, purposeful, and orderly and asserted that human beings are free and rational creatures governed by and expressive of natural or divine law.[409] It held that all human beings, being rational creatures with divine reason, share a common humanity or nature that transcends 'accidental differences of environment, language, ethnicity or civic status' and leads 'to affinity for other humans'.[410] Being human means belonging to a common humanity or inherently possessing cosmopolitan citizenship.

Early cosmopolitan thinkers such as Stoics like Zeno of Citium (333–264 B.C.E.) and Cleanthes (330–230 B.C.E.) proposed a united community encompassing all races and classes, as well as the abolishment of private property, sexual inequality, and 'natural' slavery.[411] A few centuries later, Seneca (4–65AD), a statesman of the Roman Empire, an advisor to Nero, and a Stoic and a Christian, embraced the notion that human beings are part of the cosmos and are interconnected through fellowship and reason; natural law enabled humans to form a 'universal community that transcended geographic place, social position, or national citizenship'.[412] Later Stoic thought envisioned a utopian world, a 'universal society' where worldly citizens were united by justice and philanthropy in common brotherhood in a 'great city of gods and men'.[413]

Constantine, the first Roman emperor to convert to Christianity, strived to establish a universal Christian empire that ‘would be global, permanent, and harmonious’ and would come about by the art of peace, the Pax Romana.[414] This was an ecumenical idea, a utopian teleological metanarrative culminating in the Christian Empire, which was seen as a perfect, universal, and eternal state of humankind in promise of a lasting peace. Such religiously derived cosmopolitan idealism necessarily involved the idea of a single world government and world citizenship; such notions were inseparable from imperialism, such as that witnessed in eighteenth-century Western history.[415]

4.1.1 Kantian Cosmopolitanism

By the mid eighteenth century, a ‘cosmopolitan’ was defined as ‘a man without a fixed abode, or better, a man who is nowhere a stranger’ and who was ‘not subservient to a particular religious or political authority … [or] biased by particular loyalties or cultural prejudice’.[416] A century later, cosmopolitanism had become embedded in philosophical convictions and moral ideals of a universal human community and the word cosmopolis had come to mean ‘a city inhabited by people from many different countries’.[417]

The paramount example of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism was Immanuel Kant who developed a moral theory that has remained central to cosmopolitan thought since the Enlightenment. Although the ancient Greeks and Stoics had imagined that human beings have a natural affinity between and amongst themselves as the effect of divine reason and natural law, an affinity that brings mankind together in fellowship under a benevolent world government, Kant stressed another aspect of human beings that has also drawn significant attention throughout the ages: human beings were not only social but also antisocial and possess both an affinity and aversion for the Other.

Drawing on the giants before him, Kant put forward his now famous notion of the ‘unsocial sociability’ of human beings. As discussed elsewhere in this work, he perceived human history as progressing through a natural and mutual mechanism of antagonism between people who are naturally striving to serve their own interests, an agonism that is competitive and essentially benefits human society by drawing out all the latent human

potentials possible. He thought this competitive antipathy was driving human history toward an end point, a final destination of humanity: a perfect universal kingdom of ends and solidarity, a world federation of states in perpetual peace. Kant's theories were based on the notion of cosmopolitan right, and they are seen as the philosophical origin of cosmopolitan thought in our own age.

Writing during the height of the Industrial and French Revolutions, Kant wrote several significant essays and books that laid the groundwork or philosophical foundation for his views on a cosmopolitan world order, which included '*Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*' (1784), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795), and *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). According to Robert Fine, a British sociologist and scholar on cosmopolitan social theory, Kant perceived his age as already having a universal community of people; it was a commercial age involving world relations based on world trade. However, in this state of affairs, states, acting in their own interests, armed themselves against other states and, as such, increased the risks and costs of war. This gave impetus to a desire for federation that would prevent war and aim towards peace, for 'peaceful exchange is more profitable than plunder'.[418] As war needed to be excluded as a means of settling tensions and conflicts between states, these last had to be resolved in other ways. In this context, Kant laid out a blueprint for a constitutional global federation based on cosmopolitan right and a general rule of international behaviour.

Kant thought the best way to attain a lasting peace was through a voluntary federal association between states that would gradually realise international law. His cosmopolitan model for a lasting peace was based on a federation of republican states, states in which legislative and executive powers were divided and representation and respect for the right of freedom of citizens were realised. According to Thomas Mertens, professor of law at Radboud University in the Netherlands and author of around one hundred publications, Kant held that all republican states possessed 'political sovereignty and territorial integrity', and, as a 'general rule of international behaviour' they 'should consent … to consider each other' as such and respect each other's autonomy. In order to protect these qualities of sovereignty and integrity and thereby reduce the chance of conflict and war between states, Kant wrote that international law meant states did not have

the right ‘to forcibly interfere in another’, even if that other should be despotic. He described the state as a ‘moral person’: it is ‘not a possession of a ruler’, and thus cannot be ‘acquired’ by another state. Humanitarian intervention to bring freedom to a people or political community is also not a legitimate action for another state to undertake, for such intervention would render state independence ‘insecure’. Although a despotic state violates the rights of its citizens, it has the right to form its own identity even if it is not based on freedom; it is not violating the rights of other states by doing so, and so there is no right or obligation of other states to interfere. The only justified reason for military interference in a state is when it threatens the integrity or sovereignty of other states.[419]

According to Pheng Cheah, because Kant thought human sensibilities were not wholly rational, being based as they are on self-interested impulses, they tended toward disobedience of moral law, so Kant’s cosmopolitan rationale did not mean universal freedom in a kingdom of ends. Instead, only a world based on a ‘simulacrum’ of ends is possible, a place where cosmopolitan normativity cultivates hope and minimizes disobedience and gradually instils a sense of humanity, solidarity, and sympathy through cultural reforms, global social communication, and education in the arts and sciences.[420] According to Fine and Will Smith’s reading of Kant, cosmopolitan right is ‘the duty to work towards perpetual peace that a cosmopolitan order would facilitate’;[421] the ideal of the highest political good is ‘a duty everyone ought to fulfil whether or not it accords with their inclinations’ for it ‘is binding even if there were not the slightest possibility of its realization’.[422] It is obligatory precisely because it is ‘a demand of reason itself’; it is a rational necessity not derived from experience or inclination but from the divine reason of Providence or Law of Nature.[423]

Mertens describes Kant’s cosmopolitan or international right as aiming towards peaceful relations between a ‘plurality of independent political communities’; it is limited to universal hospitality. States are obligated to respect and be friendly towards other existing political communities and towards strangers — these have the right not to be plundered or enslaved — and foreigners have the right to hospitality when they voluntary visit or accidentally arrive in a foreign political territory: that is, they have the right of visit and the right to enter into friendly relations. Even though foreigners

have this right, however, they do not have the right to remain indefinitely as guests, as this requires special treatment, i.e. legal rights and benevolence bestowed by the political community. As citizens belong to the state, to their fatherland, by birth, they are distinguished from aliens, who are foreigners and do not have the natural right to belong, and are therefore not entitled to demand residency or citizenship. If a foreigner requests membership and aims to settle in a foreign state his admission or exclusion is decided by the political community who have the right to expel the person from their territory as long as it does not result in his death. Today, this is known in refugee law as non-refoulement.[424]

Kant's cosmopolitan vision of a world federation of separate states in perpetual peace did not intend for the elimination of the different characteristics of nations, so as to create a world state ruled over by a single coercive government.[425] Kantian cosmopolitan right entails the right of every nation to its own identity and provides for the existence of autonomous nations. Hence the 'plurality of nation states' is a necessary condition for cosmopolitan right. If the plurality of separate nations were fused into a world republic, that would mean the end of internationalism, the elimination of rooted national differences, such as language and religion, the end of freedom, and interference in the creative drive of human progress, unsocial sociability. It would probably lead to a universal monarchy and despotism; one state would naturally desire to dominate all others and, through coercion, would violate the 'will', sovereignty, and integrity of autonomous states.[426]

Kant thought a world republic would be forcibly imposed upon other states, republican or despotic, by a single nation that represents itself as universality, as the protector of the true interests of humanity, though it would not be a true universality but a pretence on the part of a particularity.[427] In an effort to prevent universal despotism through world government, Kant surmised that a world federation 'based on mutual co-operation and voluntary consent among a plurality of independent states'[428] would exclude war and favour 'legal proceedings' as the means to solve conflicts and tensions in international relations. Such a federation would keep nations separate, maintain distinct national characteristics, and defend national patriotism, thus guaranteeing peace by 'an equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous rivalry' between nations.[429]

4.1.2 Proletarian Cosmopolitanism

Since the Enlightenment, cosmopolitan thinking has become increasingly anti-national and focused on issues of global justice. One of the most prominent examples from the mid nineteenth century — an example that continues to inform contemporary cosmopolitanism — is the proletarian cosmopolitanism of Karl Marx, who saw history as the unfolding of class struggle and aimed to replace free market capitalism with a socialist utopia. According to Pheng Cheah, the cosmopolitan unity of Marx was similar to the basis of Kantian global solidarity: it was grounded in economic activity and transcendent of territorial borders making civic society cosmopolitan in essence. Yet, in contrast to Kant, Marx thought the nation was distinct from civic society and was an ideological instrument of the state that invoked 'anachronistic quasi-feudal forms of belonging in modernity', an instrument of class rule wielded by the bourgeois. For Marx, global forces of production exploited the masses of working classes in the world and had inadvertently created a universal proletarian class that transcended the nation in cosmopolitan solidarity. In an effort to overcome capitalist exploitation and bourgeois cosmopolitanism, he argued that a global proletarian revolution against nationalism was necessary, which would usher in a socialist and post-national cosmopolitan age.[430] But no such revolution has ever occurred.

4.1.3 Critical Cosmopolitanism: Jürgen Habermas

Beginning in the early twentieth century, there was a cultural turn towards socialist leftism. Bourgeois radicals of the Frankfurt School, such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and other Marxist internationalists reworked Marxism into a critical and normative cosmopolitanism (cultural Marxism) that pushed for social transformation, social justice, and humanitarian emancipation. Although there are various strains of critical cosmopolitanism that have arisen since the mid twentieth century, they all present, according to Delanty, 'a post-colonial critique of the Eurocentric presuppositions of cosmopolitan thought'[431] and are based on Frankfurt School Critical Theory.

Critical cosmopolitanism moves beyond working-class proletarianism by embracing a Third-World solidarity, a cosmopolitan perspective of the

Other based on principles of global justice, cultural relativism, and the search for immanent transcendence. It views the social world as containing intrinsic possibilities for self-transformation, only realisable through opposition to global capitalism and Western imperialism, colonialism, and cultural hegemony. According to Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology, Political Science, and Social and Political Thought at York University, via a technique of critique and empirical sociology critical cosmopolitanism aims at universal emancipation through the production of different interpretations of existing nations, which have progressively undermined traditional theories, social structures, and value beliefs.[432] It emphasises global processes such as transnationalism, mass-migration, mass culture, and other global issues that have already radically transformed the traditional and existing political and social contexts of European nations.

Fine and Smith point out that contemporary cosmopolitanism 'orientates thinking away from any association with national interest or identity' by emphasising global issues.[433] Similarly, Pheng Cheah claims critical cosmopolitans theorise that globalisation is altering the key functions of the nation-state, essentially rendering human solidarity and agency transcendent of national borders, which they laud as a good thing.[434] The idea is that various global processes, such as transnationalism, mass migration, and the rise of global cities, are contributing to the development of a new global consciousness, a global form of mass-based political solidarity that is in a mutual feedback with global institutions. Such global processes create material conditions such as global networks, political institutions, and NGOs, which provide radical 'organic' cosmopolitanisms with a global reach and further the cause of 'global justice'.

A central figure of critical cosmopolitanism is Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). Habermas is a leading second-generation Frankfurt School Critical Theorist who rejects Western Christian cultural traditions but is sympathetic with eighteenth century Enlightenment thinking. In response to twentieth-century National Socialism, fascism, and global financial capitalism, Habermas has reworked Kant's cosmopolitan right to make it legal (rights), moral (norms) and backed by force (threat of sanction) as a 'world domestic policy'.[435] He perceives 'the unity of cultural, linguistic, and historical forms of life' or pre-political ethno-national identity as 'something irrational' and

ethno-nationalism, an ontological belonging and destiny, as ‘a kind of regressive credo’.[436] Habermas thus rejects ethno-nationalism as a normative and valid form of national identity and as an organising principle of political communities.

Habermas thinks the global processes of transnationalism, mass culture, mass media, multiculturalism, mass migration, and environmental and criminal global issues (Beck’s ‘risk society’)[437] ‘partially unbundle’ European nation-states. Pheng Cheah explains that Habermas thinks transnational migration (Third World and intra-European) mixes European populations such that they become constituted by individuals from disparate cultures and ethnicities, and this ‘accelerates the decoupling of political culture from the pre-political identity of the majority cultural group’.[438] In other words, the homogeneous ethnic, cultural, and political identity of a European nation, and the existing national institutions and ethno-national majorities, are undermined through the introduction and continued inflow of foreigners. Habermas endorses this transformative impact by calling for a ‘generous liberal immigration policy’ and the ‘right to migrate’, which he claims is a basic liberty like religious freedom.[439]

According to Cheah’s understanding of Habermas:

> [T]he homogeneous national-cultural base of civil-political solidarity, which is already undermined by the global dissemination of mass culture, is further eroded by economically driven South to North and East to West migration, which changes the ethnic, religious and cultural composition of European nations.

Specifically, the pre-political ‘homogeneous nation-cultural base’ of a nation represents the tyrannical ‘hegemonic cultural majority’ who respond to the radical transformations of their fundamental national structures with ‘xenophobic conflicts’ that have to be ‘controlled’ by further changes. Such changes involve the purposeful ‘construction’ or social engineering of ‘a multicultural civil society that respects the differences of minority cultures’.[440] Habermas argues that ethnonational patriotism, involved as it is in such a transition, ought to be replaced by a constitutional patriotism, a civic or enlightened post-national identity based on voluntary membership to a constitutional liberal democracy, a social contract (versus descent) that is ‘inseparable from legal rights and institutions’.[441] In fact, according to Fine and Smith, constitutional patriotism is ‘designed to integrate pluralistic

and multicultural communities on a rational basis'. Put another way, it actualises rational universal principles in national institutions because it is grounded in ethnic and cultural human diversity and immigration, and brings global politics to the local level.[442]

In contrast to Kant who derived principles of right from transcendental deductions, Habermas argues that rights and democracy arose simultaneously out of popular sovereignty; citizens are both the authors and recipients of governing laws, they have 'democratic self-determination' and participate in democratic deliberation. Democratic deliberation leads to the 'widening of moral and political horizons of cosmopolitan thought' and legitimates a system of human rights. Therefore, the political community of a nation is rooted in both 'rights and democracy'.[443] Democracy or popular sovereignty is also a 'formal procedure', such that in a modern liberal democracy individuals can only gain citizenship through democratic participation in the constitutional 'law-giving process'. In other words, constitutional patriotism means 'being loyal to the democratic procedures of the constitution', not membership to a people as a community bonded by ancestral, cultural, and ethnic ties.[444] It is a socially integrative organising principle of a nation that does not rest on the particularism of an ethno-cultural national identity. It is a 'rationally based loyalty'[445] rooted in ethnic diversity, universal principles of right, democratic self-determination, intersubjective rational deliberation, and an ethic of solidarity among an ethnically mixed population. Citizenship rests upon universal procedural rules and human rights rather than pre-political ethno-cultural properties and a common ancestral and territorial membership.

Global processes at the European national level have also been accompanied by the emergence of new supranational political forms and new global political and legal institutions, such as the UN system and NGOs, which can be understood as signifying the decline of the legitimacy of the European nation-state. These international institutions exploit existing national structures and blur domestic and foreign policies to promote the cosmopolitan vision and initiate the development of global politics. Enduring large-scale immigration and other global processes constantly feed Human Rights discourses and develop cosmopolitan culture within European nations and the European Union. In this context,

Habermas tackles the problem of reconciling a cosmopolitan community of world citizens and institutions with democracy.

If collective self-determination means there is membership, and if such collective identity of self-understanding within a specific democratic life is particularistic and not universal, then a community of world citizens cannot be democratic because democracy must distinguish between members and non-members. In Fine and Smith's interpretation of Habermas, 'democratic legitimacy simply is not possible for a political body that embraces everyone' because it cannot provide a 'particular foundation for collective identity or civic solidarity'. Regulating democratic praxis and 'inculcating' on 'a large scale' an 'accompanying ethic of cosmopolitan solidarity' would be difficult in terms of representation, administration, enforcement, and legitimacy.[446] However, Habermas suggests a 'multilevel'[447] model of cosmopolitan governance that stretches from the local to the national, regional, and global levels, successively forming a complex web of interconnected activities that he thinks makes a global order based on democratic cosmopolitan principles feasible.

For Habermas, cosmopolitanism and nationalism can be reconciled. The notion of a universal nation is defined by Fine and Smith as 'a nation whose particular values and interests are seen to correspond with the universal values and interests of humanity in general'.[448] Universal nations include the French Republic, the neoliberal USA, and the European Union. Habermas depicts the EU as a political project that creates a European civic culture opposed both to fascism and ethno-nationalism, and provides a response to global capitalism and increasingly ethnically mixed European populations. For Habermas, the EU project aims to create a transnational civil society or a 'pan-European form of political community', uniting the diversity of peoples by a rights-bearing citizenship that adheres to the legal principles of constitutional patriotism and the feeling or consciousness of cosmopolitan solidarity and universal belonging. It does not intend to 'level out the national identities of member nations, nor melt them down into a "Nation of Europe"' but rather to extend civil solidarity to 'all citizens of the Union' such that each nationality feels it is responsible for all others.[449]

Such an arrangement makes the European Union the 'new bearer of universal values', i.e. a universal transnational entity based on human rights, which 'alone [is] capable of conserving the democratic achievements

of the nation-state — civil rights, social welfare, education and leisure — and of extending them beyond the limits of the nation'.[450] To establish such a vision of European unity, according to Habermas, means transcending European national sovereignty and adhering to a democratic cosmopolitanism. He extends a shared sense of identity and 'will-formation'[451] or constitutional patriotism throughout Europe, involving 'deliberative politics, civic value orientations, and shared conceptions of justice' instituted by supranational organizations such as the UN and other human rights organisations, which establish a common European way of life, a 'European model of society' involving 'shared European values' and 'political culture'.[452] According to him, such a regional political identity, which 'depends upon a territorially based political identity situated in a shared history' will be a 'democratized regional polity' that will enable EU citizens to be members of an international community, which is in turn a basis for cosmopolitanism and world citizenship.[453] Through constitutional patriotism both the particularity of the European post-national nation and the more universal transnational political community of the European Union can be reconciled with cosmopolitanism and retain democratic legitimacy.

'Global domestic politics' or 'world domestic policy' fosters a cosmopolitan solidarity within nation-states and regional political communities, such as the EU, and can enable citizens to view themselves as cosmopolitan. Habermas thinks regional governance based on democracy, universal values, and human rights that bring together various nations into a transnational political community (political blocs) may lead to the 'potential for transnational coordination between regional polities, civil society actors, and international organizations' and may provide the first 'democratically legitimate infrastructure to the international system'.[454] He envisions 'a hierarchy of institutional forms of cosmopolitan governance at subnational, national, transnational, and supranational levels' involving the democratization of power and without a world government.[455] At the global level, supranational organizations such as the UN will be responsible for 'world security and the protection and promotion of human rights';[456] at the regional level, the focus will be on world domestic policy and will include 'large-scale economic and environmental policies' and a 'transnational

negotiating system';[457] and at the national level, nation-states will be left alone to deal with local issues.

4.1.4 Universal Cosmopolitanism: Martha Nussbaum

Similar to the cosmopolitanism of Habermas is the universal cosmopolitanism of liberal theorist Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum has fifty-one honorary degrees from colleges and universities throughout the world, has been the recipient of several awards, medals, and prizes, and is the author of several influential books including *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (1996), *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical of Reform in Liberal Education* (1997), and *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership* (2006). Like Habermas, she updates Kantian cosmopolitanism and advocates world citizenship and internationalism while rejecting a world state or government. She also thinks international intervention against autonomous nations is justified to prevent genocide.[458] Influenced by the Stoics and Rabindranath Tagore, a highly influential Bengali polymath, humanist, and universal internationalist, as well as Mohandas Ghandi and Martin Luther King, she emphasises the notion of a common humanity that unites the diversity of human groups into an open community based on principles of global justice.

According to Catherine Lu, associate professor of political science at McGill University, Nussbaum's notion of a common humanity is a cosmopolitan ethic based on a universal morality 'that eschews parochial, especially national, limitations or prejudices' and is ethical in that it is 'an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others'.[459] In the words of Professor Des Gasper from the International Institute for Social Studies in The Hague, the moral cosmopolitanism of Nussbaum means 'the principles of human justice and ethics apply with global reach'.[460] Lu concurs, saying that Nussbaum's cosmopolitan ethical orientation is rooted in a primary loyalty of human beings 'to what is morally good', a good that is applicable universally.[461] Nussbaum writes that 'all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights' and 'moral obligations to the rest of the world are *real*'.[462] As all human beings are related and 'equal', they

have ‘substantive ethical obligations’ that transcend national boundaries, i.e. they have universal solidarity and cosmopolitan concern.[463]

In the early 1990s, Nussbaum criticized patriotic pride and endorsed world citizenship. In her essay titled ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ (1994), she declared that the ‘goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of justice and equality’ would be ‘be better served’ by the ‘ideal of the cosmopolitan’ who is a ‘person whose primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world’. That is, the cosmopolitan is one ‘who puts right before country, and universal reason before the symbols of national belonging’. She envisioned individuals as being ‘surrounded by a series of concentric circles’ from self, family, extended family, and local group, to ‘fellow city-dwellers’ and countrymen, and finally to humanity itself, a single body of human beings. For her, world citizens motivated by ‘reason and the love of humanity’ should attempt to make this latter circle ‘part of our community of dialogue and concern’, deserving of ‘special attention and respect’. She suggested that through education, democratic national citizenship could be replaced with world citizenship, claiming that cosmopolitan education allows us to look at ourselves ‘in the lens of the other’ such that we can ‘come to see what in our practices is local and non-necessary’ and what is ‘more broadly or deeply shared’. She believed that cosmopolitan education can teach people that ‘the destinies of nations are closely intertwined’ and that a ‘global dialogue’ and international problem-solving grounded in knowledge of the geography, ecology, and peoples of the world and a ‘world respect’ would enable cosmopolitan progress. It would also enable the expansion of our moral circle to move beyond the national to the international level, and lead economic and political decision-making to take into account the right of human beings everywhere to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’.[464] In sum, Nussbaum rooted national patriotism in cosmopolitan ideals and values, and wanted national citizens to see themselves as world citizens who had a primary allegiance to a common humanity and universal morality — developments that she argued could be achieved through cosmopolitan education.

By 2008 Nussbaum had outlined what she considers an acceptable form of patriotism in an essay titled ‘Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism’.[465] Influenced by the late American philosopher, John Rawls, she wrote that

patriotism ought to be constrained by ‘some strong duties to humanity’ and global justice, but she also recognized that particular attachments to ‘people and places whom we love’ are necessary for a healthy and meaningful human existence. People cannot be totally uprooted and divorced from their ‘particularistic forms of love and attachment’; instead, these forms of belonging and familiarity, especially ‘national sentiment’ can be utilised ‘in creating a decent world culture’ by being based in liberal-democratic principles. National sentiment must be moral, liberal, and democratic and be ‘nation-directed’, i.e. it must not focus on ‘allegiances to smaller units’ such as ethnic and gender groups or families, and cities, and must ‘engender sentiments of love and support in their citizens’. Nussbaum essentially wants patriotism to be ‘purified’ and ‘linked to the deeper principles of the political conception’ so that citizens do not ‘exalt’ their particular nation over another, and are constantly aware of ‘suffering humanity wherever it occurs’. This ‘purified’ patriotism will also be grounded by ‘shame’ and ‘images of masculinity’ that discourage ‘diseased stereotypes’ and ‘aggressive military exploits’. Furthermore, ‘purified’ patriotism will also be propped up by laws and institutions involving ‘constitutional rights and an independent judiciary’, the ‘separation of powers that makes going to war more difficult’, ‘protections for the rights of immigrants’, ‘education about foreign cultures and domestic minorities’ and ‘a vigorous critical culture’ that produces critical thinkers.[466]

Although influenced by Rawls’ political liberalism, Nussbaum rejects his social contract theory (SCT) of justice. This social contract perspective is a thought experiment where bargainers are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ in regards to their own social identity (i.e. no knowledge of their social standing or talents etc.) and then decide the best arrangement for international social justice in an effort to establish a fair social contract between states.[467] In this way, Rawls’ SCT of international justice is based on an imagined society grounded by the model of a nation-state, a territorial political community. It is a logic based on nationalism and not on individual persons as cosmopolitans, and thus does not adequately affiliate or root itself in the human-rights or politically liberal approach, which informs Nussbaum’s own theory of cosmopolitanism. According to Gasper, Nussbaum claims that SCT is unable to ‘give justice to weaker groups’, ignores the family as a political realm of justice, ‘neglects the inviolability

of each person', and cannot properly conceive of the complex of relationships involved in the world of moral affairs. For Nussbaum, societies are composed by individual persons who are 'moral social creatures' grounded in rational social relations and who have a deep desire for fellowship, described as peaceful and intelligent co-operation between members of society in a 'common life'.[468] She seeks to extend this sociability of human beings, which is grounded in individualism and political liberalism, such as that expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the global level.

Although Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism is universalist and she stresses that theories of social justice must address world issues, she advocates internationalism rather than a world state or a political cosmopolitanism extended to the global level. She thinks that 'the institutional structure at the global level ought to remain thin and decentralized'[469] and perceives the development of a world government, represented today by neoliberalism and 'multinational corporations and the power motive', as not being rooted in egalitarianism or solidarity, not sufficiently accountable towards citizens or the moral values of local sovereignties, and not subject to external restraints.[470]

4.1.5 Liberal and Pluralistic Cosmopolitanism: William Kymlicka

In contrast to the universal cosmopolitanism of Nussbaum and the critical cosmopolitanism of Habermas, William Kymlicka, Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy at Queen's University, Kingston, promotes a 'rooted', 'anchored', 'situated', 'embedded' or 'pluralistic' cosmopolitanism both in Canada and as a model for the rest of the world.[471] This type of cosmopolitanism is based on a civic and liberal multicultural society, a society that follows 'the moderns' values of universalism', specifically individualism and freedom, 'while accommodating a cultural diversity within'.[472] It is oriented to pre-existing groups, ascribing primary identity to individuals in terms of group descent, and is concerned with protecting and preserving the cultures of established groups through group or multicultural rights.[473]

Kymlicka and colleague Keith Banting, who holds the Queen's Research Chair in Public Policy and is professor at the School of Policy Studies and

the Department of Political Studies, explain that one of the ‘core ideas’ of Canadian multicultural policy is ‘the recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity’.[474] For example, in his 1971 speech endorsing multiculturalism Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said: Ethnic pluralism can help us overcome or prevent the homogenisation and depersonalisation of mass society. Vibrant ethnic groups can give Canadians of the second, third, and subsequent generations a feeling that they are connected with tradition and with human experience in various parts of the world and different periods of time.[475]

In other words, Trudeau believed that the various traditional ethnic cultures of the Old World being imported into Canada via immigration were vital to the enrichment of Canadian culture, which had become dull as a result of mass-consumer society. This emphasis on ethnic diversity and cultural ‘enrichment’ is an ‘enlightened’ type of cosmopolitical thinking that is also perceived as a way to overcome ethnically driven violent political conflict.

Kymlicka and others, such as Hugh Donald Forbes, perceive liberal multiculturalism as a method or project to solve the often deadly conflicts that arise between ethnic and national groups. For example, Forbes claims that Trudeau ‘advised’ Canadians to ‘embark on a big political experiment’, otherwise known as multiculturalism, which had as its ‘aim’ the testing and refinement of ‘a theory of how to overcome national or ethnic conflict’, involving the ethnic mixing of national populations, the separation of nation from state, and ‘some form of global governance’.[476] At this time, the post-WWII world was still reeling from the destructive effects of ethno-national aspirations and communism and it was assumed that the cosmopolitan peace of the Enlightenment could be achieved by ‘overcoming national partialities and nationalist ideologies’ and by ‘creating new forms of transnational and global governance’ such as the UN and EU. Such a form of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism amalgamates moral, political, and cultural cosmopolitanism, and means, according to Kymlicka and Kathryn Walker, that ‘we should recognize the equal moral worth of all human beings by creating a single world political order united around a single common language and global culture’. But Kymlicka and Walker reject the expectation of a world democratic state and consider a global culture to be

an essentially imperialist colonial project that leads to the ‘suppression of cultural and linguistic diversity’ in the world.[477]

Pluralistic cosmopolitanism is suspicious of global or transnational political institutions, which are not democratic and do not have democratically elected leaders. Instead, according to Kymlicka and Walker, it ‘takes seriously the political power of nation-states and of national identities in the modern world’ and the possibility of ‘placing them at the service of cosmopolitan goals’ as a ‘transformative and constructive potential’. They suggest that ‘a postcolonial cosmopolitanism’ remains committed to moral cosmopolitanism but distances itself from ideas of a world state and common global culture leading to ‘cultural homogenization or political unification’. It embraces cultural diversity and affirms ‘the enduring reality and value of cultural diversity’ in the world, and the right of local or national governments to self-autonomy. Like Habermasian cosmopolitanism and the notion of a universal nation, it brings cosmopolitan values to the local or national level, moderating or constraining ethnonationalism ‘by commitments to human rights and global justice’ and displacing ethno-national identity as the locus of national sovereignty.[478]

Kymlicka endorses the views of Alison Brysk, an American political scientist who holds the Mellichamp Chair in Global Governance at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Brysk writes that national versions of cosmopolitan values can serve as an alternative to both neoliberal homogenization and the defensive, competitive particularism it evokes. … [O]ur best bet for global cooperation is to enhance and mobilize constructive national values, and promote national identification with positive aspects of global good citizenship.[479]

Yet, unlike the anti-national cosmopolitanism of Habermas, Kymlicka’s rooted or pluralistic cosmopolitanism is not averse to, indeed it requires, national identity politics. It views ‘cohesive and legitimate political units’ such as ‘bounded’ and ‘patriotic’ political communities as necessary for the achievement of ‘cosmopolitan goals’. Kymlicka and Walker write that a strong form of rooted cosmopolitanism holds that particularistic attachments are epistemologically required even to understand cosmopolitan goals. In this view, we can come to understand the moral

significance of ‘the other’ only because we have first been immersed in our own particular communities and ways of life, which give us a ‘thick’ or ‘deep’ sense of moral value and moral responsibility. If we lacked these particularistic attachments, and hence saw the world only as a collection of abstract and undifferentiated human beings with their universal human rights, we would lack the concepts, virtues, and practices needed to understand truly why the lives of others matter, or what justice requires of us. People must first be successfully socialized into the habits and practices of moral particularism before they are epistemologically and psychologically capable of morally engaging with the claims of distant others.[480]

In other words, although Kymlicka wants to preserve national identities and thinks cohesive political communities are important drivers of cosmopolitanism, he argues that ethnonational identities need to be constrained and modified by cosmopolitan morals, values, and ideals rooted in human rights and global justice. Members of nations need to think of themselves as ‘world citizens’. Indeed, the engineering of diversity through mass-immigration and multiculturalism has actively encouraged people to increasingly think of themselves as cosmopolitan. Kymlicka and Walker write: ‘being Canadian’ has become synonymous with ‘being a good citizen of the world’ or ‘being Canadian motivates being or becoming a cosmopolitan’.[481] By divorcing the traditional markers of national identity from the dominant ethnic group and by celebrating a multiplicity of rooted ethnicities and cultures in one single nation, the Canadian ideology of multiculturalism aims to prevent national ethnocentrism and to overcome the racial, ethnic, and value differences that lead to violent conflicts.

Kymlicka often considers Canadian multicultural society as a representative cosmopolitan model that could work throughout the world. He argues that Canada is both a polyethnic and a multinational state that recognises diversity. It has a national majority (British or White Anglophones), national minority groups (the Indigenous minorities and the French) and many non-Anglophone European and non-European immigrant minority groups. Each of these groups has the same set of individual rights (human rights) and is subsumed within the larger national majority culture, which is liberal democratic. However, minority-group individuals are also

members of an ethnic (and/or racial) community and culture in distinction to the majority national culture. Therefore, in addition to liberal individual rights, members of minority groups are also granted group rights.[482] There are different types of group rights corresponding to the distinction between national minority groups and ethnic immigrant minority groups.

Kymlicka argues that national minorities have a societal culture which provides its members with *meaningful* ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.[483]
This societal culture is *necessary* to the lives of members and the group as a whole as it is a 'basic resource for people'.[484] Indeed, Kymlicka says it is 'essential for individual freedom'.[485] Since both Francophones and the Indigenous populations of Canada, as national minorities, have been 'disadvantaged in terms of access to their own cultures' and deprived of the right to their language and land by British colonialism, the remedy to rectify this 'disadvantaged' situation is in the form of 'special protections'.[486] These protections, premised on the right of these groups to access their societal culture, are in the form of 'permanent' national minority group rights or 'group differentiated rights'.[487] They include 'rights and resources necessary to sustain a distinct culture', such as the allowance for self-governance, granting of territory, external protections, special representation rights, and exemptions from full-blown integration into the national majority culture.[488]

Kymlicka makes the case that ethnic minority immigrant groups, in contrast to national minorities, do not have the right to sustain their societal culture in Canada and thus do not have the same rights as national minority groups: 'national minorities do have societal cultures and immigrant groups do not'.[489] Ethnic minority immigrants willingly came to Canada as 'voluntary' economic migrants or through family immigration and 'waived' the right to practise their particular traditional ways of life in Canada. The primary motive behind their migration was not to reproduce their cultural life in a foreign country but to improve their economic condition and integrate. Yet, they did expect to retain certain aspects of their culture. It is here that Kymlicka assigns immigrant minority groups an 'immigrant multiculturalism' involving what he calls 'polyethnic rights'.[490] These rights are framed around 'a demand for fairer terms of integration through mostly

temporary measures'.[491] These include the right to retain some features of their ethnicity through such channels as affirmative action, the wearing of religious symbols, special privileges, and certain exemptions. These rights are conceived as 'temporary protections' until integration is achieved and thus they are significantly different from the permanent rights of national minorities. They are 'usually intended to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government'. The ideal is that polyethnic rights will 'help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society'.[492] Ethnic minority groups are not granted self-autonomy; they are ultimately governed by individual liberal rights and are meant to eventually fully integrate into the national majority culture.

Minority group rights were mandated in Canadian institutions by the 1982 Constitution Act and reaffirmed in 1988 and 1997 and by what Kymlicka calls the 'deep institutional embedding of multiculturalism'.[493] The ideology of multiculturalism has been gradually implemented, step by step, in what Kymlicka and Banting refer to as the '*long march through the institutions* at all levels of Canadian society', which began in 1971 with the federal statement on multiculturalism.[494] Since then, the institutionalisation of multiculturalism has been 'a government-wide commitment'[495] and has been carried out by a series of government-funded programmes designed to bolster ethnic diversity, which have included: support for academic research and teaching on ethnicity; anti-racism education programmes; support to ethnocultural organisations to organise heritage-language education and multicultural festivals, or to assist in immigration integration services; and support to public institutions to implement reforms to remove barriers to the participation of ethnic groups.[496]

Other important procedures also contributed to the institutionalisation of multiculturalism in Canada, such as the Broadcasting Act of 1991[497] and the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), both of which developed 'ethnic and multilingual programming'.[498] Similarly, other public institutions, including educational establishments, have followed suit, as is seen in the 'adoption of a new multicultural curriculum in the local public schools'.[499] This 'long march through the institutions'

gave ‘ample time’, i.e. ‘a generation’, for established organizations and the basic psyche of Canadians (including immigrants) to be slowly transformed by the policies and ideology of multiculturalism.

All in all, since the 1970s, the last few generations of Canadians have grown up with multicultural policies and ideology; they have been inculcated and indoctrinated in schools by teachers, as well as by the media, public speakers, and politicians, with the message that multiculturalism is an essential aspect of Canadian identity and that being a ‘good’ Canadian means being a world citizen. This is how multiculturalism today has become entrenched as an essential aspect of Canadian identity and way of life. Similar legal acts, procedures, and processes to institutionalise the ideology of multiculturalism are found within all European-based and European nations.

Although Kymlicka considers the Canadian model of liberal multiculturalism to be successful and believes it ought to be the type of cosmopolitanism emulated across the world, he also recognises that Canada is unique. He attributes the success of Canadian multiculturalism to its uniqueness in terms of geographical location, minimal illegal immigration, absence of hostile countries in its immediate vicinity, lack of ethnic ghettos, and a generally good historical record of relations between Canada and the immigrants’ countries of origin.[500] However, when Kymlicka discusses the ‘failure’ of European multiculturalism, he suggests that Europe is reasserting its old racist ways by insisting that ‘newcomers … give priority to their new national identity over their inherited ethnic or religious identities’.[501] According to Banting and Kymlicka, multiculturalism has failed in Europe because it has promoted ‘ghettoisation’, ‘social isolation’, ‘prejudice and discrimination, between ethnic groups’, ‘political radicalism’ and ‘the perpetuation of illiberal practices amongst immigrant groups’.[502] Yet Kymlicka also recognises that Europe suffers from substantial illegal immigration and has neighbours (Africa, Asia and the Middle East) that are non-liberal and poor, and that a significant portion of incoming immigrants (and those who have already established ethnic communities in Europe) have historical grievances against their host country or new country of residence. Immigrants in Europe, for example, have a ‘transnational extension of their original homeland into their new neighbouring country of residence’,[503] and the majority of immigrants are Muslim (Arab, Asian, and

African) with historical and contemporary grievances against various European nations and have no plans to integrate. These geographical, historical, and contemporary characteristics that define European immigration increase the risk of a single ethnic immigrant group developing into a dominant counter-hegemonic group that challenges the hegemony of the national majority culture, and they thus continue to contribute to the failure of multiculturalism in Europe.

4.1.6 New Cosmopolitanism

Since the late 1990s a patriotic cosmopolitanism has arisen that recognises human diversity, as well as the importance of ethnic communities to the feeling of belonging. In an effort to resolve the tension of the particular (patriotism, group identities, the local) and the universal (cosmopolitanism, global), or the dilemma of the one and the many, it stresses the importance of diversity and minority group identities within liberal-democracies. According to Delanty, contemporary cosmopolitanism theorises a new primary or loyalty politics based on the notions of world citizenship and consciousness, global politics, and a global civil society. It also involves a 'normative critique of globalisation' based on the politics of recognition, reflexivity, and a global vision of the good life.[504] It is a form of 'cultural cosmopolitanism' that combines 'the global and the local in diverse ways', resists metropolitan culture, and involves 'the creation and articulation of communicative models of world openness' often found within popular culture, but in the context of a 'global public'. Delanty writes that contemporary cosmopolitanism is the interaction of the universal order of the cosmos and the human order of the polis. Cosmopolitanism thus concerns the multiple ways the local and the national is redefined as a result of interaction with the global. The resulting situation will vary depending on the precise nature of the interaction. Hybridization, creolization, indigenization may be the result of interactions in which the local appropriates the global or in the case of global diasporas where the local is transformed into a new cosmopolitan global flow.[505]

Likewise, David A. Hollinger, Preston Hotchkis Professor of History emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, writes that contemporary cosmopolitanism encourages 'mutual transformation' and new formations

of wide-scope communities (voluntarily) created 'by changing historical circumstances and demographic mixtures' from immigration, miscegenation, multiculturalism, and various other global processes.[506]

This new cosmopolitanism is similar to the rooted cosmopolitanism of Kymlicka, the critical cosmopolitanism of Habermas, and the cosmopolitan national patriotism of Nussbaum but it is more liberal, more oriented to the individual and various groups (including that of descent) and more focused on creating the new while being cautious about destroying the old. Delanty defines several characteristics of new cosmopolitanism including: the critical evaluation and relativisation of self-identity; the reinterpretation of Self by Other leading to major self and societal transformation; the development of world consciousness; the openness or tolerance to diversity and the overcoming of divisions; the recognition and inclusion of the Other in a shared normative culture oriented to global rather than national issues; the logic of exchange and deliberative communication; and the uprooting and dis-embedding of nationalism by non-national interests.[507]

Contemporary cosmopolitanism is a critical, liberal, and political cosmopolitanism that advocates a post-territorial political community or global civil society and cosmopolitan citizenship.[508] It promotes cosmopolitan education, narratives, and identities within liberal-democratic nation-states and makes use of national sentiments and feelings of belonging (and transnational organizations) in order to further cosmopolitanism. It views the sovereign rule of democratic nation-states as being challenged from above by globalization and from below by post-territorial political communities. The latter are arising out of transnational identities born from non-European migration flows and multiculturalism as well as from non-state actors or NGOs and human rights discourses that emphasise normative social constructionism and the extension and development of democracy and civil society to the international or global level. It perceives cosmopolitanism and some form of global governance as inevitable or immanent due to the processes of globalization, which has created global, regional, and transnational networks of power, and the growth of cosmopolitan solidarity and self-identification of individuals as citizens of the world.

Yet contemporary cosmopolitanism is also anti-globalization and critical of Western dominance or Western hegemony and imperialism in the world,

especially its use of interventionist military might premised on cosmopolitan rhetoric. It is, according to Delanty, a ‘plural and post-universalist notion’ that is ‘critical and dialogic’ rather than universal, and is based on different modernities, processes of social transformation, and ‘the principle of openness’.[509] It explicitly rejects Eurocentric cosmopolitanism and the notion of a single-world culture and recognises a plurality of cosmopolitanisms rather than a single Western model. It perceives minority groups, especially those who are oppressed by the Westphalian UN-based international order of sovereign nation-states that promotes Western cosmopolitanism, as the new global proletariat.

According to David Chandler, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, in reaction to the neoliberal biopolitical global or Western cosmopolitical governance that is perceived as ‘new totalizing mechanisms of intervention and regulation from above’, minority groups are the ‘universal people’ or the ‘multitude’, in possession of cosmopolitan solidarity and global consciousness.[510] They are the universalising political subjects, the cosmopolitan individuals determined by human rights who are transcendent of ‘exclusion and hierarchy’ and involved in a normative political project that severs the connection of citizenship and state-based political community or narrow nationalism, challenges the power of state sovereignty and the international state-based order, and ushers in global civil society. Although NGOs and transnational identities denigrate territorial-based national identities and the international order — developments which contemporary cosmopolitanists deem positive — the dark side of such processes has led to neoliberal global biopolitics, described as a ‘“super-sovereign” global hegemonic power’ or global empire rather than a genuine or ethical cosmopolitanism, and has privileged human rights over territorial sovereignty rights and justified international interference and military intervention in autonomous states. New cosmopolitans are against neoliberal biopolitical governance, which is conducting a ‘universalizing war waged “over ways of life itself”’.[511]

So, on the one hand, new cosmopolitanists applaud global processes and encourage the transformation of nation-states by such developments as ‘global capitalism’, ‘cross-border flows’ and diversity, ‘international

media', 'domestic heterogeneity', and 'divisive subnational politics'. Yet, on the other hand, they are critical of neoliberal biopolitical global governance and multinational corporations that use cosmopolitan rhetoric to justify their actions — actions that contribute to economic inequalities and violate human rights, and also involve military interventions and thus violations of the territorial sovereignty of states.[512]

4.2 Critique of Cosmopolitanism

Although critical and new cosmopolitanism are attempts to update Kantian cosmopolitanism, particularly his form of cosmopolitan right, to fit with modern currents, there are several general points to be made and several critical questions that need to be asked regarding Kant's version of cosmopolitanism and its development by twentieth- and twenty-first-century cosmopolitical intellectuals. Some of these points and questions are addressed and answered in the body of this work, others are beyond the scope of this work, and will require further research.

Kant claims that nations ought not, according to international law, forcibly interfere in other sovereign states, and he denies the legitimacy of 'humanitarian' intervention even against despotic states, yet he makes no mention or does not anticipate the impact of economic or political developments of certain hegemonic nation-states or geopolitical blocs on other states. For example, dynamic economic arrangements stemming from Western nations affect the international economic sphere in the form of neoliberal corporate capitalism and can and do coerce particular states to change according to Western values. The same can be said of powerful geopolitical blocs, or universal nations such as the European Union, that have a certain appeal for member states in the form of economic benefits, but demand potential members to adhere to a given set of rules that essentially alter the existing structures and values of these nation-states. In addition, Western elites, led by the neoconservative foreign policy agenda of the United States, attempt to spread 'democracy' and 'peace' to non-liberal-democratic areas of the world, particularly North Africa and the Middle East, by force if necessary, in actions dubbed 'creative destruction' and 'humanitarian intervention'; they also conduct pre-emptive strikes against nations they consider a threat to their values and their hold on global

hegemonic power. Can these three examples of state-intervention by other states, both by forceful and non-forceful coercion, be reconciled with Kant's non-interference framework, or do they essentially violate it?

Kant makes the case that the only justifiable reason to punish a sovereign state is if it harms the integrity of other sovereign states, and punishment includes prevention of intrusion. Does this mean that those states that are harmed by the acts of other states have only the right to defend their borders, or does this mean that they (and other sovereign states who are allies) also have the right to militarily strike, including pre-emptively, against the harmful state? What about non-state actors of terrorism with citizenship in a particular state, and other forms of unconventional warfare? Do these conditions justify attacks against nation-states that are supposedly harbouring and supporting terrorists, even if there is no concrete evidence to prove their presence? If so, does this then mean that nations that are 'hotbeds' of terrorists and terrorist networks that receive funding from within the state in various ways, including welfare benefits, are also legitimate targets for attack?

Kant emphasised 'universal hospitality', made a distinction between citizens and foreigners, did not advocate mass immigration into sovereign nation-states or the mixing of disparate ethnic populations, and thought the integrity of nations and distinct national identities and political communities were integral to a viable international cosmopolitan order. He also rejected colonialism, but thought that 'colonization could sometimes be justified in terms of "bringing culture to uncivilized peoples" and purging the home-country of "depraved characters"'; he argued, however, that 'there could be no justification for the injustices of plunder, slavery and extermination'.[513] Since the 1960s European nations and European-based nations have been practising large-scale Third World immigration, which has often involved immigrants bringing their domestic political issues to domestic political levels of their host countries, leading in turn to harmful and divisive sub-national politics, among many other problems, such as various forms of disrespect to the host political community, plundering of social welfare benefits, and the extermination of indigenous peoples in acts of terrorism. Critics have also compared mass immigration into European nations to a form of neocolonization by the rest of the world (Africanization, Islamization, Eurabia), often carried out through illegal immigration and the

current ‘migrant crisis’ occurring in Europe, but also through legal immigration in the form of population-replacement projects and the complete rejection of European laws and culture by immigrants who seek to replace these with their own. Immigration has also resulted in the ethnic mixing of European populations and the dilution of the majority ethnic group.

In this context, is immigration harmful to the integrity and identity of the distinct existing nation-state ethnic majority populations that extend back millennia into the past? Has Kantian cosmopolitan right been modified to justify immigration and to undermine the nation-state and the existing political communities of European nations? If the end goal of immigration is ethnic mixing, then eventually there will be no diversity or plurality of nations based on differences in identity. Will this mean the end of cosmopolitan right?

4.2.1 Jürgen Habermas

For Habermas, citizenship in a liberal democracy is grounded in constitutional patriotism, which is a ‘rationally based loyalty’ to universal democratic procedures, rules, and human rights and does not rest on membership to a pre-political or ethno-national community. In this way, Habermas divorces European national identity from the particular and historical political community, and thus from any kind of sense of belonging or rootedness within an ethnic group. Identity for Europeans is about legal proceedings, universal abstractions, and individual interests rather than substantial and meaningful bonds that are in the interests of a community of people united by ancestral, cultural, and other ties. On the one hand Habermas celebrates this decoupling of the majority ethnic group of a European nation from their ethno-cultural political identity, and on the other hand, he rejects the idea of incoming foreigners preserving their own national identities — which are ethnic, cultural, and political in nature, and which undermine the existence of a majority liberal culture in European nations.[514]

For Habermas, ‘the democratic right of self-determination includes … the right to preserve one’s own *political* culture … [but it does] not include the self-assertion of a privileged *cultural* life form’.[515] Although immigrants

settling in European countries are obliged to accept the democratic political culture of their new homeland, this does not violate Habermas' definition of and conditions for self-determination. This is because he presumes that the political culture of European nations is universalist, procedural, and based on human rights, and not rooted in an ethno-national historical majority population. In other words, the majority ethnic population of European nations do not have a particular political-cultural life form to preserve, unlike ethnic-minority immigrants. At present, immigrant minority groups are allowed to retain and preserve their distinct national cultural identity, which is also political, through multicultural rights. In other words, the dominant political culture of European nations does not violate the self-determination of non-European immigrant minority groups because it is universal and not particular and accommodates a plurality of minority national cultural identities. However, the majority population lose their particular ethno-cultural identity in their accommodation of all other ethno-cultural identities in a pluralistic and ethnically diverse constitutional liberal democracy. European majorities do not even become a minority amongst other minorities with the right to self-determination, for what determines their identity is solely defined in terms of rational universal rights and legal procedures; they have a post-national identity only.

Global immigration into Europe, which Habermas advocates, thus results in the mixing of existing and distinct European ethnic populations. Although European ethnic minority groups have often been a feature of European nation-states, widespread non-European ethnic diversity in European nations has historically never occurred as a long-standing, induced, and enforced characteristic. Prior to the 1960s cultural diversity in Western European nation-states was a product of intra-European migration, various historical wars and annexation, and the advent of national boundaries, and was not non-European in character; both national and minority populations were overwhelmingly Caucasian. However, European ethnic minority separatist movements have been common over the last few hundred years and continue to this day in particular European nations;[516] and now certain non-European immigrant minority groups are demanding autonomy, namely Muslim groups who have already created hundreds of parallel, self-contained communities that promote Sharia law and Muslim-only areas.[517] The reality of secession movements and the growth of

separate immigrant communities under self-rule in European nation-states challenge the abstract idealism of Habermasian cosmopolitanism and his notions of the universal nation and world citizenship.

Habermas sees his cosmopolitan politics as a rational necessity and thinks his cosmopolitan right '*must* be institutionalised' as a non-negotiable development. This goes against his emphasis on the importance of rational discourse, undertaken by citizens to ascertain political morality and principles of right. His approach is that 'the universal principles of right uncovered by the discourse analysis of modern law and morality trump all claims to national self-determination'.[518] This would mean that citizens cannot be the authors of the laws they are subject to, for it is lawyers and specialists in morality who 'uncover' and determine these. Besides, do the people who determine universal principles consider themselves national citizens or post-national cosmopolitan citizens? If the latter is the case, then this means that an elite minority of uprooted cosmopolitan individuals are justified in determining and imposing those laws and principles that they consider universal on existing and particular national populations, without the latter's actual input in a democratic process. This disrespects the purpose of rational discourse, obliterates differences in opinion, violates the democratic self-determination and political independence of individuals, and subjects them to the laws of universalising elites, amounting in the end to a form of forced political subjection.

Although the cosmopolitanism of Habermas is rooted in Kantian cosmopolitanism, according to Mertens, 'Habermas' conception of popular sovereignty excludes the existence of a plurality of sovereign states'. Habermas thinks that it is 'our moral obligation to abandon the nation-state', abolish 'all historical, empirical contingencies', and establish 'a world-republic' inhabited by world citizens. Kant warned against this, arguing that it would violate the unsocial aspect of human relations, the driver of human progress, and lead to despotism and the end of freedom. Rather than cosmopolitan right meaning the establishment of proper relations 'between states and strangers', as it did for Kant, it is altered by Habermas to mean that all human beings are in 'direct membership' as 'free and equal world citizens'. What he attempts, according to Mertens, is the universalisation of communitarianism — a project that is not feasible, for it

denies the ‘significance of particularities’ and the ‘moral importance of local loyalties’.[519]

Mertens explains that communitarianism requires a ‘life-world’, a particular community with a particular identity and culture that provides for individual identity and a non-abstract or non-impartial morality. Communities are based on ‘particularistic cultural biases’ and ‘shared understandings’ and are not constituted by legalities. Individuals cannot become members of a political community merely by showing ‘loyalty to the democratic constitution’ or by trying ‘to convince members’ that they are ‘constitutional patriot[s]’, for membership also requires ‘loyalty to the cultural, ethnic and linguistic elements that also give this specific community its identity’.[520] Yet Habermasian cosmopolitanism ignores or dismisses the importance of these particularistic factors.

According to Fine and Smith, Habermas thinks that the European Union is ‘a necessary response to the history of National Socialism and the continued threat of fascism’. He thinks that Nazism ‘robbed nationalism in Germany of its last traces of innocence’, and due to the very fact that it existed neither nationalism nor national identity based on ‘the unity of cultural, linguistic, and historical forms of life’ are viable anymore as ethical norms or organizing principles of Germany and other European states. In other words, Habermas prejudicially equates nationalism with National Socialism, Nazism, and Fascism and thinks National Socialism was the sole reason for WWII. He advocates the ‘reconstruction of German national identity’ to reflect a post-national identity based on a ‘liberating power of reflective remembrance’ involving the continuous reminder of German responsibility for the Jewish sufferings of WWII.[521] It is unclear how this new guilt-complex-based post-national identity for Germany can be associated with Habermas’ advocation of the elimination of all European ethno-national identities, as many of them were not involved in WWII and were not National Socialists or Fascists; some indeed were even part of the opposition, a portion of which was responsible for millions of German civilian and non-civilian deaths during *and after* the war.[522]

It is clear that many cosmopolitanists perceive all European-based countries of the world and, by extension, all European peoples, to be guilty of something or other: Nazism, colonialism, slavery, Eurocentrism or Westerncentrism, global capitalism, being White etc. It is through this

narrative that the radical transformation of European societies and European peoples to align with the dictates of some form of cosmopolitanism is justified.

4.2.2 Elitism, Global Cities, and Mental Health

The belief in the existence of a mass global public or multitude with cosmopolitan solidarity and global consciousness is at best a fleeting and fringe notion that has no basis in reality. It stems from a small group of wealthy and young students, activists, and cosmopolitical elites in the West who lack actual and extensive representation. Cheah argues that cosmopolitan notions like a 'global public' are 'generated and sustained by institutional structures' which are not yet widespread, meaning cosmopolitanism can be understood as 'an intellectual ethos of a select clerisy, a form of consciousness without a mass base'.[523] Universalist cosmopolitanists, such as Nussbaum, are criticised for being far too utopian, abstract, and Western-centric and for assuming that the nations of the world will necessarily emulate Western cosmopolitanism.[524] In opposition to Western-centric cosmopolitical ideals and norms that essentially reject particular historical process and identities, many non-Western nations are embracing a re-indigenization of their national and collective identity and are putting forward their own particularistic versions of cosmopolitanism, including definitions of human rights (such as the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights). Cheah criticizes the Western cosmopolitan vision on three counts — Euro- and American-centrism, unsustainability, and inequality — and he carefully remarks in Marxist terms that Northern or European-based multicultural states exploit the South to empower and economically sustain themselves, which is in contradiction with the cosmopolitan vision and ethic that they wish to apply to the whole world.[525]

According to Dutch-American sociologist and Columbia University Professor, Saskia Sassen, the management of global production networks and international finance has given rise to global networks of interlinked cities not bound by centre and periphery, such as Tokyo, London, New York, Paris, Zürich, Seattle, Toronto, Hong Kong etc., cities that are dislocated from their nation-states and characterised by clusters of multinational corporate headquarters. These 'global cities' are 'transnational

hinterland[s]' and 'transterritorial marketplace[s]' that signify the 'penetration of the nation-state by global forces',[526] or the globalizing of the local by neoliberal capitalism. They are also populated by a new cosmopolitan class.

According to Carlo Strenger, a Swiss-Israeli professor of psychology and philosophy at Tel Aviv University, the 'upper echelons' of the multinational corporations that have embedded themselves and created global cities, involving 'financial, legal and media sectors', have also created a 'new social and economic class … called "international symbolic analysts"'. This new class, also known as the new cosmopolitan class or Enlightenment cosmopolitans, have altered 'the economic landscapes of Global Cities' by driving up property prices, which affects the buying power of the local middle and upper-middle classes and essentially excludes them from the property market of these cities. They have also aligned local service industries to their specific needs.[527] This latter development means that a large cheap labour force is needed to sustain the new wealthy cosmopolitan class, which for Western nations has been derived mostly from Third World immigration.[528] These cities also practice global outsourcing of both blue and white collar jobs, which contributes to the destruction of the local middle classes and further undermines employment prospects and fair wages for the native working class masses.

The new cosmopolitan elite composed of wealthy individuals have loyalties that cross or even transcend national boundaries. Influenced by this Information Age, they have strong global ties formed by global technology, global interpersonal communication, global transportation and other global networks, what Strenger calls the 'Network Society'. They have also 'developed a new form of identity' that is neither national, nor ethnic, nor religious in nature, but transnational and cosmopolitan and based on 'a set of shared assumptions: human rights, social justice, the right to happiness, and self-fulfillment' as well as scientific rationalism. Included within this class of rational and 'symbolic' international elites is the 'supercreative core of information economies' involving various professions, such as computer, math, architecture, engineering, education, training, library, arts, design, entertainment, sports, media, life, physical, and social sciences, and R-D cores of tech and life sciences. These

professions ‘are all organised in global networks run in English’, and a ‘prime example’ is academia.[529]

As academia, as well as many other professions associated with the new cosmopolitan class, have ‘integrated the liberation ethos of the 60s revolution into their way of life’, their ‘categorical imperative’ is to ‘*transform the world*’. ‘Organic’ cosmopolitan intellectuals are socialist ideologues who have high-brow academic support as well as neoliberal capitalist funding for their global projects. In other words, the new cosmopolitan class are composed of wealthy and influential elites who are either neoliberals motivated by global capitalism, or else some form of socialist (Leftists, cultural Marxists) motivated by universal values and societal transformation, or they are both neoliberal and socialist: a socialist-capitalist alliance. In either case, their primary identity is global or cosmopolitan, which is ‘completely independent from geography’, nation, ethnicity, or religion and they seek to change the world according to their elite visions and ideals of humanity, the future, and the global economy.[530]

However, there are definite conflicts between cosmopolitans and local peoples who have identities that are rooted in their traditions, territory, and ethno-political communities. As the new cosmopolitans have a universalist frame of reference, this clashes with more traditional forms of life, to the extent that cosmopolitans ‘are resented for not accepting the mores of town, country, and religion unquestioningly’.[531] For example, in 1949 the American sociologist Robert K. Merton published a landmark book, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (STSS), in which he made a distinction between ‘cosmopolitan influentials’ and ‘local influentials’ in a given town. He found that, based on the personality of these two groups, their habitual frames of reference were different. In comparison to locals, cosmopolitans were less attached to the town and were indifferent to locals, had less local friendships and connections, had jobs through expertise and speciality rather than through local popularity and sense of community, and had influence outside of the town. Cosmopolitans therefore had a lower sense of loyalty and allegiance to the town, at the expense of the locals.[532] Today, now that neoliberal globalisation and cosmopolitan elites are more pervasive, these divisions between locals and cosmopolitans are even greater.

The new cosmopolitans also tend to have mental health issues. As cosmopolitans have a universalist framework and seek to ‘transform the world’ they obviously experience difficulty achieving these lofty aims, which leads to ‘impostor syndrome’, a sense that one’s life is not significant and one is a fraud who has not accomplished the point of existence: changing the world. Strenger explains that, since many cosmopolitans are wealthy intellectuals with a transnational sense of identity, they may also suffer from ‘deep isolation’, which is further impacted by other sources of vulnerability. Examples include a lack of a secure sense of belonging due to their demands for freedom (travel, relocation, global rather than local competition in the marketplace etc.) and from their renouncement of ‘a number of existential moorings of more traditional forms of life’, relations that are ‘stable’ and that provide ‘long-standing support networks’. Thus ‘they cannot rely on family, community, religions, and national identities as a matter of course’. They also have a combined sense of intellectual superiority, moral arrogance, and existential insecurity, often involving fear of ‘natural groups’.[533]

Although, on the one hand, cosmopolitanists reject a tribal group based on traditional or natural relations such as ‘territory, ethnicity, or simple local belonging’, on the other hand, they seek to belong to a cosmopolitan ‘tribe’ that has been artificially created and is necessarily exclusionist (meritocratic and nepotistic financially and familially).[534] And they want to impose this artificial cosmopolitan tribal life on everybody by enforcing a top-down cosmopolitanism.

4.2.3 Kymlicka: Minority and Majority Rights

In addition to having their major cities and capitals transformed into global cities dislocated from their nation-state, their blue and white collar jobs out-sourced, their wages and thus jobs undercut by cheaper immigrant labourers, their houses bought by transnational foreigners, their traditions and political culture undermined and altered to accommodate the plurality of immigrants’ ethnic identities and align with cosmopolitan visions of the future, their national identity scrubbed free of any notion of their ethnicity and descent, and their leaders and other European elites making and implementing ground-breaking decisions without democratic consultation,

native Europeans are also not afforded special rights to protect, celebrate, and enhance their unique and collective ethnic identities and ways of life. Instead, they are compulsed into political subjection and silenced through various methods of state-enforced coercion such as multiculturalism, political correctness, and punishment of dissent.

British philosopher Roger Scruton explains that the postmodern anti-national Western elite (cosmopolitans) are 'oikophobes', or those who are averse to their home: [T]he oikophobe repudiates national loyalties and defines goals and ideals *against* the nation, promoting transnational institutions over national governments, accepting and endorsing laws that are imposed from on high by the EU or the UN, and defining his political vision in terms of cosmopolitan values that have been purified of all reference to the particular attachments of a real historical community.
Oikophobes consider themselves as 'defender[s] of enlightened universalism against local chauvinism'.[535] To better explain this view, one only has to return to Kymlicka's theory of rights. As mentioned above, Kymlicka grants privileges to minority ethnic immigrant groups in the form of polyethnic rights, and he affords national minority groups group-differentiated rights, which include self-government rights. Both of these groups have special privileges, such as the right to preserve their distinct cultures and ethnic identities, and they also have individual rights. Although pluralistic cosmopolitanism means that different ethnic groups are merely one cultural group among many with no single one being official, and although it holds that all cultures and ethnicities should be preserved and celebrated, Europeans are not included within this 'enlightened' cosmopolitical project.

Kymlicka does not grant positive recognition or afford special rights to the majority ethnic group of European nations, i.e. indigenous Europeans, and implies that the identity of the majority is not based on race, ethnicity, heritage or culture, but is defined only in terms of language, multiculturalism, democracy and universal liberal individual rights. In other words, the European societal cultures and ethnic identities are *not* to be preserved in the way that national minorities are granted special permission to do so: non-European Old-World cultural and ethnic groups are encouraged by various government programs, policies, and acts to embrace, preserve and celebrate their past, identity, history, heritage and culture.

European ethnic majorities are only granted individual rights, which, it is assumed, have come to define their societal cultures and identities since 1948 with the introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the onset of large-scale non-European immigration in the 1960s, and the implementation and institution of multicultural ideology from the 1970s onwards.

In fact, the ethnic identities of Europeans are stripped altogether from the national identity of their own nations, i.e. national identity now means being multicultural and cosmopolitan. They are told to reject their own historical culture, their heritage, their ethnic identity because of its racist, imperialistic, ethnocentric, and supremacist characteristics, and to fill the vacuum with new liberal and cosmopolitan behaviours, such as a hearty embrace of universal liberal values and 'enrichment' by distinctively non-European ethnic cultures. As such, the sense of a collective identity for European ethnic groups has been replaced by a government-instituted ideal-type model, an Enlightenment culture that is neutral to the characteristics that legally define non-European ethnic groups and national minorities, such as culture, history, and race. This neutralization has resulted in diminished European traditions, cultural practices, and heritage, the privileging and trumping of foreigner rights over indigenous European native rights by the granting of special rights and recognition to ethnic minorities, and the violation of the right to self-determination, which includes the right of European majorities to an ethnic identity and the right to preserve, enhance, and celebrate it. This means that ethnic European majorities have undergone a radical transformation in their identity over the last forty-five years, from a European-based ethno-cultural distinctiveness to an 'enlightened' universalism not defined by race, ethnicity, culture, or heritage.

One of the leading definitions of ethnicity within the social sciences stems from the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920). He argued that ethnicity is not fixed; it is not something objectively known, being as it is a social construct. It is 'a form of "social closure" in which a group excludes others in order to obtain a status advantage over them'. Alan Simmons, Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, argues that modern constructionists 'view ethnicity, ethnic pride, and ethnic nationalism as modern inventions' that appeared in the context of the

nineteenth century. Postmodern constructionists view ethnicity as ‘not singular and fixed, but rather multiple and flexible’ such that immigrants are ‘fragmented’ people who have ‘hyphenated and hybrid forms’ of ethnic identity.[536] Turkish-American philosopher Seyla Benhabib writes that immigrants have ‘multiple, overlapping allegiances which are sustained across communities of language, ethnicity, religion, and nationality’ and that these developments have arisen as a result of cultural pluralization arising from migration, ethnic multiculturalism, cultural diversity of all kinds and the growing demands for the recognition of different life choices.[537]

Taking the above definitions of ethnicity into account, Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism, even if it grants temporary group rights and is based on the expectation that minorities will assimilate to liberal values, can be interpreted as a form of stereotyping, in that it grants special group rights to minorities. It contradicts both the modern and postmodern social constructionist view of ethnicity by emphasising the objective existence of the ethnic identities of minorities.

It is difficult to reconcile the fact that minorities, on the one hand, claim they are transnational or cosmopolitan and thus have multiple identities, but then, on the other hand, demand multicultural ethnic immigrant rights — i.e. they have ethnic solidarity in distinction to the individual rights only of the majorities, who are viewed as world citizens. In fact, claims about the ethnic solidarity of ethnic minority groups challenge cosmopolitan ideals. Despite this, Kymlicka implies that ethnicity is a real and important characteristic of peoples who differentiate themselves from, and more importantly, self-identify themselves in contrast to one another, which is especially noticeable in the form of societal culture, and thus require special rights enabling them to preserve, enhance, and celebrate their uniqueness. However, European ethnic majorities are the only ethnic groups that Kymlicka ignores. Thus, he might be perceived as being anti-ethnic-European identity.

Another criticism of Kymlicka is his claim that his theory of multicultural group rights does not contradict liberal rights. He argues that immigrant illiberalism is checked by the ‘limits of tolerance’, which rejects illiberal cultural practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM), honour

killings, forced arranged marriages, wife beatings, and polygamy and any ‘cultural defense’ of these in the courts. In Canada for example, Kymlicka claims that the ‘deep institutional embedding of multiculturalism’, its ‘long march through the institutions at all levels of Canadian society’ since the 1970s has offset any problems that may arise from illiberal cultural practices that have and are being imported into the country by non-European immigrants.[538] Any problems that have arisen have generally been resolved and have not involved demands for exemptions from ‘the basic principles of liberal democracy in the name of multiculturalism’. According to Kymlicka, any ‘hard cases’, meaning those difficult situations that require the transformation of illiberal immigrant groups towards liberalism, will also be resolved over time: *ideally* they would do so gradually and imperceptibly so that the ability and willingness of such groups to work within a liberal framework can become established in practice before it becomes a matter of heated public debate.[539]

In other words, group rights are meant to be temporary. Immigrant groups are meant to eventually integrate into Canadian society and their cultural practices are meant to become harmonious with liberal values. The same can be said for all European countries.

Kymlicka’s line of reasoning for temporary group rights and illiberal practices fails in several ways. In particular, he does not grasp that regardless of liberal policies a significant number of new and older Muslim immigrants in the West, even into their third generations, continue to practice a conservative-style Islam involving illiberal practices. Immigration into European countries from illiberal countries, including conservative Muslim nations, also continues daily, monthly, and yearly. This replenishes imported illiberal customs, grows the stock of Muslim immigrant groups, and contributes to the growing depth of demands and claims for various accommodations in the form of permanent collective minority group rights, contradicting the idea that these are meant to be ‘temporary’. Some of the most serious demands (implicit and explicit) come in the form of separatism: separate religious schools, legal procedures (Sharia Law), social communities (Sharia zones), and financial institutions (Sharia finance).

According to Kymlicka, the formation of counter-hegemonic ethnic groups against the host or majority national society is a form of illiberal group practice. He admits that radical and demographically strong Muslim groups are challenging the authority, values, and way of life of the national majorities in Europe. The main source of large-scale immigration into Europe, both legal and illegal, tends to be impoverished Third World countries with majority conservative Muslim populations. Out of the population of non-European immigrants in Europe, 80–90 percent are Muslim (Arabs, Blacks, and South Asians).[540] In some local areas of European countries Muslims now form the largest or most dominant ethnic immigrant groups, and have formed distinct ethnic enclaves characterised by anti-Western thinking, enclaves where traditions, languages, cultural norms, and self-identified Muslim peoples make up a kind of transnational microcosm of their homelands in parallel to their host nations. Many source countries of Muslim immigrants in Europe were colonized in the past by various European powers and many today are the subject of Western military, cosmopolitical, and capitalist intervention. Hence, many Muslim immigrants who have direct or transnational ties, whether political, religious, or familial, to the countries in question, have historical and contemporary grievances and resentments against Europe and refuse to subscribe to Eurocentric cosmopolitical ideals and integrate into the national majority way of life. Instead they often prefer to form their own transnational communities in parallel to the host country. They have also gained local political power in these areas.[541] This growth of Muslim populations and their acquisition of political power has led to growing demands on national governments for special, extended, and more permanent collective group rights, calling into question the feasibility of ‘temporary’ immigrant group rights. In addition, some representatives of Muslim communities in Europe have become increasingly bold in their future political aspirations for the country, i.e. the enstatement of Sharia Law, and challenge the established institutional structures and political sovereignty of European nation-states.

The rise of both political Islam and Islamic terrorism in Europe poses a legitimate and serious security concern, and presents numerous challenges to the European project of cosmopolitanism. These issues are discussed in detail in Volumes II and III.

5. Liberalism

Liberalism is a tradition of social, economic and political thought that is centred on limited government, individual rights, utilitarianism, private property, laissez-faire economics, legal protections, progress, freedom, and perfectibility. It also stresses the toleration of differences, particularly differences in viewpoints and beliefs, and a respect for individual freedom of thought. A general definition of liberalism is as follows: an ideology that situates society in the rule of law, restricts state power to constitutional limitations (separation of powers), and favours legal or administrative reforms in the direction of its two primary values, democratic governance and individual freedom (economic and political). Liberalism has four basic principles: i) individualism, involving the moral primacy of the person over the collective and individual choice in life-defining decisions; ii) egalitarianism, meaning that all peoples have the same moral status, and legal or political hierarchies based on differences between individuals are illegitimate; iii) universalism, which holds that the human species is morally united and particular historical and cultural forms are secondary; and iv) meliorism, or the belief in progress and the improvement or perfectibility of both human beings and society.[542]

5.1 Classical Liberalism

Although traces of liberal thought can be found in the Magna Carta, liberalism *proper* or classical liberalism is said to have arisen in the seventeenth and eighteenth century European Enlightenment, when European philosophy began to be renewed by a deep interest in the natural order of things. Classical liberalism draws upon the theories of notable individuals such as Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and Adam Smith. It developed the methods of rationalism and empiricism, theories of knowledge that represented a turn towards nature to find the true origins of humanity and gain ‘proper’ insight

into the human condition that transcended Christian conventions. This ‘turn’ involved a complex re-evaluation of human nature, a major political cleavage between conservatism and liberalism, and instigated historical revolutions and reforms that changed the direction of Western history.

The Enlightenment was a time when the ideals of *tabula rasa*, freedom, and equality were used against established authority, as represented by the traditional powers of the clergy and aristocracy. It was a period of rethinking how things were done and of the restructuring of human society through knowledge and reform towards human uplift, liberation, and morality in the absence of Christian dogma. In an effort to account for the operations of human beings and the natural environment, natural rather than supernatural explanations gained ground, signalling the severance of Western man from his historical traditions. A central figure of this transition was the English political philosopher John Locke (1632–1704). In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), he wrote that the human mind was like ‘white paper void of all characters’ — *tabula rasa*, an idea known as the Blank Slate. In this view humans have no innate or defining features at birth and there is nothing in the mind that is not first in the senses; ideas (including of god, mathematics etc.) are *a posteriori* or derived from experience alone.[543]

Although *tabula rasa* was and continues to be an influential Western idea, it came to be presumed that man, in his original nature, was good. The Francophone Genevan political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), among many others of his time, railed against the corrupt and degenerate human present and envisioned a superior human past of original innocence. Influenced by the discovery of primitive indigenous hunter-gatherer tribes during the onset of Western colonialism, Rousseau romanticised the original condition of primal man in his *Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men* (1755). He thought that in his original state man, though privy to his needs of self-preservation and his irrational and amoral passions, is inherently virtuous; man has a golden nobility of the soul. He exists in a sublime state of material satisfaction and egalitarianism; he is ‘naturally good’ or a noble savage[544] — peaceful, instinctual, communal, selfless, innocent, and untroubled. Although Rousseau surmised that there is no going back to this former harmonious age, he thought that over time man can become perfect, for he has the

instinct of self-interest, ‘the faculty of self-improvement’.[545] Endowed with intelligence, sentience, and liberty, man can free himself from his instincts, and as he is aware of this freedom; man is a free agent. Our ‘faculty of making progress’, our use of reason to be free from our instincts and to live in a contractual society, is precisely what distinguishes man from beast.[546] It is our sentience and liberty, our willing and choosing, our rational, intelligent mastery of the passions that is the process of perfectibility, which gives human beings the ability to progress.

A few years later, Rousseau published *The Social Contract* (1762). In this work he declared that ‘man is born free but is everywhere in chains’; it was not liberty but the ‘law of property and inequality … labour, servitude, and misery’ that defined modern life.[547] At this time, ideas of Enlightenment progress became associated with individual prosperity, the wealth of the nation, and limited government. The Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith (1723–1790) explained in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) that individual economic competition between free enlightened individuals — the ambitions, self-interests, and egoisms of men — formed a system of natural liberty that by ‘the rule of justice’ provided wealth, prosperity, stability, and progress to the social order. Profits and material wealth from individual self-interest in a market economy, or laissez-faire capitalism, ultimately trickle back, by an ‘invisible hand’, into society as a public good, which essentially leads to economic progression and happiness, or to a ‘natural progress of opulence’.[548] Smith also advocated limited government: the state should have a restricted role in society, upholding only the fundamental aspects of public order such as the armed forces, law enforcement, education, infrastructure, and legal rights, and should have limited interference in the market economy (no tariffs or subsidies affecting supply and demand), an arrangement he thought would lead to greater democracy and freedom.[549] These ideas of limited government, free-market capitalism, and the ‘invisible hand’ have dominated the liberal political-economy of Western societies since their inception, albeit with various additions and amendments, until they were seriously challenged by the 1930s Great Depression.

The Enlightenment ideas of a blank slate at birth, an inherently good human nature, and human perfectibility and progress became central

theoretical tools of Enlightenment rationalism,[550] a dominant view of history that perceives an increasing development and universalisation of human knowledge, institutions, laws, and happiness and a future World Federation of States in Perpetual Peace. Overall, Enlightenment rationalism envisions the building of a new world society through knowledge, reform, and the universal promotion of the ideals of liberty, equality, prosperity, peace and fraternity. Human beings and the natural environment are seen as malleable and are to be mastered — that is, altered, shaped, and created, so as to align them with the vision of a progressive secular society in pursuit of virtue, truth, freedom, and prosperity on a mass scale. Liberalism has utilised industrialism, technology, urbanism, and rationalism, and employed empirical observation, rational management, economic freedom, and secular regulation to transform social reality into a more perfect type.[551]

As Classical Liberalism is situated in the delegitimization of the authority of the Church and religion in human life, and separates politics from the realm of economics, it also appeals to tradition-independent norms that can be applied universally. It aims to provide to the world a political, economic, legal framework with rationally justifiable principles (freedom, liberty, equality) which are divorced from any historical tradition, and which, it is hoped, will allow for peaceful relations between different peoples and nations. The aim is to create a harmonious global order in which everyone co-exists in an open, liberal-democratic society. Two of the most important historical events in Western European history to encapsulate these aims are: the codification of a foundational document of liberalism in 1789, the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* (similar to the American *Declaration of Independence* that was likewise based on an idea of universal natural rights)[552] and the French Revolution (1789–1799), which overthrew the aristocratic monarchy, established a republic based on radical and liberal Enlightenment ideals, and created massive turmoil (Napoleonic wars) and the spread of classical liberalism across most of Europe.[553]

5.2 Modern, Social or New Liberalism

In comparison to classical liberalism, modern liberalism, also known as social or new liberalism (Leftism), arose as a political movement in reaction

to the social and economic consequences of the 1930s Great Depression. It is based on social welfare, egalitarianism, and the economics of John Maynard Keynes (1945–1970) and draws upon the theories of other such notables as Karl Marx, J. S. Mill, Matthew Arnold, and John Rawls. Although social liberalism shares classical liberal ideas of the individual and individual rights, it pushes these further by advocating civil rights, civil liberties and social justice, supporting groups and collective rights over individual rights and responsibilities, and promoting affirmative action (racial preference policies) and identity politics. It rejects the creation of wealth through free markets based on private property and instead advocates for a Marxist correction of free-market inequalities and an expanded role of the state in the economy, such as more influence on the regulation of the marketplace, the redistribution of wealth (through higher taxes) and power, and the supplying of essential goods and social services to all in a welfare state. Modern liberalism has been a central force in the implementation of social-welfare programs across the Western world. Initiatives such as social liberal reforms in the UK (supported by Fabian socialists John Maynard Keynes, William Beveridge, and Winston Churchill) and social liberal policies in America (such as the New Deal, supported by the Social Democrats) created what are known as welfare states that became particularly prevalent in the post-WWII era.[554]

Although social liberalism proper arose after the Great Depression, it has roots in the growing appeal of socialism in the late nineteenth century that was initiated by Karl Marx and his theses on dialectical or historical materialism and the end of capitalism. Marx argued that socio-economic circumstances determine consciousness and that all history is ‘absorbed into an economic process’ and is moving linearly forward toward ‘a final world revolution and world renovation’, which was to come after capitalism. He saw capitalistic society as being divided into proletariat and bourgeoisie, with the proletariat being ‘enslaved to alien power, to capital’ and suffering from alienation due to the existence of private property. He claimed that the industrial and scientific powers had become the master of man and nature, altering the relationship of man with his production (as for example through the specialised division of labour), and had objectified things, concretised abstract exchange values, exploited man economically and rendered his life empty and uninspired. He argued that ‘modern society cannot exist without

constantly revolutionising the instruments of social relations of production' and that the historical pattern of advance was about the struggle between social classes, a dialectic between oppressors and oppressed, between forces of production and social conditions. Historical progress for Marx occurred through economic antagonisms. He thought that capitalism was the 'last antagonistic form of the social process of production' and saw the proletariat achieving 'the eschatological aim of history by [an explosive] world revolution' to overcome the bourgeoisie.[555]

Marx envisioned the abolishment of private property, competition, and profit and a collectivist, centralised absolute political power, a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in which the working class of the world unite to end history as progress.[556] This could be achieved by the working class becoming new men, the communists, and transforming the existing socio-economic order into a classless society in which men are in charge of their own social development, and the desires of individuals and social relations are united in 'an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all'.[557]

By the end of the nineteenth century modern man had come to emphasise gradual progress in the material world, gradual progress on Earth toward a secular goal without god and without providence. The belief in a future goal was framed in terms of the material perfectibility of man, the totalising of the world under one powerful and secular empire, and the complete mastery of man over his environment in terms of profit. The West saw everything according to its own values and interpreted all non-Western peoples as being at a previous stage of human development. Progress was perceived to be a universal and spiritual motivating force, an impersonal, secular and material teleology of progressive and successive evolution, manifesting the developments in learning and intelligence, in achievements and advances of science and industry, of new tools and technologies, of a growing economy and the production of material comforts, of increasing types of entertainment and leisure, and of rights and freedoms. It was affirmed in the movements of socialism and communism, in revolts, strikes, and new organisations of the working class and also in world fairs and exhibitions, such as the 1933 Chicago World Fair, titled 'A Century of Progress'.[558] Attempts to hasten and to clear away any obstacles to progress via methods

of humanitarian intervention focused on resolving the conditions of poverty, insecurity, and deprivation caused by capitalism.

Although the belief in liberal economic progress survived the Great Depression, modern liberals argued for political intervention in social and economic issues through cultural government planning and regulation and adopted a proliferation of social reforms based on social science methods. These social reformers were democratic politicians and liberal intellectuals, as well as sociologists who wanted to shape the future using social engineering to identify problems and develop government programmes that were divorced from traditional institutions. There were five main intellectuals that influenced the transition from classical to new liberalism and advocated greater state intervention based on applied social science. British liberal political theorist, sociologist, and former Fabian L. T. Hobhouse (1864–1929) called for more state intervention and suggested a 'conditional teleology', or the 'fusing of biological, social, and moral progress' with social-science-informed guidance by the government. English social scientist and member of the Fabian Society J. A. Hobson (1858–1940) argued for state regulation of economic and social progress from the use of social scientific principles that produce 'enlightened political legislation'. American sociologist Lester Frank Ward (1841–1913) suggested 'social telesis', meaning government and education were to guide and hasten natural progress. Norwegian-American economist, sociologist, and Fabian Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) suggested the expansion of governmental power, legislation and reason into all areas of human life so as to ameliorate the social conditions produced by capitalism. And American philosopher and Fabian John Dewey argued for rational progression through the instrumental reform of society, education, and morality.[559]

Morality for social liberals rests not upon moral realism but relativism. Moral relativism is a radical individuality stemming from the Enlightenment emphasis on individualism, on the subjective and personal interpretation of morality and the denial of *telos*. The work of this historical period revealed the situational context of all inquiry, leading to the view that different traditions have different standards of rational justification. There can be no objective and impersonal standard of right and wrong, since each tradition is revealed to have its own standards and its own logic,

and therefore none is better than any other. Disputes between these different ethical systems cannot be rationally terminated. In this way there is a lack of *rational* moral argument in contemporary liberal society, i.e. we are stuck with perpetual assertion and counter-assertion in arguments. In other words, there is no rational method to secure agreement about true and false moral judgments. Moral argument is often about 'expressive assertion' says Scottish moral and political philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. The adoption of a position, a stance on a particular moral matter is because of a 'non-rational decision', and thus it is a 'disquieting private arbitrariness'. Its main tenet is that anything is permitted; there is no universal or sacred morality (other than individual human rights). This leads to the degradation of values, for moral human relationships in the social milieu involve people treating each other as an end in themselves, whereas non-moral human relationships, i.e. in contemporary liberal society, involve people treating one another as a means to an end. This latter form of social relationship involves individual wills with own attitudes and preferences meeting and using each other to achieve some satisfaction, and in this way it is all about opportunities for enjoyment and the prevention of boredom. This type of social interaction also involves a 'manipulative mode of moral instrumentalism', or persuasion rather than normative rationality.[560]

In response to the metaphysical void left by the 'death of god', itself produced by Enlightenment rationalism and science, and by the failure of secularism to provide any viable objective moral standards due to moral relativism, in the 1930s social liberalism, influenced by analytical philosophy and logical positivism, declared man to be emotivist. Stemming from the theories of A. J. Ayer, particularly his book *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936), and the theories of C. L. Stevenson, especially his papers entitled 'The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms' (1937) and 'Persuasive Definitions' (1938) and his book *Ethics and Language* (1944), the doctrine of emotivism holds that evaluative or moral judgments 'are *nothing* but expressions of preference, experience of attitude of feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character'. It denies the rational justification of objective moral standards, yet it utters universal principles, which are apparently only based on preferences 'embodied in our culture'.[561] Liberal emotivists are historicists; they are sceptical towards metanarratives because grand theories dismiss the chaos and disorder of the universe and

ignore the heterogeneity and variety of human existence. They also hold the belief that grand narratives are created and reinforced by power structures, such as the church, and so are untrustworthy and, in general, provide an unacceptable view of historical development as progress towards a specific universal goal. Liberal emotivists argue that the promotion of universal principles and norms alienates men. What is valuable is the local and temporal; localised narratives, local contexts and specifics. However, emotivists also retain and defend the belief that there are immutable laws in history — that the natural law of progress can explain the historical evolution of humanity.

Social liberalism is close to Fabian socialism and cultural Marxism in that it advocates more government intervention to achieve social equality, and rejects traditional Christianity, absolute moral standards, and various other ‘older’ institutional cultural and political structures. It also stresses democracy, individual rights, freedoms, and social justice, and emphasises Enlightenment rationalism, progress, social science engineering, and reformism to exact transformative changes in existing society, towards a socialist good.

Two separate but interlinked political views, neoliberalism and neoconservatism, developed in the late 1950s and 60s as a response to the implementation of new or socialist liberalism.

5.3 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a distinct politico-economic liberal ideology that arose after WWII and became prevalent in the 1970s as a response to economic and social problems arising from modern or social liberalism. After WWII, European and American economists suggested a third way between classical liberalism and socialist planning, arguing that ‘the only protection against dictatorship, fascism, or rule by military junta was individual freedom, which only a weak government and unfettered, free-market capitalism could preserve’.[562] Fabian-socialist Keynesian economics was viewed as ‘interfering with the free market’, social liberal welfare spending was perceived as creating a ‘dependency culture’, and trade unions were seen as causing ‘high wages and industrial disruption’. American economist Milton Friedman (1912–2006) and other writers influenced by the liberal

economic theories of the founders of the Mont Pèlerin Society — Austrian-British Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992) and Austrian-American Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) — suggested the need for a 'reversal of social liberalism' through economic deregulation, privatization, and reduced funding for social services. Friedman advocated monetarism, a theory that the money supply should determine GDP and prices, and that the control of the money supply can stabilise the economy. Neoliberalism defined the governments of British PM Margaret Thatcher and American President Ronald Reagan.[563]

The central feature of neoliberalism is economic liberalism, whereby society is principally governed by free-market and free-trade mechanisms (the political is subsumed by the economic), but it continues to share several principles in common with liberalism *proper*, such as belief in the rights of the individual, individual freedom of choice (natural law), and minimal state intervention in the economy. According to David Harvey, social scientist and Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that proposed that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate for such practices such as safeguarding individual and commercial liberty and private property rights.[564]

Neoliberalism also considers democracy to be flexible when it comes to neoliberal reforms. In their 2007 paper 'What is Neoliberalism?', associate professor of political science at the University of South Norway, Dag Einar Thorsen, and co-author Amund Lie, state that if the democratic process slows down neoliberal reforms, or threatens individual or commercial liberty, which it sometimes does, then democracy ought to be sidestepped and replaced by the rule of experts or legal instruments designed for that purpose.[565]

In fact, neoliberal political reforms have been criticised for limiting democratic governance and the political authority of society, which have relocated power from the political (the state, legislature/lawmakers, and

executive authorities) to the economic (individuals, markets, and corporations) and judiciary (judgment authorities). As such, market mechanisms are increasingly extended into all aspects of society by state intervention, while at the same time a neoliberal economy is not controlled by the power of the state, but by other actors, such as rich and powerful individuals, groups, and domestic and international corporations that monopolize the economy, have economic endeavours that do not necessarily bear the interests of society in mind, and influence the political governance of states; corporations rather than the people increasingly effect societal governance. Individuals have freedom within a realm of talents and enterprises, which makes neoliberalism oligarchic and meritocratic rather than democratic, and individuals and groups are defined in terms of the marketability of their skills. In other words, a society and individuals are defined in terms of the economy, rather than the political.[566]

Neoliberalism goes beyond issues of domestic social economics to extend to the international or global financial system. At the international level, neoliberalism is a system of free markets and free trade that is regulated, in terms of assuring commercial liberty and property rights, and forms the capitalist world economy. It ‘favors the opening of foreign markets by political means, using diplomacy, economic pressure and, for some neoliberals, military might’ and multilateral political pressure through international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Bretton Woods, the United Nations, and the African Development Bank.[567]

International capitalism became a main tool of post-WWII ‘take-off’ theories, a method of modernization and development of the whole world via capitalist interventionist policies. Former Howard Payne University Professor Joseph Weatherby described their goal: ‘to create a critical mass of concentrated capital that will support takeoff of Other World economies into sustained economic growth’.[568] It is thought that Other World economies can achieve self-sustaining growth in a capitalist world economy; this is an inundation of the utopian promise of eventual material abundance for all via large scale industries and the creation of jobs. Take-off theories attribute problems of inequality to the necessities of progress. Human beings are thought to be unequal in essence; it is necessary for

human evolution that a top few have unencumbered progress, thus supporting the imperialistic agendas of the most powerful nations. This approach is justified by economists such as proponents of Mont Pèlerin capitalism and social evolutionism. Of course, capitalism is responsible for the increase in life expectancy, literacy, access to education, and development of infrastructure in these 'un-developed' countries. Yet, take-off development strategy is implemented to intentionally benefit the strong, as it is focused on individual gain rather than egalitarianism, and structural adjustment programmes and other loan programmes create massive debt and the dependence of these 'developing' countries on the 'strong'.[569] In these ways, hierarchy and elitism characterise neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism is associated with the spread of global capitalism and consumerism and the increasing power and wealth of transnational corporations and elite groups. Its critics argue that it is a politico-economic ideology that advocates 'a globalized economy under the implicit control of an international financial elite outside the regulative power of any state jurisdiction' and 'favors the creation of an international system of consumption, production, financing, [and] a drastic reduction of state power which is accomplished by [the] local political elite of all the state which is serving local and global financial interests'.[570] According to the late political scientist and social activist Jean Hardisty, neoliberalism has become characterized by the use of international loans and other mechanisms to suppress unions, squelch regulation, elevate corporate privilege, privatize public services, and protect the holdings of the wealthy.[571]

American sociologist David Fasenfest argues that neoliberal foreign policies are an attempt to alter the legislative landscape in countries around the globe in order to accommodate globalization, to attack social welfare by forcing countries to impose 'austerity' policies that create a more compliant labor force, and to promote financialization of economic activities for short-term gains at the expense of long-term growth and development.[572]

Many other opponents of neoliberalism, particularly of its activities at the global level, also accuse it of being a form of exploitation and neocolonialism. For example, Louise Racine, Professor in the Department of Health Sciences at the University of Saskatchewan and Amélie Perron, Associate Professor in the Faculty of Health Sciences at the University of

Ottawa, write that globalization and neoliberalism are ‘neocolonialist discourses and practices from which social injustice arises’ and that ‘corporate capital and transnational trade jeopardize democracy, human rights, freedom of speech and social agency because of their effects on economic and financial systems worldwide’.[573] Professor Henry A. Giroux, who holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest at McMaster University, writes that Wedded to the belief that the market should be the organizing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism wages an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, the welfare state, and non-commodified values. Under neoliberalism, everything is either for sale or is plundered for profit.[574]
Author Mary C. Diang writes that ‘Neocolonialism and neoliberalism are all offshoots or veiled forms of colonialism’[575] and Researchgate member Louis Brassard writes that neoliberalism ‘is a generalization of colonialism to the whole world under an international financial elite. It is a financial refeudalization of the world’.[576]

Global neoliberalism has also led to a radical opposition as well as large-scale emigration to the Western world. According to Roderick Parkes, a senior analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), writing a brief for EUISS titled *Tourism, Terrorism, and Migration* (April 2016), ‘Wherever the West has promoted globalisation [in terms of economic modernisation], radical groups have emerged to oppose it’ and many ‘young workers, seeking a way out of the dead-end jobs, may turn to radical groups or consider the emigration option’. He further writes that Western states ‘increasingly view the growth in terrorism and disorderly migration as an intrinsic part of the development process — economic modernisation is now conceived as an automatic trigger of violent extremism and migration’.[577] In other words, neoliberalism is viewed by its proponents as a form of creative-destruction, which, as we shall see, is in line with the goals of neoconservatism.

6. Conservatism: Classical to Neoconservatism

Russell Kirk, a renowned American conservative who helped found two conservative journals, *National Review* (1955) and *Modern Age* (1957), describes conservatism as ‘neither a religion nor an ideology’ but rather ‘a state of mind, a type of character, a way of looking at the civic social order’ that is ‘sustained by a body of sentiments, rather than by a system of ideological dogmata’.[578] Often called classical or paleoconservatism, conservatism emerged as a social and political movement in response to Enlightenment rationalism, the spread of democracy, science, and capitalism, and the French Revolution. It provided a critique of the abstract social theorizing and universalism of progressive liberal policies on radical change.

6.1 Paleoconservatism

According to Arthur Herman, an American historian and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, classical conservatism insisted that ‘material comfort and opulence has drained away all creativity and life’. Striving and struggle were lacking, which produced pervasive disillusionment and despair and the ‘soft and effeminate’ base personality of narcissistic philistines and decadents.[579] In this context, former American sociologist Robert Nisbet wrote that Conservatives brought in ‘a profound doubt’ about the qualities of utilitarian and progressive social development.[580] French political scientist and historian Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), for example, thought that democracy could produce a ‘majority tyranny’, a despotic and dark side of democratic equality that reduces arts and sciences, creates boredom from wealth, leads to community breakdown, and ‘homogenises’ and ‘regiments’ individuality and personal ambition.[581] Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897) saw his age as one of ‘civilized barbarism’ and thought that the radical democratic striving for power and gain produced social despotism, vulgarisation, mediocritisation, standardisation, dictatorship (military and economic), while shunning individual responsibility and liberty. He argued that progressive civilization, the modern striving for a higher standard of living, amounted to the ‘conquest

of all things earthly'[582] and prophesised that republican 'military commandoes' would lead 'new tyrannies' and 'primitivisms' after the '*terribles simplificateurs*' had destroyed civilization.[583]

Other Enlightenment-era conservatives, such as French politician and philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) thought that although the rise of Christianity had laid the foundations of modern society, modern society had led to the decay of Christianity, to social dissolution, sadness, and decadence, a crisis characterised by the 'prostitution of conscience, triumph of mediocrity, confusion of truth and falsehood, betrayal of principles, baseness of passions, cowardice of morals'.[584] Still others, such as French sociologist and economist Frederic Le Play (1806–1882) argued that 'democracy, liberalism, laissez-fare industrialism' are a 'negation of morality and human happiness' and German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) wrote of the 'death of god' and lamented over 'decadence, philistinism, and idle romanticism'.[585] Overall, nineteenth century conservatives were concerned with the progressive rationalisation of the human spirit, the emergence of tyranny and bureaucratisation from democracy and liberal despotism, and the disenchantment, moral vacuity, and decadence arising from materialism.

Conservatism has several binding principles that are emphasised differently in various contexts.[586] Kieron O'Hara, a conservative author, philosopher, and computer scientist at the University of Southampton who draws heavily on the counter-revolutionary conservative Edmund Burke (1729–1797), isolates two main principles, which are useful for a general understanding of overall conservative thinking. The first principle, the knowledge principle, is based on the limits of knowledge. O'Hara writes that because society and its mediating institutions are highly complex and dynamic with natures that are constantly evolving as they are co-constituted with the individuals who are their members, both data and theories about society are highly uncertain.

The second principle, the change principle, is based on risk-aversion: [B]ecause the current state of society is typically undervalued, and because the effects of social innovations cannot be known fully in advance, then social change (a) must always risk destroying beneficial institutions and norms and (b) cannot be guaranteed to achieve the aims for which it was implemented. It therefore follows that societies should be risk-averse with

respect to social change, and the burden of proof placed on the innovator, not his or her opponents. It also follows that change, when it does come, should ideally be (a) incremental, (b) reversible where possible and (c) rigorously evaluated before the next incremental step.[587]
Keeping in mind these two principles, let us examine some of the main themes of conservative thought.

The conservative Edmund Burke was an Anglo-Irish politician and one of the most distinguished intellectuals of the conservative 'Old' Whig Party during the Enlightenment; he continues to be a central figure of the conservative movement today. He denied the worth of Enlightenment reason, which emphasised human progress and perfectibility based on '*theoretical* or *abstract reasoning*' or 'reasoning without contextual restriction, independent of the pragmatic, historical or contingent considerations'. He instead stressed '*practical reasoning*' or 'reasoning in a concrete context' and 'the importance of human fallibility'.[588] For Burke and those who follow his conservatism, human beings are, by a constant and enduring nature, inherently flawed; we are 'restless' and imperfectible creatures with limited knowledge, yet we have 'moral truths [that] are permanent'.[589] In contrast to liberal man, who is first and foremost an individualist or a private rationalist entitled to liberty, conservative man, according to Keith Feiling, is 'born … "under a yoke"', into 'an interlocking circle of communities', relationships that are often binding, involuntary and non-reciprocal, such as between parent and child. Man is also bequeathed with 'all hopes, all passions, all delights, all morals and all powers' by his people;[590] he inherits a 'people's historic continuity of experience', a moral order, which insures the goodness of a society, a people's generational stability and longevity, and social continuity. Society and individuals derive their meaning from the endurance of social institutions, 'the life-blood', which links 'generation to generation' and has been established over 'centuries of trial and reflection and sacrifice'.[591] These relationships make man necessarily dependent on others, not just others of the present, but also others of past and future generations. Man is therefore a socially and politically bound historical creature rather than merely an individualist.

For Burke and other conservatives, the implementation by Enlightenment rationalists (and other social engineers) of theoretical social designs (social experiments) to alter or govern society and human beings in pursuit of human progress and perfectibility is problematic. As human beings are fallible and limited in their knowledge, society, too, is naturally imperfect and cannot be transformed into a 'Terrestrial Paradise'. Socially transformative theories, applied domestically and universally, are based on what Burke called 'abstractions',[592] *a priori* ideas not grounded in the reality of historical and situated human contingencies. One such contingency is inequality. Conservatives adhere to a principle of variety, which Kirk describes in the following way: For the preservation of a healthy diversity in any civilization, there must survive orders and classes, differences in material condition, and many sorts of inequality. The only true forms of equality are equality at the Last Judgment and equality before a just court of law; all other attempts at levelling must lead, at best, to social stagnation and, at worst, to 'some tyranny or host of squalid oligarchs' who will 'create new forms of inequality'. Socialists who want to destroy 'natural and institutional differences', such as private property,[593] to impose measures of equality 'do not take the range of constraints on a functioning society into account', constraints such as social provisions of 'prosperity, relief from poverty, security, liberty, art and culture, diplomacy and so on'.[594] In other words, there are more goals of an existing society than just equality, and pursuit of these other goals means that a purely egalitarian society is impossible to achieve.

To be clear, conservatism is opposed to the rationalist drive to socially engineer a new utopian-like egalitarian future grounded in abstract *a priori* ideals, theories or ideologies that view existing society and institutions, morals and laws, as wrong and in need of radical correction. Social engineering reforms, 'top-down' policies fashioned and imposed by politicians and bureaucrats, destroy existing institutions without grasping their positive benefits. O'Hara explains that conservatives criticise rational liberal policies which use various legislation, novel institutions, technologies, and big business markets to effect radical change upon 'the physical form and social function' of societies; all of this has had unforeseen and unwanted consequences, such as unemployment, unsustainability, tyranny, and oligarchy.[595] Kirk argues that, for a just and

healthy society to function, decisions directly affecting citizens ought to be ‘made locally and voluntarily’ — organically — rather than being based on an ideal of ‘abstract Democracy’ and designed and enforced by a ‘central administration, or a corps of select managers and civil servants’ who are distant from the community and who stand against the will of the people. Enforced change by a small and dominant group ‘without check’ is despotism.[596]

Such forced restructuring of society and its institutions also does not take into account the knowledge and risk-aversion principles. These principles, and the historical institutions that are founded upon them, guard against changes based on non-historical theory — changes that suggest hypothetical benefits but lack a serious anticipation of errors and unquantified risks. For instance, will proposed reforms actually be effective, have the opposite effect, or have serious side-effects that cannot be controlled or reversed? In the words of O’Hara, the rationalist, who believes that they are removing the unknown, is in fact taking us from the known unknowns [of which their probability (of risk) can be calculated] to the unknown unknowns [of which their probability (of risk) cannot be calculated].[597]

However, conservatism is not against innovation and does think society can be improved, but only through incremental changes that have been deeply evaluated for their risk factor — a ‘reasoned and temperate progress’. Kirk writes that change ‘ought to be gradual and discriminatory, never unfixing old interests at once’. That is, the conservative questions how much damage may be inflicted upon the survival and well-being of the nation over the long-term by a proposed change in social structure or by the adoption of a particular innovation. They ask if such modifications are necessary: is the damage, or risk, from such alterations on an established people and its way of life, worth it in terms of long-term survival? Societal change must be prudent, that is, based on ‘sufficient reflection’ of the knowledge of societal complexity, and on long-term survival goals, and situated (context and significance) in the authority (and continuity) of the local and traditional existing ways of life and other concrete or historical experience and knowledge.[598] As Burke has said, ‘the wisdom of the many, laid down and aggregated through time, is superior to that of the few’.[599] Societal change must be based on evidence-based policies, and independent (as opposed to

NGO, Corporate, or government) and scientific data collection, analysis, and evaluation.

Conservatism also opposes the universalisation of Enlightenment liberalism, itself offering no alternative 'universal prescriptions'. Although conservative thinkers may agree that the various ethnic groupings of human beings across the world share certain natural traits, this does not mean that such commonalities should therefore be taken as 'normative or essential' and promoted and enforced across the globe.[600] According to Feiling, the idea that there is a set of Universal Human Rights (and for that matter, such a thing as 'Humanity'), which are ascertained from a 'purely intellectual process' or 'metaphysical speculation'[601] and applied on a global level — to all humans — is completely wrong. What is considered a 'human right' by Liberals is continuously contested and altered by the ever-changing human-rights discourse across the world, stimulated by the continuing myriad of distinct peoples that exist, who have their own notion of the human being, of human rights, and the 'good life'. These varieties represent a serious challenge to the validity of imposing a Western-based liberal democratic world order rooted in human rights on a universal level.

To impose, from top-down and without full consent, such and such a version of rights and changes upon a society, whether domestic or foreign, is equivalent to socially engineering a society and its people in a potentially 'harmful' way. At what cost, ask conservatives, is change implemented? O'Hara thinks that rationalists, seeking to make change, follow 'terribly mistaken purposes in promoting innovation'. As they cannot predict demand or organic-driven change, which they oppose, they manipulate these things and attempt to cause them via the implementation of specific institutional programmes, such as ideological intellectuals sponsoring projects or legislating policies not approved by the public.[602] Such projects lead to bureaucratization. Burckhardt thought that the future was in the hands of 'bureaucracy and militarism', the 'twin forces' of democracy; Weber criticised the rationalisation of everything including 'society, thought, and mind';[603] and MacIntyre argues that managerial bureaucracy 'disguises and conceals rather than illuminates' and 'bureaucratic authority is nothing other than successful power'.[604] Knowledge does not always lead to improvements, to social amelioration for many, as the interests of a few can monopolize knowledge for power and profit. In his book *After Virtue*,

MacIntyre makes the case that law-like generalisations required by managerial organisations are false and the establishment of universal laws, which occurred in the Enlightenment era and the early twentieth century, are associated with the rise of the social sciences. The rise of the human sciences garnered information and knowledge about the behaviour of human beings — information that has been used to further political and economic ends.

Conservativism also has an isolationist or non-interventionists approach to foreign policy. It opposes neoconservative foreign policy, which aims, by military force if necessary, to alter traditional non-Western societies so they conform to neoliberal economic policies and neoconservative ideals of freedom and democracy. O'Hara aptly writes that Iraq under Saddam Hussein 'was in much better shape before the invasion than after it' and that 'Even when a society is clearly vile, unjust or violent, one should be cautious about wishing it away'.[605] Although various harms were committed by Saddam, the destruction of his regime by George Bush and Tony Blair under the pretext of bringing democracy and freedom to the Iraqi peoples actually left Iraq crippled and its people worse off. The Iraq war created a power vacuum in which various ethnic factions now vie for power, leading to great violence, terror, destruction, and oppression. We have seen in very recent times (2015–2016), as ISIS storms various areas in Iraq, that tyranny has not been toppled and democracy and freedom have not been installed.

Bearing the above points in mind, conservatism is a body of thought that conceives the human being as a socio-political historical creature and inequality as a natural aspect of human society. It aims to apply historical experience and preserve 'older forms of life' (social institutions, customs, values etc.) when confronting liberal or individualistic-inspired universal and egalitarian projects towards human progress and perfectibility, schemes that represent profound foundational changes to the existing social structures and institutions of a given society. Essentially, conservativism views liberalism as 'the ideology of western suicide'[606] and argues that moral relativism has left Western man without certainty or order, leading to the threat of societal breakdown. It holds that in order to understand reality, reason must be supplemented with an understanding of the limits to who we are and what we do. As such, conservatism is not adverse to social innovation, but seeks to maximise benefits, i.e. the preservation of

traditions and customs vital to the longevity of a particular people, by a rigorous analysis of the risks and costs of societal change to old ways of life. It seeks voluntary or desired ‘organic change’, a genuine demand for reform stemming from an uncoerced population, both domestic and foreign, which is evaluated for its risk factor, rather than an ‘artificial’ change that is based merely on theory and designed and imposed, or even violently enforced, upon a particular population or people in general by a small but powerful ideological and despotic elite.[607]

6.2 Neoconservatism

Neoconservatism is a political and intellectual body of thought that arose in America in the post-WWII Cold War and Counter-Cultural Era, and became distinguished from both Conservatism and Social Liberalism in terms of foreign and domestic economic and political theories, practices, and policies. Neoconservatives claim that neoconservatism is not a movement or an ideology, but rather a ‘tendency’ (Norman Podhoretz), a ‘persuasion’ (Irving Kristol), or a ‘mood’ (James Q. Wilson).[608] Douglas Murray, a British journalist, author, and director of the Centre for Social Cohesion, a think-tank based in London, describes neoconservatism as ‘not a political party, or social set, but a way of looking at the world’ or ‘a particular creed’ or ‘philosophy for dealing with the world’ that ‘can provide the philosophical and practical solution to many mature Western political parties’.[609] It rejects communism and radical cultural and social changes, emphasises limited government, neoliberal economic policies, social traditionalism, and foreign ‘democratic interventionism’, challenges hostile regimes antagonistic to the alleged values and interests of the United States, and ‘aggressively support[s]’ and spreads the values of democratic capitalism throughout the world.[610]

Neoconservatism can be generally defined by two brief but concise descriptions of its domestic and foreign policy, provided by Murray. He writes that neoconservatives are united through their domestic policy by specific and general objections to the post-Sixties western status quo, to increasing secularism, to illiberalism masquerading as liberalism, and to the destructive effects of the counterculture. Implacably opposed to relativism, they invariably differ in what they believe the specific foundations of

contemporary culture should be, but not in the belief that American society was better off and more itself when the common values of organized religion formed its bedrock.[611]

Murray also explains that neoconservative foreign policy is ‘an attitude to conflict’ that is ‘inspired’ by ‘the ancients, in particular … Thucydides’ and is based on a set of ‘instinctive beliefs’ that include the belief that ‘patriotism is a good and natural thing’, that ‘world government [UN] is to be rejected’, and that ‘leaders should distinguish clearly between friends and enemies’.[612]

Sydney Hook, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Bell, and Irving Kristol were the leading liberal intellectuals to influence the rise of neoconservatism in the second half of the twentieth century. In the 1930s, 40s, and 50s the liberal democratic intellectuals and social scientists at the City College in New York were proto-neoconservatives. They endorsed Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the overthrow of communism, the protection and spread of democracy and capitalism, interventionism and imperialism in foreign policy, and Roosevelt’s New Deal liberalism (a series of Relief, Recovery, and Reform programmes enacted in response to the Great Depression). Mostly the children of poor Jewish immigrants[613] these neoconservative founders were known as the New York Intellectuals, and had fierce debates with their pro-Stalinist colleagues.[614]

According to Anson Rabinbach, history professor at Princeton University and director of the Centre for European Studies, the rivals of the New York Intellectuals were the German refugees or ‘Frankfurt School exiles’ (cultural Marxists) who arrived in America in the 1930s and 40s. They were overwhelmingly ‘anchored in universities, institutes, and the elite newspapers’ and were from ‘upper-bourgeois German-Jewish households’ before they emigrated.[615] In addition, unlike the New York Intellectuals, they were pro-Communist, since they did ‘not regard Stalinism as the “main enemy”’, and they developed ‘an analysis of capitalism that saw more convergence than confrontation in the Cold War systems of power’,[616] i.e. a socialist-capitalist alliance. The 1967 Vietnam War saw many of these uppercrust German-Jewish intellectuals reconsider the existing foreign policy and ‘support new foreign-policy ideas’ that aimed to ‘reduce American commitments overseas’ and create ‘an international regime

stabilized by economic interdependence and stronger legal mechanisms'.[617] In contrast, the lowercrust New York Jewish Intellectuals or paleoliberals, as some identified them at the time,[618] maintained their anti-communism and anti-Stalinism, and supported the Vietnam War.

By the early 1950s, New York Intellectuals like Kristol, Bell, and Podhoretz had become dominant thinkers within American liberalism. They began playing a leading role in the 'Americans for Democratic Action' during the Harry Truman era (1945–53), and, as they were professors in literary, cultural, and artistic criticism who hoped to address their academic concerns in a practical way, they also disseminated and advocated liberal, reformist, and mildly socialist reforms 'into the mainstream',[619] supporting the civil rights movement, racial integration, Martin Luther King, and the New Deal social reforms.[620] However, by the 1960s these anti-communist liberal-democratic intellectuals became disillusioned with Left-liberal approaches to American problems of political, economic, and racial inequality and the anti-war movement, which were becoming increasingly conventional. As captured in Bell's book *End of Ideology* (1960),[621] the New York Intellectuals viewed the New Deal social reforms as failures which were too ideological and impractical, and they were dismayed with Lyndon B. Johnson's 'Great Society' domestic programs (war on poverty and racism, i.e. Civil Rights and Economic Opportunity Acts),[622] which had led to radical cultural changes. Such changes included: anti-American countercultural movements and urban deterioration, liberal utopianism, increasing welfare enrolments and costs, radical New Left coalition politics and the rise of black militancy, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, pro-Communism and anti-war movements, the Port-Huron-Statement-inspired student revolution,[623] and the promotion of alienated minorities (rather than working-class majorities and labour activists) as the main forces of social change.[624]

The proto-neoconservatives explained the failures of social reform by questioning the theories behind government programmes and administration. They became sceptical of the effectiveness of social scientists and government to shape society and claimed government planning in a liberal state had led to harmful social instability. For example, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Harvard sociologist and neoconservative, wrote that A program was launched that was not understood, and not explained,

and this brought about social losses that need not have occurred. … The government did not know what it was doing. It had a theory. Or, rather, a set of theories. Nothing more.[625]

As identified in early neoconservative journals, such as *Public Interest*, which was founded by Bell and Kristol in 1965, and *Commentary*, which was founded and edited (1960–1995) by Podhoretz and endorsed by the American Jewish Committee, these neoconservatives revealed their disillusionment with the increasingly Leftist Democrats, launched a counter-attack against the New Left, and began emphasising certain conservative values, such as 'traditional modes of behaviour' and 'restraints' and a 'politics of stability'.[626]

By the end of the 1970s the proto-neoconservatives had completely broken with the radical Left over the student movement, unsuccessful economic and foreign policies, and failed liberal government programmes and social reforms, and came to be known as right-wing liberals or neoconservatives. Some even self-identified with the term, such as Irving Kristol, who published *Confessions of a True, Self-Confessed Neoconservative* (1979), and Norman Podhoretz, who wrote *The Neoconservative Anguish over Reagan's Foreign Policy* (1982). They mobilized support for alternative policies through influential journals, newspapers, think-tanks, and public policy institutes such as the American Enterprise Institute (founded by Lewis Harold Brown in 1938) and the Heritage Foundation (founded in 1973 by Paul Weyrich, Edwin Feulner, and Joseph Coors), and helped develop and spread new ideas about reducing the size of federal government and countering the liberal establishment.[627]

These early neoconservatives were influenced by the ideas of several prominent thinkers and politicians, such as Leo Strauss and Henry 'Scoop' Jackson. Despite the intellectual rivalry between the New York Intellectuals and the German refugee exiles, Leo Strauss arrived in America as a Jewish refugee from Germany in 1938, taught at the New School for Social Research in New York (1939–1949) and the University of Chicago, but also had a lasting influence on neoconservative thinking from the 1950s onwards. He thought that the West was in crisis because it lacked a moral purpose, which was the result of its nihilism, its emphasis on natural right

over natural law through the Enlightenment cultivation of reason, specifically the theories of natural rights proposed by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.[628] Strauss thought the solution to this crisis was the restoration of the heritage ideas and faith of Classical Greek Philosophy and Judeo-Christianity, including the duties of man, virtue, and discovery of the best regime. Strauss endorsed the Greek philosopher Aristotle and his notion that natural beings have a natural end, a destiny that 'determines what kind of operation is good for them'.[629]

Aristotelian natural-end ethics is a philosophy of internal teleology and realisation; all natural beings have a valuable potential that ought to be realised as an end-in-itself according to natural or moral law. The good life is the life in which 'the requirements of man's natural inclinations are fulfilled in the proper order to the highest possible degree'; it is 'the perfection of man's nature', a life in accord with nature, which is 'the life of human excellence or virtue'. The proper function, indeed the natural or moral law of human nature, a universal, is to pursue their natural end in virtuous action. The virtuous action of men is found within political communal life, which develops and implements virtues that enable the transition from is to ought. Self-restraint of 'lower impulses' is necessary for the perfection of man's humanity.[630]

For Strauss, our good, the good life, is sorted out with others via an unconditional commitment to the rules of reason, the precepts of natural law in rational (political) debate, not conventional notions of 'might is right', coercion, or other modes of non-rational persuasion. Strauss rejected the individualism, natural rights, vulgar conventionalism, positivism, 'scientific approaches to epistemology', and historicism of the Enlightenment.[631] Instead, he pitted the ancients against the moderns, embraced rational political community (defined in terms of happiness and justice rather than sovereignty and force), natural law, the good life, virtuous action, and human fulfilment. His philosophy influenced Kristol, Podhoretz, and Paul Wolfowitz, and became 'an intellectual pillar' of neoconservatism.[632]

Another influential figure for neoconservatism was Henry 'Scoop' Jackson, an American Senator, Cold-War liberal and anti-communist Democrat. Some of the first-generation neoconservatives, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, worked for him as aides during the 1970s and

they, among others, specifically endorsed his foreign policy.[633] Jackson opposed the détente (SALT I and the Helsinki Accords) between America and Russia under President Nixon and promoted American power as a force of good facing evil in the world. He pursued a 'robust foreign policy' that was 'based on clear universal principles such as the global promotion of the rule of law, liberal democracy, civil rights, environmental responsibility and the market economy'.[634] When Jackson lost to Jimmy Carter in his second presidential campaign (1977), first-generation neoconservatives became disillusioned again; they broke with the Democrats and turned to Republicanism, endorsing Ronald Reagan and joining his administration in 1981.[635]

In the late 1970s and early 80s, domestic issues for first-generation neoconservatives like Jeane Kirkpatrick involved dealing with a 'new class', the counter-culture communist Left (Cultural Marxists) or 'second level stratum of political elite', who were increasingly able to 'shape debate, determine agendas, define standards, and propose and evaluate policies'.[636] Kirkpatrick and others thought Leftists were effectively 'unmanning the West' as they attacked the 'family, business, and schools'[637] and impacted the 'composition of the ruling elite'.[638] Irving Kristol wrote:

> Today there is a new class hostile to business in general, and especially to large corporations. As a group, you find them mainly in the very large and growing public sector and in the media. They share a disinterest in personal wealth, a dislike for the free-market economy, and a conviction that society may best be improved through greater governmental participation in the country's economic life. They are the media. They are the educational system. Their dislike for the free-market economy originates in their inability to exercise much influence over it so as to produce change. In its place they would prefer a system in which there is a very large political component. This is because the new class has a great deal of influence in politics. Thus, through politics, they can exercise a direct and immediate influence on the shape of our society and the direction of national affairs.[639]

In *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea* (1995), which traces his intellectual thoughts from 1949 to 1995, Kristol further writes that the New Class is created by capitalism, but that they feel 'alienated' from and 'hostile to the business community' because they feel they have not received 'sufficient power and recognition' from the liberal capitalist system. Very 'few' of the New Class are actually 'intellectuals'; they are educated through higher education but are 'self-designated "intellectuals"' who are driven by 'ideals' that oppose the market economic system and are

‘elitist’ in that they ‘pursue power in the name of equality’ and appeal ‘to populist anxieties’. They ‘do not “control” the media, they *are* the media’ and the ‘educational system … public health and welfare system’.[640] This ever-pressing counter-culture was the effect, according to Kirkpatrick, of ‘the ideological assault on authority symbols and structures preced[ing] the anti-war movement’ in the 1960s, which, by portraying the United States as an immoral ‘“sick society” guilty of racism, materialism, imperialism, and murder of Third World people in Vietnam’, attempted to undermine the ‘legitimacy’ of America.[641]

In foreign policy, Kirkpatrick is known for what is called the ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’. Based on her ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’ in *Commentary* (November 1979) in the context of the Cold War, she supported anti-communist dictatorships, criticised America’s détente with the USSR, argued for military force against Soviet expansionism, and advocated the gradual liberalization of autocratic countries.[642] Kirkpatrick’s ‘Doctrine’ was a big hit with the Reagan administration and she became Reagan’s Ambassador to the UN for four years (1981–1985). Other first generation neocons were also coming into administrative positions of power regarding American foreign-relations, such as two former aides of Jackson, Wolfowitz and Perle, who respectively became Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Assistant Secretary of Defense regarding the Soviet Union and Europe. American neoconservatives were also influencing politicians and political affairs in the United Kingdom, such as Margaret Thatcher, who was a close ally with Reagan and conservative Prime Minister of Britain between 1979 and 1990, and in Israel amongst the mainstream right, particularly the Likud nationalist party.[643] Michael Gove, a British politician and, since the 2015 general election, the Secretary of State for Justice, wrote in 2004 that the ‘stance’ of Churchill and Thatcher was neoconservative, for they believed that ‘to stand up for liberty against its enemies’ was the ‘duty’ of the West.[644]

A younger, second generation of neoconservatives, including Charles Krauthammer, Joshua Muravchik, and William (Bill) Kristol, came of age in the post-Cold-War world and openly aligned with the Republican Party. Bill Kristol, the son of Irving Kristol and American historian Gertrude Himmelfarb (‘Bea’ Kristol), worked as Chief of Staff for William Bennett and Secretary of Education in the Reagan administration, and was a ‘major

architect' of the 1994 Republican Party campaign.[645] Foreign policy was a 'key concern'. Beginning in the 1990s neocons pushed a radical foreign-policy agenda, rigorously promoting democratic progress and the 'advance of freedom' in the face of communism and fascism, 'the twentieth century's twin evil ideologies'. They perceived their task to be getting America to send these wicked political systems 'conclusively back into history'.[646] Compared to their intellectual forefathers, the foreign policy goals of second generation neocons have been 'much more visionary … and militant', much more interventionist. For example, during the Bill Clinton administration (1993–2001) neoconservative organizations like the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) pressed 'for a significant increase in the defense budget and for military intervention and regime change in countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq'.[647] They thought the regimes of Slobodan Milošević (Yugoslav Wars, 1991–2001) and Saddam Hussein (Kuwait, Gulf War, 1990–1991) had to be overhauled and replaced with liberal democracies; they considered these types of war to be conducted 'in the interest of American security' and 'driven by humanitarian instincts' based on 'technologically advanced [military] power'.[648]

The PNAC was founded in 1997 by Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, a foreign policy commentator and a foreign policy adviser to US Republicans since the early 1980s, such as Jack Kemp and John McCain, and to Democrats, such as Hillary Clinton. The PNAC aimed to 'promote American global leadership'[649] and represented 'a neoconservatism that was almost exclusively foreign-policy inspired', a foreign policy that proclaimed that for over a century 'the use of American power' in the world was 'repeatedly … shown' as 'a force for good'. They prescribed several projects that America needed to undertake over the 'next century', which included increased funding for America's global defence 'responsibilities' and the American promotion 'of political and economic freedom abroad', both of which were based on a 'Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity' and the preservation and spread of American interests and values.[650] Neocon influence on American foreign policy was most apparent with George W. Bush Jnr., the Bush Doctrine, and the War on Terror.

Bush Jnr. was leading the United States as the 43rd president when the Islamist terrorist attack against the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 occurred, almost eight months after he came into office. 9/11 was a

decisive factor in the adoption of the neoconservative view that American security was linked to hostile international developments and that foreign policy needed to change. Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle were among Bush's 'senior appointees', and according to Murray 'neoconservative ideology' helped 'define George Bush's escape not just from the shadows of his father's style of politics, but from the whole oppressive philosophy of status-quo American conservatism', i.e. non-interventionist and isolationist foreign policy. Bush implemented militaristic-style foreign policies in what is collectively known as the War on Terror. This was a distinctly 'neoconservative' approach to 'terror' such as the war against Afghanistan (2001–2014) and Iraq (2003–2011), and involved the Bush Doctrine, which was interlinked and based on the neocon 'persuasion' of the PNAC.[651]

The Bush Doctrine explicitly rejected moral relativism or natural right and wholeheartedly expressed the necessity 'of moral judgment in the realm of world affairs' in the post-9/11 context.[652] Going against the prevailing liberal orthodoxy of the West, according to Michael Gove, it combined 'humanitarian liberalism and brute force',[653] and according to Murray provided 'coherent policies for dealing with the dilemmas of the day: genocide, dictatorships, and human rights abuses'.[654] It was a new strategic doctrine that emphasised pre-emptive war, as stated in a 2002 National Security Council *Security Strategy* text*:* The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.[655]

This security strategy also explained the American approach to enemies and rogue nations. Identifying 'the enemy' as 'terrorism — premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents', it states that terrorism is not just committed by non-state actors or terrorist 'cells', but by states who 'knowingly harbor or provide aid to them'.[656] Bush Jnr. stated in his September 20, 2001 address to the Joint Session of Congress, that America will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are

with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.[657]

A year later, at his speech to the US Military Academy at West Point, June 1st 2002, Bush stated that America was fighting 'for a just Peace … that favors human liberty', which will be defended 'against threats from terrorists and tyrants', preserved 'by building good relations among the great powers', and extended 'by encouraging free and open societies on every continent' of the world.[658] The 2002 *Security Strategy* also warned that 'We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends'. Further, it stated that terrorism is of 'global reach', and the war on global terrorism is against a 'particularly elusive enemy'; there are thousands of terrorist cells throughout the world. The effective dismantling of these regimes would involve not just actual military offensives, such as the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, but also a 'war on ideas' including the promotion of 'the free flow of information and ideas' to incite hope and liberty against those who sponsor global terrorism.[659]

Policy analysts suggest that this Bush Doctrine resembled recommendations of the controversial Defense Planning Guidance draft, February 1992, co-authored by Paul Wolfowitz, who was Undersecretary of Defense for Policy during the first Bush administration, and his deputy, Scooter Libby. This initial set of military guidelines states that Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.[660]

This doctrine was given its unofficial name, the Wolfowitz Doctrine, after it was leaked to *The New York Times* in the first quarter of 1992 and caused a public outcry against American defence and foreign policy. Former chief correspondent for *The New York Times*, Patrick E. Tyler, claimed that the

document ‘asserted that America’s political and military mission in the post-cold-war era will be to insure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territory of the former Soviet Union’ and that America would be the sole world superpower wielding ‘benevolent domination’, a superpower ‘whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and sufficient military might to deter any nation or group of nations from challenging American primacy’.[661] Such American aspirations for world hegemony abounds in contemporary neoconservative thought. Murray, for example, states that America is ‘the world’s supreme superpower and defender of freedom’,[662] and influential American author Bruce Bawer thinks that America is the guiding light of the world.[663]

The Bush Doctrine was also heavily influenced by the PNAC report *Rebuilding Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century* (2000). Indeed, according to Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, this report ‘functioned as the blueprint of the Bush Administration’s response to 9/11’.[664] It stated that ‘At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s *grand strategy* should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible’ and this can only be achieved by ‘U.S. military capabilities’.[665] Only through ‘military modernization or transformation’ can ‘American global leadership’ and the ‘American Peace’ be realised.[666] This neocon approach to foreign affairs was also outlined in a major book, *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (2000), edited by Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, founders of the PNAC. They wanted a ‘sustained American attempt to spread freedom and democracy’[667] and stated that ‘we will occasionally have to intervene abroad even when we cannot prove that a narrowly construed “vital interest” of the United States is at stake’.[668] In other words, it is in American neoconservative interest to spread democracy and freedom throughout the world, through force if necessary, and pre-emptive strikes against states that challenge this interest are justified.

After 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, Kagan and Kristol wrote that President Bush grasped that our response to the attacks must go beyond simply destroying some terrorist groups, important as that is. He also understood the underlying truth that there’s no substitute for American leadership — a leadership that is willing not just to use our military strength, but also to defend and advance liberal democratic principles.

George W. Bush is now a man with a mission. As it happens, it is America's historic mission[669] .

Max Boot agreed. Boot, a neocon military historian and the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, has written that he is a 'hard Wilsonian' who agrees with the use of 'American might to promote American ideals'. He explains that a hard Wilsonian is one who 'embrace[s] Woodrow Wilson's championing of American ideals but reject[s] his reliance on international organizations [such as the United Nations] and treaties to accomplish our objectives'.[670] In an interview with PBS, he said that

> We have to go out and stop the terrorists overseas. We have to play the role of the *global policeman*. … [And] we ought to go further. … I think we have to shape the global environment. … I think we have to shape the world much more in our own image, and we have to be much more aggressive about that even acting as a quote, unquote great empire should.[671]

Hard Wilsonian or neo-Wilsonian foreign policy ideals were aimed at defending and exercising American hegemony in the world, extending and enforcing American democratic capitalism, peace, prosperity, and liberty, through unilateral and militaristic methods if necessary. This neocon foreign policy was based upon the assumption that 'the United States and its allies were safest in a world of democracies',[672] otherwise known as Democratic Peace Theory. Democratic Peace is the idea that democratic regimes are less likely to start wars with each other compared to other regimes. It claims that the success of America is based upon democracy and individual freedom. As non-democratic, rival or opposing regimes in the world violate human rights, which belong to everyone, and lack secular general education and economic opportunities, which leads to radicalism and extremism, places like Saddam's Iraq will have to be overcome by American might and by the forced proliferation of 'democratic institutions and free economies' within their nations.[673]

In sum, Democratic Peace promotes interventionist policies in regions of the world where democracy does not exist, especially Arab and Muslim regions (Middle East, South Asia, North Africa) as well as China and North Korea, with the aim of liberating them. The goal of spreading democratic ideals is the erasure of tyrannical regimes, such as communism and Islamism, and 'nation-building' that is designed to be friendly to America

and her allies.[674] The invasion of Iraq for example was seen as a 'regime change' in one country that would produce 'a domino effect', essentially democratizing the entire region and thus making Iraq, the region, and the world, 'safer' for America and its allies, particularly Israel.[675]

Democratic Peace is one aspect of the Bush Doctrine; the other is 'the end of history' principle. Francis Fukuyama, a Senior Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University and a former contributor to the Reagan administration, wrote an essay titled 'The End of History?' published in *National Interest* in the summer of 1989. In this essay he provided a view of world history claiming that the end point of human history as progress was the achievement of economic and political liberalism. He writes that What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.[676]

Fukuyama continued this idea in his book, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), in which he essentially argued that if a society wanted to be modern, there was no alternative to a market economy and a democratic political system. Not everyone wanted to be modern, of course, and not everyone could put in place the institutions and policies necessary to make democracy and capitalism work, but no alternative system would yield better results.[677]

The end of history thesis is not exclusive to Fukuyama:[678] it is rooted in notions of progress, progress towards a particular place in the future, particularly as Hegel understood this. Fukuyama held that future point to be 'an absolute moment — a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious'.[679] In summary, the 'end of history' is the idea that struggles between left and right politics are going to come to an end, that human socio-cultural evolution, or 'human thought about first principles' or first things, has an end point and there is a final form of human government: liberal democracy.[680]

According to Murray, most second-generation neocons agreed with Fukuyama's end of history thesis. They perceived liberal democracy as 'the desirable endpoint of all human societies' because democracy is 'the surest

means of preventing nation-states waging war on each other'.[681] And this idea was clear in the foreign policy of the Bush regime. Bush claimed during his June 2002 West Point speech that there was a single surviving model of human progress based on nonnegotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property, and free speech, and equal justice and religious tolerance.[682]

In other words, American liberal democracy was the end point of human history. The former president of the United States, Barack Obama, although a Democrat rather than Republican, also agreed with this, as well as the Bush Doctrine. He adhered to American unilateralism, pre-emptive war,[683] Bush's counterterrorism policies,[684] the Democratic Peace Theory, and the spread of liberal democracy throughout the world in terms of American security interests. Speaking at the U.S. Military Academy on May 28th 2014, Obama said that 'The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it' and America's support for democracy and human rights goes beyond idealism. It is a matter of national security. Democracies are our closest friends and are far less likely to go to war. Economies based on free and open markets perform better and become markets for our goods. Respect for human rights is an antidote to instability and the grievances that fuel violence and terror.[685]

Although not a self-identified neocon, Tony Blair, British Labour PM from 1997–2007 also endorsed the end of history principle in his 1999 Chicago speech during the height of the Kosovo War, and generally supported second-generation neocon foreign policy.[686] He supported 'interventionism' and surmised that '[t]he political debates of the twentieth century — the massive ideological battleground between left and right — are over', saying that 'If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer'.[687]

Although Fukuyama's end of history principle was validated through the speeches of Bush, Obama, Blair and many others, and although Fukuyama was active in the PNAC, signing its 1997 Statement of Principles which promoted 'American global leadership' and 'a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity',[688] he later rejected the foreign policy of the Bush

Administration, affirming that it had nothing to do with his views on 'democracy and development' and that his argument about the end of history does not constitute the 'intellectual foundation' for the Bush administration. In an April 2007 article he wrote titled 'The History at the End of History', he stated: I believe that the European Union more accurately reflects what the world will look like at the end of history than the contemporary United States. The EU's attempt to transcend sovereignty and traditional power politics by establishing a transnational rule of law is much more in line with a 'post-historical' world than the Americans' continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their military.[689]

Compared to Fukuyama, neocons like Murray berate the European Union for its lack of military action in the War on Terror and its lack of Bush Doctrine foreign policy. Murray explains that the EU is unlike America in three distinct ways: it does not have the ability 'to sustain a prolonged and costly modern war'; it perceives war as 'a pointless and irrational thing in the modern world' (i.e. it prefers debate and dialogue, legislation and legal means to solve conflict); and its leaders (the Brussels Eurocrats, socialists and Leftists) are proud of its post-Christianity or moral relativism.[690] This European character is in stark contrast to American neoconservatism, which takes the view that the world needs an absolute moral standard and that America should bolster its military, act as 'global policeman', and justify pre-emptive, albeit 'humanitarian' (i.e. technologically advanced), wars against tyrannical regimes in the world in terms of liberal democratic interests, and the security and safety of America and allies.

However, twenty-first-century anti-war movements, especially against the American-led Afghanistan and Iraq wars, are found on both sides of the Atlantic, in Europe and America. But Murray and other neocons, such as David Horowitz, cast the anti-war movements in Europe and the U.S. as part of a new socialist-inspired counter-culture movement whose primary target is Israel and whose secondary targets are Britain and America, the foremost supporters of Israel and neocon foreign policy in the Western world. Horowtiz, in his 2004 book *Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left*, makes the claim that 'leftist criticism of U.S. foreign policy constitutes an alliance with terrorism'[691] and Murray concurs, asserting that anti-war coalitions also support the American Muslim Council and the

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), and therefore support Hamas. Murray also argues that the anti-war movement came to be supported by Muslims in the West, influential imams and influential radical Muslims in the Muslim world, as well as ‘extremist racists and white supremacists’ who believed, along with ‘far left organizations’, that Jews were dictating world policy. This new or second counterculture, which is ‘anti-Semitic’ and transatlantic, is, according to Murray, ‘an assemblage of people specifically and consistently opposed to [Western] culture’, people who adhere to the ideologies of fascism, socialism, and Islamism and who attack the West in a variety of ways, from supporting ‘caliphates or socialist dystopias’ and ‘international courts and supranational institutions’ to open violence, death and destruction.[692]

According to Murray, what underlies neocon opposition to the anti-war movement in Europe is the view that a generation of socialists had come to power and were creating ‘an entirely new society’ that is ‘hostile’ to both America and Europe. This new society is a ‘utopia’ grounded in ‘long-disproved assumptions about human nature and the course of our future’ and centred on such themes as ‘integration’, ‘unity’, and ‘perpetual peace’ and ‘the myth of human perfectibility’, both of the human and social kinds. This last myth ‘exists as a substitute for faith in humankind, not as an expression of it’. Furthermore, perfectibility is not ‘progressive’ or an ‘inevitable’ story of humanity, but it is an ‘alien ideology’ that is ‘woefully blind to human and political reality’ (citing Irving Kristol) and is being imposed upon Europeans by EU elites. The central narrative of these elites has been that European nations have gone to war with each other because of the very existence of the nation state. Therefore, to eliminate war and the potential for war, nation-states have to be discontinued as a viable form of collective existence, and/or super-states had to be created, such as the EU. Murray calls this generalised reasoning about nationalism ‘absurd’ and ‘entirely based in relativism’.[693]

The supranational EU is problematic to neocons such as Murray because they perceive that the only aim of the EU is the ‘passing [of] laws’ that separate what ‘matters’ from public debate and democracy, and removes the Eurocrats from any responsibility to hear and encompass public opinion. The EU is an ‘experiment’ that has aimed to ‘make war illogical, indefensible, and impossible’ and has involved ‘an assault of national

identity', such as the adoption and implementation of Muslim immigration and immigrant multiculturalism, campaigns against the Catholic Church, silence in the face of Islamic terrorism, funding for the spread of Islam in Europe, and rights for Muslim terrorists. The European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 2, is 'ridiculous' according to Murray, for it forbids European countries from deporting 'culprits if their lives may be in danger'. It means that terrorists or immigrants causing societal unrest or antagonism are protected by lawyers who claim that their foreign clients will face endangerment if they are extradited to a particular country and so, because of humanitarian legalities, they must remain in the host country at the taxpayers' expense. In other words, the EU project has been 'unable to stop Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda demonstrations and supporters, because they have given such people rights that cannot be breached'.[694] Furthermore, the morality of immigration is one-directional; diversification is not advocated for the sending countries, such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan.

Murray further writes that

> A nation that dares not mention matters of race and culture is a nation that lacks the confidence needed to survive, let alone be a global leader. And it is a country that leaves itself open [through immigration, multiculturalism, and relativism] not only to the strongest, but also to the weakest of alien creeds. Multiculturalism has become such a rampaging force that it can end careers and force the populace as a whole to live under a petty tyranny of political correctness.[695]

Or, as Huntington has put it, quoted by Murray: 'Multiculturalism is in its essence anti-European civilization … an anti-Western ideology'.[696] Irving Kristol absolutely agrees, adding that multiculturalism is 'as much a "war against the West" as Nazism and Stalinism ever were'.[697]

Quoting Tony Blankley, an English-American political analyst and former press secretary for Newt Gingrich, Murray warns that if Europe transforms into Eurabia this would mean the destruction of the 'birthplace of the West' and a loss of America's 'cultural and historic first cousins, our closest economic and military allies, and the source of our own civilization'. To rectify this situation, Britain, America's closest ally, must exit the EU, improve its relations with America, and continue to assist America in its 'targeted warfare of the new century'.[698]

Neoconservatism is not just opposed to the European Union but also the United Nations, which is seen as having 'no spiritual authority, no legal

authority'.[699] This is related to another important aspect of neocon foreign policy: Zionism and support for Israel. A self-identified Jewish neocon, Murray Freidman, wrote in *The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy* (2005) that Zionism was part of the original neoconservative stance, as outlined in *Commentary* and published by the American Jewish Committee.[700] Likewise, Murray asserts that 'Zionism was … itself a precursor to neoconservative thinking' and contends that neocons support the right of Israel to exist and defend itself because it is the sole democratic nation amongst a sea of 'squalid dictatorships' in the Middle East.[701] Murray explains that Jewish and non-Jewish neocons wholeheartedly disagree with the 1975 UN Resolution 3379, *Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, which stated that 'Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination',[702] a resolution which was aggressively rejected in public on 'behalf of the US' by Moynihan, who called it an 'infamous act',[703] and which was officially revoked in 1991.[704] For Murray and other neocons, Resolution 3379 was anti-Zionist and therefore anti-Semitic and represented 'a moral inversion taking place' that made aggressors into victims (i.e. Arab states attacking Israel were now victims); this was a microcosm of the current decadence or 'decay' brought about by cultural liberalism/Marxism, by 'relativism and countercultural equivalence', which had affected people's ability to discern the truth. Murray also argues that UN Resolution 3379, which was endorsed for sixteen years, revealed that 'world government was a dangerous and potentially tyrannical concept'.[705] Although the UN, the closest thing to world government, was partly modelled after Immanuel Kant's notion of Perpetual Peace, it ignored the First and Second Definitive Articles, which clearly stated that for a system of perpetual peace to work, every nation must be 'republican' (a liberal democracy) and united in a federation of free states. Since the UN is not constituted by free republican states as some of them are 'hostile dictatorships', and as UN officials are 'unelected', Murray declares that the UN is rather a non-democratic 'pseudo-world government'.[706]

6.3 Critique of Neoconservatism

Neoconservatism has been criticized in various ways and by various thinkers on the Left-Right political spectrum. There are five main interrelated issues brought against neoconservatism: i) their endorsement of neoliberal economics; ii) their readiness for interventionist, pre-emptive American foreign policy applied unilaterally, especially in the Middle East and against global Islam, and based on absolutist moral categories (good and evil; friend and enemy) and military power; iii) their robust support for the security of Israel at the expense of America; iv) their left-wing origins; and v) their predominantly Jewish constitution.

Jonathan Clarke, senior fellow at Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, and Stefan Halper, foreign policy scholar and Director of American Studies at the University of Cambridge, wrote in 2004 that David Frum and Richard Perle's book *An End to Evil: What's Next in the War on Terrorism* (2004) reinforces the neoconservative thesis that American interests and values are best pursued with a maximum of military stick and minimum of negotiating carrot. It makes little difference whether the issue is Libya, Iran, or North Korea. The authors believe market-democracy is best delivered on the back of a Tomahawk missile.[707]

John McGowan, Humanities professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and author of several books on liberal democracy and cultural criticism, thinks neoconservatives are attempting to build an American Empire, a successor of the British Empire, with the goal of perpetuating a Pax Americana. He writes in 2007 that 'Frank neoconservatives like Robert Kaplan and Niall Ferguson recognize that they are proposing imperialism as an alternative to liberal internationalism' and tells us 'that "only through stealth and anxious foresight" can the United States continue to pursue the "imperial reality"'. He continues by saying that The Bush administration, justifying all of its actions by an appeal to 'national security', has kept many of those actions as it can secret and has scorned all limitations to executive power by other branches of government or international law'.[708]

Similarly, in 2008, Joe Klein, an American journalist and columnist, complained about the neocon attempt to export and impose freedom and democracy on the non-Western world. Writing for *Time* magazine, he described neocon foreign policy as being 'best described as unilateral

bellicosity in the utopian rhetoric of freedom and democracy'.[709] This is certainly the case, as can be seen by the following statement by neocon foreign-policy analyst Michael Leeden: We tear down the old order every day, from business to science, literature, art, architecture, and cinema to politics and the law. Our enemies have always hated this whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces their traditions (whatever they may be) and shames them for their inability to keep pace. Seeing America undo traditional societies, they fear us, for they do not wish to be undone. They cannot feel secure so long as we are there, for our very existence — our existence, not our politics — threatens their legitimacy. They must attack us in order to survive, just as we must destroy them to advance our historic mission.[710]

In 2009, in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of *The Atlantic*, Joe Klein stated that I just don't want to see policy makers who make decisions on the basis of whether American policy will benefit Israel or not. In some cases, you want to provide protection for Israel certainly, but you don't want to go to war with Iran. When Jennifer Rubin or Abe Foxman calls me anti-Semitic, they're wrong. I am anti-neoconservative.

Klein further declared that examining the predominate religion of neoconservatism is legitimate, for there is a case to be made against the disproportionate Jewish influence, and their allegiance to Israel, on US foreign policy, such as angst towards Iran and the actual Iraq war, and he thinks that this 'represents a dangerous anachronistic neocolonial sensibility'.[711]

In March 2006 John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M. Walt, Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University published an essay entitled 'The Israel Lobby', and in September of that same year they published a revised Working Paper titled 'The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy' in the *Middle East Policy* journal. In these works, they argue that US foreign policy in the Middle East is 'primarily' influenced by 'domestic politics and especially … [by] the activities of the "Israel Lobby"' in America, and that this group has convinced 'Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical'.[712] In February 2009 Andrew Sullivan, a former neoconservative supporter, saw the basic tenet

of neoconservatism as a defence of Israel: [N]eoconservatism, in large part, is simply about enabling the most irredentist elements in Israel and sustaining permanent war against anyone or any country who disagrees with the Israeli right. … And to insist that America adopt exactly the constant-war-as-survival that Israelis have been slowly forced into. … But America is not Israel'.[713]

Likewise, in 2003 Paul Gottfried, a Jewish-American paleoconservative political philosopher, noted that Jews 'have a special inviolable right to an ethnic state, while Euro-American gentiles are expected to practice multiculturalism.'[714] In other words, neoconservatives hold to the double-standard that Jews have a 'right to ethnocentricity' whereas Europeans are obliged 'to have open borders and to exchange their traditional identities for "human rights"', which Gottfried thinks has led to European old conservatives opposing Israel.[715]

For paleoconservatives, neoconservatism is not considered to be truly conservative,[716] for the neocons continue to have 'the emotional gestalt of liberalism, the liberal sensitivity and temperament' leftover from their days of liberalism.[717] Some think that neoconservatism is an illegitimate addition to conservatism, particularly after the Cold War, or has stolen conservatism from the paleoconservatives by 'shaping the trajectory of post-Communism conservatism' and 'leaving the paleoconservatives isolated and marginalized'.[718] Paleocons are concerned with the influence of neocon publications and their ability to raise funds, and they criticize the media for suggesting neocons represent all conservatives, as they don't, because, according to Gottfried, they 'have always favored social democratic policies together with an aggressive liberal internationalist foreign policy', which is something that paleocons reject (since they are non-interventionist and isolationist).[719] Pat Buchanan views neocons as 'undocumented aliens from the Left, carrying with them the viruses of statism and globalism'; they are war-mongers and pro-open-borders interventionists.[720]

One of the major distinctions between neo- and paleoconservatism regards foreign policy. Conservatives are concerned that aggressive American policy is serving Israeli interests at the expense of American interests and are sceptical of efforts to spread American democracy abroad, especially by force, or by 'wars of peace', such as the Iraq and Afghanistan

wars.[721] They are also critical of the way neoconservatives are quick to label any opposition to them as ‘fascist’ or anti-Semitic. For example Thomas Fleming, editor of the paleoconservative magazine *Chronicles*, derisively writes that ‘an anti-Semite is anyone who uses the term neoconservative’.[722] Russell Kirk, who in a 1988 lecture at the Heritage Foundation said, ‘Not seldom has it seemed as if some eminent Neoconservatives mistook Tel Aviv for the capital of the United States’,[723] and was criticised for his comment by neoconservative Midge Decter, wife of Podhoretz and director of the Committee for a Free World, who claimed that Kirk’s remark was ‘a bloody outrage, a piece of anti-Semitism’.[724] Such labelling of the opposition, which also has been attached to such notable conservative figures as Buchanan and Kirk among many others, was criticized by Samuel Francis, a leading paleoconservative and political theorist, who wrote: The dedication of their neo-conservative enemies to driving them [paleoconservatives] out of the movement they have taken over and demonizing them as marginal and dangerous figures has no legitimate basis in reality. It is clear evidence of the ulterior aspirations of those behind neo-conservatism to dominate and subvert American conservatism from its original purposes and agenda and turn it to other purposes.[725]

Afterword

This is the first volume in a three-volume series. The following is a concise summary of what have been the main points so-far discussed and a few statements on what will be covered in the next two volumes.

Drawing most notably from the socialist ideas of Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, we began with an examination of the early twentieth-century European integration models of Pan-Europa, the United States of Europe, and Eurafrica and found that these early plans involved the joint exploitation, by Europe, of the resources and land of the African colonies; a new culturally united Europe led by a spiritual aristocracy (Judaism); and a new European identity stripped of its distinct ethnonational characteristics. At this time, the unification of Europe was perceived as the first step toward the eventual unity of humanity under a World Federation in perpetual peace and, by the mid twentieth century, this idea had garnered American intellectual and financial support.

After a discussion on the ongoing development of European unification as well as further integration with Africa in the initial post-WWII era, such as the founding of the Paneuropean Union, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Parliamentary Union, we then examined the history and influence of two international socialist ideologies on European integration in the twentieth century: Fabianism and cultural Marxism. We established that both ideologies have been integral to the progressive transformation of Europe into a denationalised and open European Union (including the promotion of Euro-Mediterranean integration); to the creation of the new European and

world citizen; and to the gradual development of a new world order based on cosmopolitan ideas of perpetual peace.

We came to understand that Fabian socialism advocates a non-violent step-by-step revolutionary transformation of established society towards a new world order that is exacted by changing the system from within, by infiltrating educational institutions, government agencies, and political parties, and initiated by the wealthy socialist classes. Like Fabianism, cultural Marxism is a bourgeois revolutionary ideology backed by capitalist forces (a socialist-capitalist alliance) that seeks the gradual gain of power via a destructive 'long march' through the existing institutions, the superstructure of Western Civilization. And, in contrast to economic Marxism, cultural Marxism relies on a coalition of Third World racial movements and New Left/New Class oppositional forces as their source of revolutionary change (new proletariat).

After a discussion on post-WWII international institutions, namely the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which established a new global order and effectively opened European nations to large-scale non-European immigration, we then examined certain developments and conflicts in the Middle East (i.e. the creation of Israel and Pan-Islamism) that had direct bearing on further intra-European integration and provided the geopolitical context for an additional integration model: Eurabia. Of particular focus was the 1970s oil crisis that triggered the formation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, a cultural, political, and economic cooperative partnership that promoted the importation of Muslim migrants and Islam into the European Union. We also analysed official documents from the 1980s into the twenty-first century regarding the further political and economic unification of Europe, including the 2016 EU Global Strategy for a centralised European superstate, and further developments in Eurafrican, Euro-Arab, and Euro-Mediterranean integration.

We then identified and critically examined four ideologies that have been essential to the creation of the present form of the European Union: cosmopolitanism, social liberalism, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism. After a brief overview of early cosmopolitan thought and the cosmopolitan ideals of Immanuel Kant, particularly his notion of a world federation in perpetual peace, we investigated contemporary cosmopolitanism. It was

ascertained that contemporary cosmopolitanism is a utopian ideology imposed by a small intellectual elite. It is an ideology that is: rooted in the Marxist fixation to transform the world according to socialist ideals and abstract universal values; does not comprehend the importance of historical, traditional, and particular forms of existence, especially communitarian or natural relations and loyalties (ancestral, territorial, ethnic, local, and cultural); and does not provide for a secure sense of belonging and identity.

Regarding the cosmopolitan ideology of Jürgen Habermas, we determined that he seeks to decouple European majority ethnic groups from their ethno-cultural political identities and institutions by promoting global mass-immigration into Europe; attempts to overturn national self-determination and the plurality of sovereign-states by universal principles of right; and insists that European nations must be transformed into ethnically diverse liberal democracies. And concerning the liberal multiculturalism of William Kymlicka, we found that on the one hand, he promotes minority group rights, while on the other, does not grant majority group rights for European ethnic groups.

Then, after a discussion of the main principles and ideals of classical or Enlightenment liberalism, we clarified that new or social liberalism had roots in the late nineteenth century, particularly in Marx’s theories of historical materialism and the end of capitalism, and arose proper in response to the 1930s Great Depression. We found that new liberals applied social science methods (social engineering) to make European societies more liberal and moral authority and judgments began to be understood through the lenses of relativism and emotivism. We then discussed neoliberalism; that it arose in the 1970s as a response to the failures of social liberalism and that its economic basis is deregulation, privatisation, and reduced funding for social services. We also examined both domestic and international level critiques of neoliberalism, including the transfer of political power from the political authority of the state to the economy and judiciary; the control of the economy, and by extension society and local politics, by corporations and a small wealthy elite; the debt and dependency that is incurred from the interventionist and coercive opening of foreign markets to the capitalist world economy; and the increasing power of transnational corporations and the international financial elite over the global economy and over life itself.

Finally, we then investigated classical conservatism; finding that it arose as a response to the universalism of liberal social development during the Enlightenment. Conservatives at this time were concerned with the progressive rationalisation of the human spirit, the emergence of bureaucratisation and tyranny from democracy and liberal despotism, and the moral vacuity, standardisation, and decadence arising from materialism and the conquest of all earthly things. Consulting three modern and contemporary conservative thinkers, Kieron O'Hara, Russell Kirk, and Keith Feiling, we then found that conservatives reject Enlightenment progress and liberal individualism because these ideologies are not ground in concrete historical experience, knowledge, or evidence-based policies, and tend towards mediocracy, despotism, and oligarchy. Conservatives instead emphasise practical reasoning, non-interventionism, human fallibility, natural differences, the limits of knowledge, the continuity of social institutions, the longevity of peoples as socially, historically, and politically bound human beings, and organic, gradual, and rigorously evaluated social change.

We then critically analysed the birth of neoconservatism in America after WWII. We found that the New York Intellectuals became first generation neoconservatives in the 1970s and 80s as a response to the failures of the New Deal reforms (Roosevelt), the Great Society programs (Lyndon B. Johnson), and the undermining influences of Frankfurt School social liberalism, and they supported limited government, the aggressive spread of neoliberal economic policies, and democratic foreign interventionism. We also determined that an intensified aggressive neoconservative foreign policy arose at the turn of the century that was associated with second generation neoconservatives. They influenced the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine. This Doctrine is rooted in Democratic Peace Theory and the notion of the 'end of history', and advocates pre-emptive war and the use of military might to achieve American global leadership, spread American freedom and democracy, and prevent any potential or actual rivals arising as a global superpower to challenge American hegemony. We then ended with a brief critique of neoconservatism, particularly in terms of its neoliberal economics, its pre-emptive military interventionism, its left-wing origins, its predominantly Jewish composition, and its devotion to the security of Israel at the expense of America.

Volume Two

Immigration, Islam, and the Migrant Crisis

With reference to experts and analysts, we begin Volume II with an account of the origin of Islam, the revival of political Islam in the twentieth century, militant Islamist movements such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, and the difference between violent, non-violent, and participationist Islamists. We then examine Islamist channels of operation in Europe and the proposition that Islamism represents a Gramscian counter-hegemonic ideology and movement against the power structures of the West. After this, we ascertain that immigration into Europe has been predominately from Muslim majority countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East since the 1960s, and analyse Muslim demographics in Europe, particularly for five key European countries: Belgium, the UK, France, Sweden, and Germany. Here, there is specific focus on educational levels, welfare consumption, unemployment rates, and penal statistics compared to national and other immigrant groups. There is also a discussion on the growth of Muslim enclaves and problem neighbourhoods, on Islamist organizations and political parties, and on Muslim radicalisation and European anti-radicalisation efforts.

After a statistical analysis that shows significant support for radical Islam by Muslims in Europe and a majority European opposition to Muslim enclaves, political Islam, and large-scale population changes brought about by global mass-immigration into Europe since at least the late 1980s, we then move on to an examination of illegal immigration into the EU, specifically the source countries and numbers, and the increasing use of the Mediterranean Sea for clandestine entry. Here, definitions of various aspects of Asylum Law are provided, recent violations of Dublin Regulation rules committed by irregular migrants, border officials, and EU elites are assessed, and the intentions, conditions, and deficiencies of the EU-Turkey agreement are investigated. Using demographic data of recent asylum seekers and first and second generation non-European immigrants, elite arguments that use the migrant crisis to solve economic and demographic issues in Europe are critically evaluated.

We then analyse irregular migrant arrivals to Europe in 2015/2016, specifically the source countries, numbers, and the various land and sea

routes. We clarify that the vast majority (over 90%) came from Muslim majority countries, many of which are safe or safe third countries and suggest that the European migrant crisis reflects a mass exodus of young Muslim men. In addition, issues with the identification of irregular migrants — the lack of identity documents, the purposeful discarding of papers, and the pervasive use of fake passports and other IDs — and their large-scale disappearance from their state-provided accommodations are critically discussed.

Next, we deliberate over three explanations, along with challenges to these accounts, as to why the overwhelming majority of irregular migrants to Europe in 2015/2016 were young Muslim males. The reasons are, briefly, 1) the journey to Europe is too dangerous for women and young children to make; 2) perceived economic opportunities in Europe; and 3) an Islamist invasion and/or Muslim demographic conquest. After this, we discuss how Muslim countries have responded to the migrant crisis, with a critical focus on Turkey. We determine that Turkey is a key American ally and central player to overthrow the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad while having an open-door policy for Syrian refugees and concomitantly being a central transition country for Syrian and other irregular migrants. We also demonstrate that Turkey uses asylum seekers as politico-economic weapons to blackmail Europe and that Turkish President Erdogan supports the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, as well as the recreation of the Ottoman Empire through conquest.

After consulting official reports, statements, and news articles to examine migrant crimes in various European nations, with particular focus on a new type of crime in Europe: mass-sexual assault, we then detail the actual and estimated costs of the migrant crisis in Europe: the types of economic costs for individual European nations; the financial costs for the European Union, including border controls and development, emergency and humanitarian aid, and international aid and funding to foreign countries, international organizations, and NGOs; costs on the environment, local businesses, and tourism; and various social and security costs for Europeans, such as the rise in terrorism, the safety of females (and males), civil unrest, and the increased possibility of civil war.

Finally, we critically examine and challenge the responses of the police, mainstream media, EU bureaucrats and other elites to the 2015 New Year’s

Eve mass-sexual assaults in Germany as well as mainstream elite responses to the November 2015 (Paris) and March 2016 (Brussels) terrorist attacks. We first investigate elite denials about the migrant character of the sex crimes in Germany, the blaming of the victims, the "Lying Press", the political censorship of media and police reporting, and examples of similar responses to migrant sex crimes in other countries, such as Sweden and Britain. And we also briefly analyse the consistent over-representation of foreign-born immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa in European rape statistics and assess how such crimes have led to behavioural changes in Europe. We then investigate various mainstream reports and statements on why Muslim radicalism and terrorism exist in Europe and examine the various integration and counter-radicalism efforts that have been implemented over the last decade. We examine why these costly strategies have failed, explaining that: a significant number of Muslim immigrants support Islamic fundamentalism and do not want to integrate; Muslim extremism is a global phenomenon found in Muslim and non-Muslim countries and targets Westernized-Muslims and non-Muslims alike; and a central motivating factor behind Muslim terrorism in Europe is revenge.

Volume Three

Critical Views

We begin Volume III with a critical evaluation of Muslim immigration, Islamism, multiculturalism, and Left-wing ideologies in the EU as presented by neoconservative authors Bat Ye'or, Melanie Phillips, and Bruce Bawer. We then critically refute some of their central arguments, including: the actions of Israel and America in relation to Islamic terrorism; American superiority and global hegemony; American assimilationism (liberal individualism and monoculturalism); an Israel-West neoconservative alliance against Islam and Leftism; the origins of European Leftism; ridding Europe of ethnonationalism; limited provision of details regarding how Islamism, non-European large-scale immigration, Leftism and the imposed white-guilt complex in Europe destroys the ethnic identity and well-being of Europeans; and the lack of discussion on pivotal

influences on post-WWII developments leading to Eurabia, such as Paneuropean socialism, Fabianism, and cultural Marxism.

Next, referring to international laws, rights, and other official documents, we define self-determination, discrimination, persecution, genocide, and indigenous rights and clarify the aim and basis of the European Union. In an effort of assessment, we then apply these laws, rights, and legal terms to various aspects of the EU cosmopolitan project. Consulting the research of several scholars and experts on demography and ethnicity, and using examples, the essential argument is that non-European immigrants with strong anti-European identities (Third World oppositionists and Islamists) are politically aligning with anti-European pro-immigrant open-border Leftists to elicit regime change in Europe. These groups, as well as EU elites (including neoconservatives), use immigration and the recent flows of irregular migrants into Europe, as well as discriminatory measures, hate propaganda, and exclusionary ideologies that condemn indigenous Europeans who oppose their goals, to negate and undermine European demographic majority rule and national homeland sovereignty. Such a project dismisses the will of European peoples, renders them as political and demographic minorities in their own homelands, increases the likelihood of civil war, and violates numerous international laws that serve to protect the rights of distinct ethnic peoples from any form of genocide.

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Alexander Wolfheze

Alba Rosa

Notes

[←1]
United Nations, *World Fertility Patterns*, 3.

[←2]

Mass-immigration and the EU project are ‘experiments’, per the declarations of their masterminds and those who support them, as cited in the body of this work. These creators and advocates perceive mass-immigration as a tool to ethnically mix European homogeneous populations for various reasons, including an attempt to end racism, ethnic conflict and intra-European national conflict, to separate nation from state, and to usher in a form of world governance.

[← 3]
Francis, ‘Why Race Matters.’

[← 4]
Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 15.

[← 5]
Kalergi, ‘A Parliament for Europe,’ 401.

[← 6]
Ibid, 401.

[← 7]
Rousseau, *A Project for Perpetual Peace*, 26.

[←8]
John T. Hamilton, *Security,* 203.

[←9]
Ellis, ‘Dualism and Progress in Kant and Nietzsche’.

[← 10]
Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*.

[← 12]
Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective,’ 377.

[← 13]
Ibid, 377.

[← 14]
Gusejnova, *European Elites*, 85.

[← 15]

In 2006 this prize was awarded to the President of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga; in 2010 it was awarded to Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel (recipient of the Charlemagne Prize in 2008); and in 2012 it was awarded to the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. See Herman Van Rompuy, ‘Acceptance Speech.’

[← 16]

See Chard (1964) Limited (GB); ‘Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi - Stock Editorial Photography’, *Depositphotos.com*; *Wikimedia*, s.v. ‘Plaque commemorating Count Richard Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi’, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gedenktafel_Richard_Coudenhove_Kalergi.jpg (accessed October 2014); *Wikipedia*, s.v. ‘Europa-Platz — Coudenhove-Kalergi in Klosterneuburg, Austria’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Nikolaus_von_Coudenhove-Kalergi#mediaviewer/File:E%C5%ADropo-placo_C-K.JPG (accessed October 2014); *Wikipedia*, s.v. ‘Coudenhove-Park at Hietzing, Vienna’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Nikolaus_von_Coudenhove-Kalergi#mediaviewer/File:Coudenhove-Park.Hofpavillon.U4hietzing.A.JPG (accessed October 2014).

[← 17]

See ePanEurope, ‘The PanEuropaean Union.’

[← 18]

Kalergi himself became a freemason at the Masonic Lodge Humanitas in the same year and place he founded the Paneuropean Movement (1922 Vienna), yet in 1926, after reaching several degrees, he left the lodge, supposedly to avoid criticism of his Paneuropean Movement being associated with freemasonry.

[← 19]

Gehler, ‘From Paneurope to the Single Currency,’ 275.

[← 20]

Kalergi campaigned by personally meeting with prospective members of the movement and conversing with them by letters, as well as through his written works.

[← 21]
Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective,’ 378.

[← 22]

See Tim *Chapman, The Congress of Vienna.*

[← 23]

Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. 'Concert of Europe,' https://www.britannica.com/event/Concert-of-Europe, (accessed October 2014).

[← 24]

See: Richard F. Hamilton, ‘The European Wars: 1815–1914,’ 45–91; Langhorne, *The Collapse of the Concert of Europe*.

[← 25]

Richard J. Evans, *Death in Hamburg*, 1; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. 'Franco-German War,' https://www.britannica.com/event/Franco-German-War (accessed October 2014).

[← 26]
See Robert C. Allen, ‘International Competition in Iron and Steel.’

[← 27]

The Columbia Encyclopedia, s.v. 'Triple Alliance and Triple Entente,' http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Triple_Alliance_and_Triple_Entente.aspx (accessed October 2014); Weitsman, 'The Franco-Russian Alliance.'

[← 28]

Wilson was also the author of the famous ‘fourteen points’, a statement of peace principles used to negotiate the end of World War One. See Lillian Goldman Law Library, ‘President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.’

[← 29]
David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*; Schmidt, ‘The League of Nations.’

[← 30]
Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa,’ 67.

[← 31]
Kalergi, ‘‘Pan-Europe’, 1923,’ 7–8.

[← 32]

As evidenced by the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1871, the French Revolution and the rise of French nationalism (late 1700s), the Ottoman siege of Vienna (1683) and the Great Turkish War (1683–1699), which the French used to attack southern Germany with a ‘scorched earth policy’ and burn and level as many as twenty villages and towns, the collapse of the Carolingian Empire and the resulting split of the Frankish state into France and Germany both ruled by Charlemagne’s grandsons, and Clovis I, the first French King to unite the Franks. See Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV*, 198.

[← 33]
Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa,’ 446.

[← 34]
Ibid, 444.

[← 35]

Ibid, 446.

[← 36]
Ebert, *Schriften, Aufzeichnungen, Reden*, 290, quoted in Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa,’ 446.

[← 37]
Nelson, ‘The “Black Horror on the Rhine”,’ 606–627.

[← 38]
Kalergi, ‘The Pan-European Outlook,’ 638.

[← 39]
Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa’, 70.

[← 40]

PanEuropa, ‘History: Pan-Europa,’; Kalergi, *Pan Europe*, 116, quoted in Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa’, 72.

[← 41]
Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa,’ 448.

[← 42]
Ibid, 448.

[← 43]
Kalergi, ‘The Pan-European Outlook,’ 639.

[← 44]
Ibid, 638–639.

[← 45]
Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa,’ 448.

[← 46]
Kalergi, ‘The Pan-European Outlook,’ 644.

[← 47]

Kalergi, *Pan Europe*, 94, quoted in Quincy Wright, ‘Pan-Europe, Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi,’ 634.

[← 48]
Kalergi, ‘The PanEuropean Outlook,’ 638–639, 644.

[← 49]
Ibid, 640–643, 648.

[← 50]
Ibid, 639.

[← 51]
Ibid, 651.

[← 52]

Brubaker, ‘Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany’; Brubaker, ‘Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State’, 379–407.

[← 53]
Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Collective Identities and Transnational Networks in Europe’.

[← 54]
Botz-Bornstein, ‘European Transfigurations,’ 569.

[← 55]
Ibid, 573.

[← 56]

Kalergi, *Practical Idealism*, 22–23. This translation has been kindly provided by Dr. Diemo Landgraf, Professor of German Studies at Acadia University. To note this citation is taken from Chapter 4, titled ‘Inzucht — Kreuzung’ or ‘Inbreeding-Crossing’. Original German text: ‘Der Mensch der fernen Zukunft wird Mischling sein. Die heutigen Rassen und Kasten werden der zunehmenden Überwindung von Raum, Zeit und Vorurteil zum Opfer fallen. Die eurasisch-negroide Zukunftsrasse, äußerlich der altägyptischen ähnlich, wird die Vielfalt der Völker durch eine Vielfalt der Persönlichkeiten ersetzen.’

[←57]
Botz-Bornstein, ‘European Transfigurations’, 571.

[← 58]
Kalergi, *Weltmacht Europa*, 75, quoted in Botz-Bornstein, ‘European Transfigurations’, 571.

[← 59]
Kalergi, *Europa Erwacht*, 251, quoted in Botz-Bornstein, ‘European Transfigurations’, 570.

[← 60]
Botz-Bornstein, ‘European Transfigurations’, 571.

[← 61]
Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective’, 378, 380.

[← 62]
Kalergi, ‘The Pan-European Outlook’, 645.

[← 63]
Gusejnova, *European Elites*, 95.

[← 64]
Kalergi, ‘The Pan-European Outlook’, 645.

[← 65]
Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa’, 72.

[← 66]
Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, 21–22.

[← 67]

Kalergi, *Practical Idealism*, 27–28. Translation by Landgraf. To note, this citation is taken from Chapter 5, titled ‘Heidnische und Christlich Mentalitat’ or ‘Pagan and Christian mentality’. Original German text: ‘Heute sind es weder die Zionisten noch die Christen, sondern die jüdischen Führer des Sozialismus: denn auch sie wollen, mit höchster Selbstverleugnung, die Erbsünde des Kapitalismus tilgen, die Meschen aus Unrecht, Gewalt und Knechtschaft erlösen und die entsühnte Welt in ein irdisches Paradies wandeln’ and ‘Charakterstärke verbunden mit Geistesschärfe prädestiniert den Juden in seinen hervorragendsten Exemplaren zum Führer urbaner Menschheit, zum Protagonisten des Kapitalisums wie der Revolution.’

[← 68]

Ibid, 32–33. Translation by Landgraf. To note, this citation is taken from Chapter 6, titled ‘Geistesherrschaft Statt Schwertherrschaft’ or ‘Mental Domination instead of Sword Domination’. Original German text: ‘Der Einfluß des Blutadels sinkt, der Einfluß des Geistesadels wächst. Diese Entwicklung, und damit das Chaos moderner Politik, wird erst dann ein Ende finden, bis eine geistige Aristokratie die Machtmittel der Gesellschaft: Pulver, Gold, Druckerschwarze an sich reißt und zum Segen der Allgemeinheit verwendet.’ This arrangement that Kalergi suggests is a contradiction, in that he advocated for an ethnically neutral European patriotism while at the same time promoted an ethnic-Jewish leadership.

[← 69]

Kalergi, ‘The Pan-European Outlook’, 651. What about other European countries that had no colonial possessions in Africa, countries such as Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Monaco, and Liechtenstein? How would they contribute to Pan-Europe without such a cementing factor of wealth and resources in Africa?

[← 70]
Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 448.

[← 71]
Botz-Bornstein, ‘European Transfigurations’, 565–567.

[← 72]

Kalergi, ‘The Pan-European Outlook’, 648. Communism has been responsible for up to 94 million deaths since its inception. See Stéphane Courtois et al., *The Black Book of Communism*; Matthew White, ‘Russian Civil War’.

[← 73]

Botz-Bornstein, ‘European Transfigurations’, 565–566, 568–569. Also see Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 449.

[← 74]
Botz-Bornstein, ‘European Transfigurations’, 567.

[← 75]
Ibid, 570.

[← 76]
Kalergi, ‘Afrika’, 5, quoted in Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 450.

[← 77]
Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 450.

[← 78]
Eley and Retallack, *Wilhelminism and Its Legacies*, 220, 232.

[← 79]
Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, ‘Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi’, 98.

[← 80]
Peterson, *Revoking the Moral Order*, 122.

[←81]
Aldrich, ‘OSS, CIA and European Unity’, 184.

[←82]
He and Aristide Briand received this prize in 1926 for reconciling France and Germany.

[←83]

Kalergi, ‘A Parliament for Europe’, 400.

[←84]
Villanueva, ‘Elusive “Object of Belonging”’, 68.

[←85]
Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective’, 380.

[←86]
Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, ‘Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi’, 96.

[←87]

Geißler, *Paneuropa in der deutschen Dichtung der Gegenwart*, 34, quoted in Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa’, 69.

[←88]
Orluc, ‘Caught Between Past and Future’, 114.

[←89]
Kalergi to Guido Manacorda, quoted in Orluc, ‘Caught Between Past and Future’, 114.

[← 90]

See Kaufman, *Germany Must Perish!*; Hooton, ‘Breed War Strain Out of Germans’; Morgenthau Jr., *Germany is our Problem.* The Hooton article suggested genetically transforming Germany by outbreeding and by settlement of Germany by non-German nationals.

[← 91]

This was the same University where Ludwig von Mises studied currency problems of the PEM and where several Frankfurt School members taught.

[← 92]
Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective,’ 379, 381.

[← 93]
Churchill, ‘Speech Delivered at the University of Zurich’.

[←94]

Ibid. The United Nations, which aims at the promotion of international cooperation, had been established on 24 October 1945 when its Charter, drafted and signed by representatives of fifty countries in June, was ratified by the main power countries in the world, such as China, France, the Soviet Union, the UK, the US, and other signatories. The United Nations pledged to follow the principles of the Atlantic Charter (Aug 14, 1941), which was drafted by Britain and America and signed by the Allies and set the goals for post-war development.

[← 95]
Kalergi, ‘A Parliament for Europe’, 399.

[←96]
Ibid, 400.

[← 97]

Wikipedia, s.v. ‘James Warburg before the Subcommittee on Revision of the United Nations Charter’, Washington D.C., 17 February 1950, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/James_Warburg_before_the_Subcommittee_on_Revision_of_the_United_Nations_Charter#We_shall_have_world_government.

[← 98]
Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa’, 69.

[← 99]
Gehler, ‘From Paneurope to the Single Currency’, 276.

[← 100]

Edward McWhinney, for example, who was a Canadian lawyer and professor of international law, wrote that post-WWII European integration was different from the ‘pan-European idealism’ of the interwar era regarding their ‘elaboration and drafting of an abstract constitutional charter’. McWhinney, *Self-Determination of Peoples*, x.

[← 101]
Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa’, 71.

[← 102]
Aldrich, ‘OSS, CIA and European Unity’, 284.

[← 103]
Kalergi, ‘The Pan-European Outlook’, 401.

[← 104]
Ibid, 401.

[← 105]

See Citizens for Europe, European Movement: International; Deschamps, ‘The International Committee of the Movements for European Unity’; Baimbridge, Whyman, and Mullen, ‘From Membership to Referendum’; Beddard, ‘The Background to the Convention.’

[← 106]
McWhinney, *Self-Determination of Peoples*, ix–xi.

[← 107]
Ibid, x.

[← 108]
Ibid, x–xi.

[← 109]
Such as Peter Coleman; see *The Liberal Conspiracy*.

[← 110]
Aldrich, ‘OSS, CIA and European Unity’, 185.

[← 111]
Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 452.

[← 112]
Ibid, 451.

[← 113]
Deighton, ‘Entente Neo-coloniale?’ 845.

[← 114]
See Marshall, ‘The Marshall Plan Speech’; Schain, *The Marshall Plan*.

[← 115]
Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 451.

[← 116]

Not to be confused with the European Council, an institution of the EU comprised of the heads of state or government of member states, the President of the European Commission, and the Council's president. The European Council was established informally in 1975 and was formalised in 2007 with the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon. It 'defines the EU's overall political direction and priorities' and 'sets the EU's policy agenda'. European Council presidency rotates among Member States. See European Council, 'European Council' and 'History of the European Council: Fifty Years of Summit Meetings', European Council.

[← 117]

Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 453. There were widespread concerns about massive population growth stimulated by such works as *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798) by Thomas Malthus, *Our Plundered Planet* (1948) by Fairfield Osborn, and *Road to Survival* (1948) by William Vogt, which influenced the seminal book, *The Population Bomb* (1969/1970) by Paul Ehrlich. There was also a feverish embrace of planned parenthood, the creation of Zero Population Growth Inc., and the rise of environmental movements that merged with feminism. Notwithstanding this, in the post-war era, Europe and Britain experienced what is familiarly known as a ‘baby boom’, a time of greatly increased birth rate. In Britain and France this phenomenon stretched nearly three decades (1946–1974); it came later, and for a shorter time, in Germany (1955–1967).

[← 118]
Hansen and Jonsson ‘Bringing Africa’, 454; Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 123.

[← 119]

The President of the European Commission is elected by European Parliament and is the highest officeholder in the EU, meaning he or she has the most powerful position akin to a Prime Minister or Head of State, but unlike these, the President of the EC does not have the power to raise taxes, command troops, or determine foreign policy. See Hix, *What's Wrong with the European Union,* 155.

[← 120]
Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective’, 381.

[← 121]
European Commission, *The Treaty of Rome*, 2.

[← 122]
Ibid, 2.

[← 123]

Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 454–455. Many members of European integration groups at the time were involved with the EEC, such as Alcide de Gasperi, who had pre-war links to the Peace and Paneuropean Movements, became the Prime Minister of Italy (1945–1953), and was a key figure in the emergence of the EEC, and Altiero Spinelli of the European Union of Federalists, who became EEC commissioner. See Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective’, 381.

[← 124]
Emile Noël, ‘*Discours de Guy Mollet 1956–58*’.

[← 125]
Ibid.

[← 126]
Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 460.

[← 127]
Davis, ‘Eurafrica and De Gaulle’s Constantine Plan.’

[← 128]

See Golder, ‘Freemasonry in British India 1728–1888’; *Freemasonry Today*, ‘The First Entente Cordiale’.

[← 129]
Mill, ‘Of Capital’, Chap III in *The Principles of Political Economy*.

[← 130]

See Pease, ‘The Foundations of the Society’.

[← 131]
Bevir, ‘British Socialism and American Romanticism’, 79; Spencer, *The Heretic’s Feast*, 283.

[← 132]
Pease, ‘The Foundations of the Society’.

[← 133]
Robert Sullivan, ‘Fabianism’.

[← 134]
Stormer, *None Dare Call It Treason*, 26.

[← 135]
The Fabian Society, ‘The Fabian Story’.

[← 136]
See Khayyam, ‘The Rubaiyat’, stanza XCIX.

[← 137]
Perdue, The War of All the People', *97.*

[← 138]
Pease, ‘The Early Days’.

[← 139]

The Fabian Society, *Why are the Many Poor?*

[← 140]

LSE Digital Library, ‘Fabian Society and Young Fabians’; *Encyclopedian Dictionary* (blog), ‘Fabian Society’, Encyclopedian.blogspot.ca, http://encyclopedian.blogspot.ca/2012/05/fabian-society.html. The Third International (1919–1943) became ‘a truly global, anti-colonialist project’; see Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective’, 377.

[← 141]
Wells, *Anticipations*, 276.

[← 142]
Ibid, 278.

[← 143]
Mackenzie and Mackenzie, *H.G. Wells*, 170.

[← 144]

Taunton, ‘H.G. Wells’s Politics’.

[← 145]
Archibald B. Roosevelt, introduction and epilogue, *The Great Deceit*, n.7.

[← 146]
Wells, *The World of William Clissold*.

[← 147]
Wells, *Open Conspiracy*, 59.

[← 148]
Wells, *The World of William Clissold*, Book the Fifth.

[← 149]
Ibid.

[← 150]

The Fabian Society, ‘The Fabian Story’.

[← 151]
Bolton, *Revolution from Above*, 102.

[← 152]

Wikipedia, s.v. ‘London School of Economics Gaddafi Links’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_School_of_Economics_Gaddafi_links#LSE_and_the_Monitor_Group (accessed May 2015) and London School of Economics. ‘A History of Philanthropic Support at LSE’.

[← 153]
Bolton, *Revolution from Above*, 102.

[← 154]
Wells, ‘The Envoy’.

[← 155]

Wikipedia, s.v. 'Intercollegiate Socialist Society', https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercollegiate_Socialist_Society (accessed June 2014).

[← 156]
Bolton, *Revolution from Above*, 112–113; Zygmund Dobbs, *Keynes at Harvard*.

[← 157]
Hilton et al., ‘Fabian Society’.

[← 158]
Ibid.

[← 159]

See Manuscript Collections of Africana; Fabian Society Archives, ‘Fabian Society’.

[← 160]

The Fabian Society, ‘The Fabian Story’.

[← 161]

Beveridge, ‘Social Insurance and Allied Services’.

[← 162]

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, s.v. 'Fabianism', 2008, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Fabianism.aspx (accessed June 2014).

[← 163]
See Gowland, ‘Financial Reform in the UK’.

[← 164]
The Fabian Society, ‘Members’.

[← 165]

The Fabian Society, ‘Famous Members’ and ‘The Fabian Story’.

[← 166]

Whitehead, ‘Labour Wanted Mass Immigration to Make UK More Multicultural, says Former Advisor’.

[← 167]
Garbaye, ‘Birmingham’, 91.

[← 168]
BBC News, ‘Blair Defines “British Values”’.

[← 169]
BBC, ‘Full Text of the Queen’s Jubilee Speech’.

[← 170]
Sargeant, ‘How Labour Turned London into a Foreign City’.

[← 171]
Whitehead, ‘Labour Wanted Mass Immigration’.

[← 172]
Mendick, ‘Tony Blair Accused of Conspiracy’; Morrison, ‘Tony Blair Let in 2Million Migrants’.

[← 173]
Miliband, ‘Europe 2030: Model Power Not Superpower’.

[← 174]

Memories of Karl Korsch: Interview with Hedda Korsch 1972’.

[← 175]
Renton, *Dissident Marxism,* 64.

[← 176]
Levitt, ‘Karl Korsch: A Review Essay’. 176.

[← 177]
Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School*, 11.

[← 178]
Carey, *Theonomy and Autonomy*, 68.

[← 179]
Jay Bernstein, *The Frankfurt School*, 45.

[← 180]
Renton, *Dissident Marxism*, 67.

[← 181]
Mattick, ‘The Marxism of Karl Korsch’.

[← 182]

G.B. Shaw as cited in Eric D. Butler, *The Fabian Socialist Contribution*, 11. See also National Economic Council, *Economic Council Letter,* 290; Marilynne Robinson, *Mother Country*, 119.

[← 183]
Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow*, 67–68.

[← 184]
Bean, ‘Nikolai Bukharin and the New Economic Policy’, 83.

[← 185]
See Dietrich, *Taboo Genocide*.

[← 186]

The estimated number of unnatural deaths during the Russian Civil Wars of 1917–1923 stands between 6 and 9 million; the estimated average number of unnatural deaths during the Stalin regime (1924–1953) stands at around 20 million. See Conquest, *The Great Terror;* White, 'Source List and Detailed Death Tolls'; *Conservapedia*, s.v. 'The Great Purge', Conservapedia.com, http://www.conservapedia.com/Great_Purge.

[← 187]

See Hollander, Political Pilgrims; Conservapedia, s.v. ‘George Bernard Shaw,’ http://www.conservapedia.com/George_Bernard_Shaw.

[← 188]
Mattick, ‘Karl Korsch’.

[← 189]
Mattick, ‘The Marxism of Karl Korsch’.

[← 190]
Levitt, ‘Karl Korsch’, 179–181.

[← 191]
The Frankfurt School, the Tavistock Institute, and the Pan-Europa Movement are interrelated.

[← 192]

Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 8.

[← 193]
Jay Bernstein, *The Frankfurt School*, 45.

[← 194]
Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 3–4.

[← 195]
Bill Lind, ‘What is Cultural Marxism?’ and ‘The Origins of Political Correctness’.

[← 196]
See Geifman, ‘Red Terror in Soviet Russia’.

[← 197]
See Borsanyi, *The Life of a Communist Revolutionary; New York Times*, ‘Execute Joseph Cserny’.

[← 198]
Lukács as cited in Buchanan, *The Death of the West*, 75. Also see Löwy, *Georg Lukács*, 93, 119, 151.

[← 199]
Borst, *The Scorpion and the Frog*, 106.

[← 200]
Poetschke, *Memoirs from the Turbulent Years and Beyond*, 582.

[← 201]

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. 'Georg [György] Lukács', November 4 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lukacs/#HisClaCon; Bill Lind, 'The Origins of Political Correctness'.

[← 202]

Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 41.

[← 203]

Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, note XI.

[← 204]
Bill Lind, ‘The Origins of Political Correctness’.

[← 205]

Raehn, ‘The Historical Roots of Political Correctness’. Raehn has an MA in International Affairs and founded the United States Global Strategy Council in 1981.

[← 206]
Buchanan, *The Death of the West*, 77.

[← 207]
Bolton, *Revolution from Above*, 105.

[← 208]
100 Years: The Rockefeller Foundation, ‘Refugee Scholar Program’.

[← 209]
Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, ix.

[← 210]
Bolton, *Revolution from Above*, 106; Hammer, *Adorno and the Political*, 62–63.

[← 211]
Raehn, ‘The Historical Roots of Political Correctness’.

[← 212]

Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, 229, 314, 370, 385.

[← 213]

Buchanan, ‘Demonising America’s Middle Class’.

[← 214]
Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi, ‘Correlation not Causation’, 34–51.

[← 215]
Kuhle, ‘Conservatism as a Mental Illness’.

[← 216]
Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi, ‘Erratum to “Correlation not Causation”’, E3–E4.

[← 217]
Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*.

[← 218]
Howson, *Challenging Hegemonic Masculinity*, 19.

[←219]
Ibid, 19.

[← 220]

Dutschke, ‘On Anti-Authoritarianism’, 249. Dutschke (1940–1979) was the leading spokesperson for the German student movement of the 1960s and was inspired by Gramsci and the Frankfurt School.

[← 221]
Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 49–50.

[←222]
Ibid, 239.

[←223]
Bolton, *Revolution from Above*, 106.

[← 224]
Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 17, 13.

[←225]
Kellner in Marcuse, *The New Left*, 17.

[← 226]
Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective’, 381–382.

[← 227]
Ibid, 382.

[← 228]
This term was coined by Gramsci; they were the American New Left and the European 68ers.

[← 229]
Kaufmann, ‘A Comparative-Historical Perspective’, 382–383.

[← 230]
Buchanan, *The Death of the West*, 80.

[← 231]
Committee on Un-American Activities, *Soviet Total War*, 347.

[← 232]
Bolton, *Revolution from Above*, 268.

[← 233]

Ibid, 268. An economic example of such a dialectic synthesis is ‘Third Way’ economics, as advocated by Fabian PM’s Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and the UK Fabian Labour government. This is an attempt to reconcile left- and right-wing politics through a synthesis of right-wing *economic* policies i.e. capitalism and left-wing *social* policies i.e. socialism. See Flavio Romano, *Clinton and Blair*.

[← 234]

Wells, ‘The Envoy’. Kalergi himself explained in 1925 that ‘The General Staff of both parties [capitalism and communism] is recruited from the *spiritual guide breed in Europe: Judaism*’, Kalergi, *Practical Idealism*, 33 (my emphasis). Translation by Landgraf. Original German text: ‘Der Generalstab beider Parteien rekrutiert sich aus der geistigen Führerrasse Europas: dem Judentum.’

[← 235]
Aquilion, ‘Extracts from Pierre de Villemarest’s book’.

[← 236]
Kymlicka, ‘The Canadian Model of Diversity’, 71–74.

[←237]
Banting and Kymlicka, ‘Canadian Multiculturalism’, 52 (my emphasis).

[← 238]
Forbes, ‘Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism’, 34.

[← 239]
However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Kalergi did envision a mixed race of the future.

[← 240]

Kalergi, *Pan Europe*, 162, quoted in Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa’, 74.

[← 241]
Kalergi, *Pan Europa,* 29, quoted in Villanueva, ‘Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa’, 75.

[← 242]
Lillian Goldman Law Library, ‘Atlantic Charter’.

[← 243]
Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 35.

[← 244]
Lens, *The Forging of the American Empire*, 327.

[← 245]
Young, ‘The Real Churchill’.

[← 246]
United Nations, ‘Declaration by United Nations’.

[← 247]

See Cairns, *Charter versus Federalism*, 23–26; Jacobson, *Rights Across Borders*, Chapters Two and Six.

[← 248]
See Bloomberg, ‘The French Algerians’; Fogarty, ‘Between Subjects and Citizens’.

[← 249]
Bouvier, ‘Vue d’ensemble’, 13.

[← 250]
See Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain.*

[← 251]

Germany, for example, signed bilaterial labour recruitment agreements with Italy in 1955 and Spain and Greece in 1960. See Shonick, ‘Politics, Culture, and Economics’, 719–736; Oezcan, ‘Germany: Immigration in Transition’; Kolinksky, ‘Non-German Minorities in German Society’, 79–80.

[← 252]

Temporary work permits were first set at two years, but this was extended in 1964 and family migration began at the same time. Instead of leaving after their set time of employment, many ‘guest workers’ stayed, brought over family members, and established Turkish diasporic communities in Germany.

[← 253]

See Akgündüz, *Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe*; Castles, ‘The Guests Who Stayed’, 517–534; Gottfried Volker, ‘Turkish Labour Migration to Germany’, 45–72.

[← 254]
Randall Hansen, *United Kingdom*, 2.

[← 255]
UK Parliament, ‘Commonwealth Immigrants’, Col. 161.

[← 256]
Dummett and Nicol, *Subjects, Citizens, Aliens, and Others*, 202–203.

[← 257]
National Archives, ‘Commonwealth Immigration Control and Legislation’.

[← 258]
Karner, *Ethnicity and Everyday Life*, 75.

[← 259]

Zionist founder Theodor Herzl pushed for a homeland after the Dreyfus Affair and established the First Zionist Congress in 1897, which founded the Zionist Organisation (1897–1960, renamed the World Zionist Organisation); then came the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the British Mandate for Palestine in 1923.

[← 260]

According to Tomer Kleinman, writing for the UCSB Oral History Project, the Holocaust was integral to the ‘founding and long term visibility of the State of Israel in three respects: The Holocaust motivated large numbers of immigrants to move to the new country, providing the necessary population; secondly, the Holocaust enabled Israel to pressure Germany into supplying the economic base necessary to build infrastructure and support those immigrants; and finally, the Holocaust swayed world opinion so that the United Nations approved the State of Israel in 1948’. See Kleinman, ‘Did the Holocaust Play a Role in the Establishment of the State of Israel?’

[← 261]
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘The Arab-Israeli War of 1948’.

[← 262]

The Canadian Encyclopedia, s.v. 'Suez Crisis', http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/suez-crisis/ (accessed June 2014).

[← 263]
US Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘The Suez Crisis, 1956’.

[← 264]
Guy Mollet as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 457.

[← 265]
Hansen and Jonsson, 457.

[← 266]
US Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘The Suez Crisis, 1956’.

[← 267]
As cited in Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa’, 456.

[← 268]
U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Doc. 232.

[← 269]

Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Khartoum Resolution’; Jewish Virtual Library, ‘Israel-Arab Peace Process: The Khartoum Resolutions’.

[← 270]
United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 242 (1967)*.

[← 271]
David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 323; see also Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 70.

[←272]
Ibid, 325.

[← 273]

Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social and Military History*, s.v. ‘Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’, (ABC-CLIO, 2008), 1: 752–754.

[← 274]
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, ‘Member Countries’ and ‘Our Mission’.

[←275]
See Tétreault, *The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries*.

[← 276]
Yergin, The Prize, 587–589; Leslie Hayward, ‘The Oil Weapon’.

[← 277]

Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe and one of the largest ports in the world and also happens to be considered the Islamic capital of Europe. See Sandro Magister, 'Eurabia Has a Capital: Rotterdam', *Chiesa News*, 19 May 2009, http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/1338480?eng=y.

[← 278]
David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 326.

[← 279]
Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue 1973–1978’, 108.

[← 280]
Ibid, 107–108.

[← 281]

This was the second official attempt by Europe (after the EC appeal on 13 October 1973 for ‘Suspension of Hostilities in the Middle East’) to involve itself in the Middle East peace process, which had hitherto been overseen by America, partly because the Suez Crisis had limited European influence in the region and partly because of the Soviet issue (Cold War). The Soviet Union was considered a threat to Western business interests in the Arab world and had provided arms to Egypt and Syria during the Yom Kippur War. See European Political Cooperation, ‘Statements of the Foreign Ministers and Other Documents, 1973’.

[← 282]
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘19 Declaration of the Arab Summit Conference at Algiers’.

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Willy Brandt became the head of the Socialist International in 1979, at a time when this organisation had become not just anti-colonialist and anti-nationalist, but also anti-Israeli and anti-American.

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Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 96; Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 53.

[← 285]
David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 326–328.

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Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 95–97.

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Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 70

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Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 97.

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Ibid, 95.

[← 290]
UK Parliament, ‘Energy Supplies’.

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Edward Heath as cited in Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 99.

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Sir Alec Douglas-Home as cited in Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue,’ 99–100, 107.

[← 293]
Henry Kissinger as cited in David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 327.

[← 294]
David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 327.

[← 295]
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[← 296]

The oil embargo was considered a ‘weapon’ because the control of oil was control over a vital commodity.

[← 297]
James Callaghan as cited in Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 100.

[← 298]
Henry Kissinger as cited in Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 97.

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Ibid, 101, 95–96.

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James Callaghan as cited in Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 102.

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David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 340–341.

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See Arab Inter-parliamentary Union, ‘Regional and International Activities’ and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), ‘Arab Inter-parliamentary Union’.

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European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA), ‘Euro-Arab Parliamentary Dialogue’.

[← 308]
Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 55.

[← 309]
Ehlermann, ‘The Institutional Context of EEC-Israel Economic Relations’, 215.

[← 310]
Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 64–66.

[← 311]
E.L.M. Volker, *Euro-Arab Cooperation*, 179, 188–189.

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Ye'or, *Eurabia*, 65. Because most of the foreign labourers that were recruited en masse by various European countries in the 1950s and 1960s were not citizens and were considered as 'temporary' workers who would eventually go home, they were denied various rights, including those associated with the labour market, residence, political participation, and social security. Once they began to be granted long-term residence their legal status changed and hence their access to national rights was improved. See Castles and Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration*, 70.

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See Bat Ye'or, 'Who Invented Eurabia?' *New English Review* (blog), 5 March 2012, http://www.newenglishreview.org/blog_direct_link.cfm/blog_id/41014. The term Eurabia is a portmanteau of Europe and Arabia. Although used for the title of the journal *Eurabia* in the 1970s, Bat Ye'or defined the concept in the early 2000s to mean the Islamisation and Arabisation of Europe.

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Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 63.

[← 315]
As cited in Ye'or, *Eurabia*, 64.

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The labour agreements were terminated in the 1970s because of high unemployment and economic issues generated by the oil crisis. However, the termination of these agreements amounted to the end of the recruitment of unskilled labourers rather than labourers as such, with ‘skilled’ non-European workers continuing to arrive in European nations. See Chapters 3 and Volume II.

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Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 67–68.

[← 318]
Ibid, 57.

[← 319]
Commission of the European Communities, *Fourth Meeting*, 2.

[← 320]
David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 337–338.

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Zakariah, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 107.

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Ibid, 97.

[← 323]
Soliman, ‘The Euro Med Partnership’, 4.

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David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 336.

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Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 82.

[← 326]
Ibid, 91, 271.

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See Hopwood, *Euro-Arab Dialogue*, 317–23.

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Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 91, 93, 83.

[← 329]
European Council, ‘Statement on the Middle East’, 93.

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Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 58.

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David Allen, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue’, 336.

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Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 95.

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Dumper, ‘Jerusalem’, 122.

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Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 84–85, 278.

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See *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. ‘Maastricht Treaty’. https://www.britannica.com/event/Maastricht-Treaty (accessed June 2014).

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See: EUR-Lex, *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union*, Part Two ‘Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union,’ article 20.

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See EUR-Lex, ‘Treaty of Maastricht on European Union’.

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See Gerbet, ‘The Second Pillar of the European Union’; EUR-Lex, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’; Gerbet, ‘The Third Pillar of the European Union’; European Council, ‘Justice and Home Affairs Council Configuration (JHA)’; Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 103.

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See ‘The Barcelona Process’ and International Labour Organization, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED)’.

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This makes global issues primary and national issues secondary. Think of the Club of Rome and their manufacturing an environmental threat.

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For example, between 6.9 and 8.8 million Germans (military and civilian) died during WWII, particularly at the hands of the Red Army and from the air-bombing by the British and the Americans, and it has been estimated that a further 11 million German civilians and POWs were murdered by Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Serbs and other 'allies' after WWII through ethnic cleansing, starvation, slave labour, and the mass-rape of German women, many of whom committed suicide in despair. Where is the constant public reminder of their guilt? See Wikipedia, s.v. 'World War II Casualties,' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties (accessed December 2015); The National WWII Museum, 'By the Numbers: World Wide Deaths'; and Keeling, Gruesome Harvest. Also see footnote 87, Chapter 1.2.

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Lillian Goldman Law Library, ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man — 1789’; Meacham, *Thomas Jefferson: President and Philosopher*, 131..

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